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ABSTRACT

"THE LAW WILL MAKE YOU SMART": LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS,
RIGHTS RHETORIC, A N D AFRICAN AM ERICAN IDENTITY FORMATION
IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1641-1855
by
Scott Hancock
U niversity of N e w Hampshire, Septem ber, 1999
In 1834, one o f the inform al leaders of Boston's black comm unity
rebuked a black defendant in court, declaring "the law w ill make you smart."
This dissertation un covers h o w African Am ericans in M assachusetts did
indeed become 'smart' through an ongoing engagem ent w ith the law for over
tw o hundred years. W hile the law could be oppressive, the accessibility o f the
legal system in M assachusetts enabled black w om en and m en, slave and free,
to learn to use the la w in efforts to exercise som e control over their daily
lives. In the deteriorating racial atmosphere during the first half of the
nineteenth century, the law rem ained one of the fe w arenas in w hich African
Americans had any h op e of experiencing the professed egalitarian ideals of
the new republic. But the law also instructed African Americans about the
value of establishing and m aintaining ind ividu al legal boundaries b etw een
them selves and others, black and white. Through their engagem ent w ith the
law , African A m ericans develop ed a legal consciousness that fostered a sense
o f them selves as auton om ou s individuals. A fter em ancipation, that legal
consciousness com bined w ith a legal rights id eology to help define w hat it
m eant to be African A m erican. That legal rights id eology eventually becam e
an integral part of free black identity w hen African Am erican leaders, w ho
had expressed little identification w ith the n ew nation in the first decades
after the American R evolution, began to explicitly identify black m en and
w om en as Am erican in response to attempts by som e w h ites to deny African
Americans an A m erican identity and citizenship. Black leaders anchored
their argument in the D eclaration of Independence and the Constitution, and
articulated a black identity defined in part by com m itm ent to achieving full
citizenship rights. W hen som e black Bostonians balked in that com m itm ent,
som e black leaders attem pted to define them as standing outside of the black
comm unity. What it m eant to be free, black, and A m erican, remained a
com plex and at tim es contentious issue com plicated by the evolution o f legal
consciousness and legal rights ideology.
ix
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Introduction

"The Law Will Make You Smart7: Legal Consciousness. Rights Rhetoric, and
African American Identity Formation in Massachusetts. 1641-1855

In 1834, Governor Riggins, the black 'governor' of Boston, publiclyrebuked one of his subordinates, W illiam Patterson, w ho had fallen to the
mercies of the formal legal system. As governor, Riggins occupied an
informal position of leadership w ithin the black community that had cultural
roots in N ew England extending back into at least the m iddle of the
eighteenth century. Black governors and kings, traditionally chosen by other
slaves and free blacks during Negro Election Day festivals, w ere often m en of
exceptional physical strength and stature, but also demonstrated leadership
ability befitting their role. In the nineteenth century, how ever, the
prominence of black kings and governors w as on the wane; Riggins, in fact,
m ay have been the last in a line of black rulers in Boston. Riggins did not
adm onish Patterson for any grievous crime. Patterson had sim ply gone out
and bought som e unlicensed liquor for a group of African Americans w ho
probably only sought momentary escape from the travails of a som etim es
difficult existence. Making up only about five percent of the population, and
livin g in a grow ing metropolis during an era of dim inishing opportunity for
and increased antipathy towards free people of color, black Bostonians had
good reason to desire escape, even if only temporary. But Patterson's mistake
w as not buying unlicensed liquor. H e had gone outside of the governor's
authority and m ade his purchase on a Sunday — Riggins rem inded him that

1
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"I always gets a gallon o f good spirit on Saturday night" —and thus drew the
ire of reform-minded city authorities. Riggins w ashed his hands of Patterson,
declaring "the law w ill m ake you smart."1
Riggins spoke as a man firmly ensconced in black culture and
community. He also spoke as a man well aware of the law's utility and
power. The law, he knew , could teach through discipline. The legal
consequences Patterson m ight suffer, likely a fine and several days in jail,
w ou ld hopefully teach him to think more carefully about transgressing the
informal authority the governor possessed w ithin the black com m unity.
Riggins' declaration also suggests how the law could make African Am ericans
'smart': by running afoul of the law, Patterson probably learned how to avoid
the law, but he also learned som ething about how the law and the court
worked. From experiences like this, he and other black Bostonians learned
h ow to use the law to their advantage as w ell as w hen to avoid it. A nd
finally, Riggins' public chastisem ent of Patterson in court suggests his ability
to work within the system . Whether or not Riggins brought the charge
against Patterson him self or only testified as a w itness is unclear, but his
rebuke was surely as m uch for the court's benefit as for Patterson's. R iggins
managed to use the law to cast him self as a black man who supported the
law 's function of m aintaining certain moral codes w hile rem inding his
subordinate of the price for overstepping his authority. That recasting o f self
in relation to the law likely had implications for Riggins' identity; it h eld the
potential to reinforce an im age of him self as a black man w ho could
som etim es use w hite institutions to his advantage.

1 Selections from the Court Reports originally published in the Boston Morning Post, from 1834
to 1837 (Boston: Otis, Broaders, & Co. 1837), 173-174.

2
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This dissertation tells the story of African Americans7 engagem ent with
the legal system in M assachusetts from 1641 to 1855 and the consequences of
that engagem ent for African A m erican identity. Because the M assachusetts
legal system remained accessible to enslaved and free black w om en and men,
African Americans gained a legal consciousness that shaped black identity
form ation. This process began in the seventeenth century w ith ordinary
black folk like Zippora, a slave w om an acquitted of infanticide in 1663, and
the tw o slave w om en w hose testim ony, along w ith Zippora7s o w n account,
contributed to her exoneration. In the South, black testim ony w ou ld soon be
virtually m eaningless, but in M assachusetts, black testimony carried legal
w eigh t throughout the colonial era. All three black w om en gained som e
insight into h ow the law w orked in N e w England. The seeds o f legal
consciousness w ere planted early on.
The evolution of legal consciousness and its role in African American
identity form ation began soon after Africans came to the shores o f
M assachusetts. Chapter One sets that engagem ent within the unique context
of Puritan law and documents the ability of enslaved and free black wom en
and m en to use the law in M assachusetts. The law, along w ith other social
and cultural interactions, played a role in the transition of an African identity
to an African American identity. Chapter Two relates the story o f free black
Am ericans like Chloe and Cesar Spear, w h o bought a house in 1798 w ith an
eye tow ards im proving their financial standing. African Am ericans began to
acquire property in increasing num bers as they attempted to carve out a life
for them selves in the young republic. Becom ing property ow ners entailed
sign in g a deed, which established legal boundaries and contributed to an
aw areness of h ow to use the law . It also entailed becoming subject to a host of
city regulations in a growing early nineteenth century urban area. The Spears

3
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and other African Americans experienced both the benefits of the pow er of
the law and its concomitant restrictions. Chapter Two also carries the story
into the nineteenth century and points to the significance of conflict w ithin
the black com m unity. With the erosion o f the black festivals and their
judicial function w ithin the black com m unity, free people of color turned to
the law in increasing numbers to m anage conflict w ith white and black
Bostonians. That heightened awareness o f the law 's utility, how ever, also
affected black identity. A likely consequence of their court involvem ent w as
the inculcation of h ow one's rights as a citizen worked on a practical,
personal, day-to-day level, and blacks' acceptance of the law's role in ordering
their lives. Chapter Three traces African Americans' continued use of the
lower courts despite a new court system installed by reform-minded city
officials after the incorporation of Boston in 1822. During the antebellum era,
a time of increased racial antipathy, African Americans' legal consciousness
continued to be informed by a variety o f encounters with the law, and they
continued to demonstrate a know ledge o f and belief in the law's utility. But
the increased hostility, combined w ith black Bostonians' steady court
appearances, drew the attention of new spaper reporters, who began to
regularly lam poon black litigants. The court reports made black litigants into
public performers and contributed to a racist caricature, paralleling the rise of
minstrel sh ow s.
The fourth and fifth chapters shift the focus to the impact of black
leaders' rights rhetoric on black identity. Sparked largely by the abolition of
the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization movement nearly a
decade later, black leaders began explicitly defining free people of color as
Americans. Forming a key part o f the foundation of their definition w as the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The legal consciousness

4
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of black leaders manifested itself in a belief that the law, based on the
Constitution, was and should be able to protect and prosper African
Americans. A legal rights ideology — the belief that legal rights should reflect
and aid the aims and needs of African Americans — became an integral part of
black identity. As Chapter Five demonstrates, an incorporation of fighting for
rights within black identity led to acrimonious disputes within the black
community. When one group of black Bostonians, w ho preferred to avoid
rather than fight certain kinds of discrimination, decided to try and keep th e
city's black school open, black integrationists attempted to define them as
traitors to their race and country. The black separatists viewed the law as a
m eans of protecting them selves from w hite interference in their lives,
whereas integrationist-minded m embers of the community w ielded their
legal consciousness to identify denied rights, and claim them by negating the
'rights' of white and black Bostonians to maintain any separate black school.
The definition and usage of the term 'legal consciousness' in these
pages is best encapsulated by Michael Grossberg's description of legal
consciousness as a "conscious sense of legal entitlement that encourages
individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about their status,
rights, duties, and problems."2 Unpacking the key terms of Grossberg's
definition helps elaborate how the term is used here. First, legal
consciousness is conscious. It does not operate on som e subliminal level, bu t
is an awareness informed through experience, whether that experience is
personal, vicarious, or com m unicated through others. Legal consciousness is
an informed, though varied, awareness of the presence of the law's pow er
and function.
2 Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in
Antebellum America (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.

5
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Second, legal consciousness in v o lv es a sense of legal entitlem ent.
Legal consciousness entails the sense that individuals or groups should be
able to use the law , and, I would add, that to som e extent the law exists for
their use and their benefit. Individuals or groups w ho possess a legal
consciousness m ay simultaneously perceive the law as beneficial, deficient, or
oppressive, because the law is not m onolithic. D avid Walker expressed this
in 1829 w h en h e complained that black property owners were rarely able to
pass on their property to their heirs. W henever a black property ow ner in
Boston died, W alker claimed that the real estate "most generally falls into the
hands of som e w h ite person."3 Walker surely understood that the law
required that creditors be satisfied, but h e apparently believed that w hites
som ehow exploited the situation to deprive black families of their
inheritances. In this case, he believed the law to be deficient in its perceived
inability to protect black families.
But his protest indicates how he b elieved the law should function.
And the experience of many black property ow ners in M assachusetts belied
Walker's protest. African American w id o w s kn ew they could petition the
court for an allow ance and a dower, and thus obtain legal protection of a
portion of the inheritance from creditors. Abel Barbadoes, a black property
owner w h o d ied in 1820 in Boston, left h is property to his wife, w h o m anaged
to keep it and eventually passed it on to her children. Peter H oward, a black
barber w hose shop w as frequented by black and w hite abolitionists and w ho
probably knew Walker, bought property in 1822 on Poplar Street for $1400,
lived there for 32 years, and then d eeded the property to his sons for $1 and

3 David Walker, David Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together xvith a Preamble, to the
Coloured Citizens o f the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those o f the United
States of America (Boston:1829), 10.

6
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"considerations." Even families in danger o f losin g their property were
som etim es able to devise strategies to keep property by exploiting ties w ithin
the black com m unity.

Thomas and Margaret Revaleon bought property near

Boston late in life. In 1831, their house w as u p for auction due to a tax debt,
but the Revaleons m anaged to have it sold to their son-in-law, Peter H oward.
H ow ard eventually sold the house back to the Robert Revaleon, with the
understanding that Robert w ou ld take care o f Margaret, his mother.4 The
ability of these and other fa m ilie s to u se probate law s reinforced the
conception of legal entitlement, that the law should be usable and beneficial.
W hen the law w as not usable or beneficial — for there were surely cases that
substantiated Walker's criticism — African Am ericans did not necessarily
perceive the law as useless, but in need of rem edy.
Finally, the conscious sense of legal entitlem ent encourages people to
use legal beliefs. Legal beliefs are perceptions of h ow the law does or should

work, perceptions based on personal experience, on information passed
through the neighborhood, or by watching w h at happens to others w ho
encounter the law . Legal beliefs may be inaccurate and still be effective, or at
least perceived by those em ploying legal beliefs to be effective. Historian
H endrick Hartog has pointed out that p eop le m ay som etim es be "objectively
wrong...about w hat public institutions w o u ld actually do" in certain
situations. Nevertheless, people's "legal assertions and claims are
important...not for their truth as law, but for their roles in giving m eaning to
actions." In 1701 a slave named Adam believed he had a legal basis for
4 Carol Bulchalter Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston: An Analysis of Probate
Records (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 3-4; Franklin A Dorman, Twenty Families of
Color in Massachusetts, 1742-1998 (Boston: N ew England Historic Genealogical Society, 1998),
2-3,144, 365-366; on Peter Howard and his barber shop, see James Oliver Horton and Lois E.
H orton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North ( N e w
York: Holm es and Meier, 1979), 37.
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becoming a free man. As Chapter One docum ents, his belief informed his
actions for tw o years, despite repeated legal setbacks during his pursuit of legal
freedom. In 1837, w h en black Bostonians John and Sophia Robinson
kidnapped a y o u n g black girl from a w hite fam ily w ho they believed intended
to sell her back into slavery, their actions w ere informed by their
understanding of the law and by a similar previous case. Though the court
informed them their interpretation of the law w as wrong, their
understanding of the law continued to inform their actions.5
On other occasions, legal beliefs can be em ployed w ithout ever actually
formally engaging the law. Legal beliefs include perceptions of h ow law can
work in life outsid e the legal system as w ell as in it. Chapter Two documents
black Bostonians' zealous use of a justice of the peace court in the early
nineteenth century. M any of them probably used the threat of litigation to
intimidate irritating neighbors or would-be assailants. The group of black
Bostonians w h o set up the African H um ane Society in 1818 m ade sure to
include a by-law that authorized the directors to act as a court w ith the power
to try members suspected of violating any of the Society's rules. African
Americans understood the value of infusing certain situations w ith the
authority of the law.
It is these three key concepts working in conjunction that define legal
consciousness. It is a cognizance of how the law works, coupled w ith some
expectation of the law as useful and potentially beneficial, and the actual
employm ent o f that know ledge and expectation, whether in attempts to gain
rights, change one's status, or sim ply to m anage neighborhood conflicts.

5 Hendrick Hartog, "Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married Woman's Consciousness," in
Law in Everyday Life, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1993), 69.
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To som e extent, this differs from how som e legal scholars employ the
term. Austin Sarat, for instance, calls legal consciousness "a consciousness of
power and dom ination... and a consciousness of resistance." H e examines
how individuals enm eshed in the m odem welfare system attempt to
navigate through the terrain of legal rules and practices of bureaucracy. Sarat
concludes that the w elfare poor experience and understand the law as
"grounded in the realities of a society in which race, wealth, and power
matter, and law is neither m ore nor less useful because it does not transcend
or transform the w orld as they know it."6 African Am ericans in
Massachusetts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not
ignorant of the relevance of race, wealth, and power, but did perceive the law
as a tool that could be u sed to make a difference in their world. The law was
one of the few forms o f pow er available to them in an increasingly racist and
hostile environment. Black leaders in antebellum M assachusetts and
throughout the North dem onstrated their belief in the law 's utility w hen
they resorted to a rights rhetoric based on the Constitution to assert their legal
standing as citizens, an d called Americans to live up to the both the law s and
spirit of the Constitution.
This divergence in the legal consciousness of free people of color and
the people of Sarat's stu d y points to the difficulty of talking about legal
consdousness. Sarat7s definition of legal consdousness is applicable to the
particular group of p eo p le in the spedfic context of the m od em welfare
bureaucracy. In fact, that is a key part of his argument: Sarat condudes that
"legal consdousness is, like law itself, polyvocal, contingent and variable."
Even within the welfare poor, legal consdousness varies. Legal scholars
6 Austin Sarat, " '...The Law Is All Over': Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor," Yale Journal o f Law and the Humanities 2 (Summer 1990), 344 and 359.

9
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Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey define legal consciousness as "the w ays in
w hich people make sense of law and legal institutions." But, like Sarat, they
argue that "consciousness is neither fixed, stable, unitary, nor consistent.
Instead, w e see legal consciousness as som ething local, contextual, pluralistic,
filled w ith conflict and contradiction."7
But, even considering the variation of legal consciousness, "it has
shape and pattern." Part of the shape and pattern, according to Ewick and
Silbey, is people's "tactical engagem ent" w ith the law. Tactics involve the use
of legal beliefs to discern h ow to resist the institutional pow er o f the law and
the courts. Resistance does n o t typically mean criminal activity; it is the
ability to exploit the w eak links in the law in order to use it, avoid it, or work
w ithin it to achieve one's goals. For instance, w hen a black m an in colonial
M assachusetts was arrested for not carrying a lit lantern, he shrew dly pointed
out that the town ordinance m erely stated that blacks, m ulattos, and Indians
w ere required to carry a lantern after dark. Nowhere did it m ention that the
lantern had to be lit. The selectm en's intention had clearly been to require
any black man or wom an w h o w as ou t at night to be easily visible. This black
man, how ever, went out repeatedly at night and m anaged to escape
prosecution because of a w eak link in the law. In the antebellum era, black
leaders used a rights rhetoric to challenge segregation — they em ployed legal
beliefs about rights and the Constitution to challenge w hat they considered to
be an unjust law. In both cases, African Americans used the law against itself
to achieve their goals.8

7 Sarat, 375; Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An
Account of Legal Consciousness," New England Law Review 26 (Spring, 1992), 734 and 742.
8 Ewick and Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance," 742; Edward H. Savage, A
Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, from 1631 to 1865; Together with the
Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or Boston by Daylight and Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 33;
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Like these exam ples, much of the legal scholarship dealing w ith the
late twentieth century casts individuals' use of tactics within an adversarial
relationship w ith law . People w ield their legal consciousness in a sort of
sparring m atch w ith the law to achieve certain goals or to protect them selves
from the law. T hough that kind of relationship characterizes som e o f the
stories in this dissertation, the argum ent here is that African Americans'
engagem ent w ith the law was not alw ays adversarial. Because African
Americans did n o t perceive the law as w h o lly hostile or useless, their
conscious sense o f legal entitlement encouraged them to use the law in their
everyday lives. For them, the law w as n o t always an institution to be resisted.
A t times, it w as an effective ally. And frequently, African Americans found
the law useful for regulating their relationships and conflicts w ith one
another.

The calls of historians of pre-Civil War black America to push into the
relatively unbroken territory of conflict w ithin African America fueled much
of this dissertation. Over a decade ago, N ell Irvin Painter succinctly issued a
sum m ons to turn over this new ground by getting historians to
transcend the w eigh t of stereotype and to bravely investigate black life
fully, even w h en the evidence sh ow s angry, violent, disorderly black
people. After all, anger, violence, and disorder are thoroughly
hum an em otions and actions. By sanitizing blacks w ho lived in the
past, historians m ake them less com plete human beings.9

A Report o f the Record Cotnissioners of the C ity o f Boston, containing the Selectmen's Minutes
from 1769 to April, 1775 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1893), November 9 1769.
9 N ell Irvin Painter, "Comment" in The State o f Afro-American History: Past, Present, and
Future (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1986), 88. Painter's "Comment" was in response to
an essay in The State o f Afro-American History b y Arm istead L. Robinson, "The Difference
Freedom Made: The Emancipation of Afro-Americans," 51-74.

11
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There is no shame in acknowledging the reality of the ugly sides of the lives
of an oppressed people, even w hen that ugliness grew of their own volition.
That individual Africans and African Americans often chose to indulge in
petty, selfish, even vicious behavior is no surprise, but perhaps due to a fear
of supplying political ideologues with weapons for hurling charges of black
inferiority, or a fear o f enabling those same ideologu es to absolve themselves
of individual, corporate, and institutional responsibility, historians have
devoted scant attention to black misbehavior except w h en cast as a form of
resistance.
Slighting any aspect of African Americans' history, however, means
missing opportunities to explore causes, ’meaning, and consequences of
events in black peoples' lives. It means m issing the choices they made.
Evelyn Brooks H igginbotham pointed to this w h en she commented that the
powerful rubrics of race and gender not only obscure important distinctions
in antebellum gender constructions, but also m ask significant differences
along class and gender lines within black com m unities.

Higginbotham also

argued that the term 'race' has superimposed "a 'natural' unity over a
plethora of historical, socioeconomic, and ideological differences" among
African Americans. Furthermore, race, "as the sign of cultural identity has
been neither a coherent or static concept among African Americans."10 For
nineteenth-century African Americans, and tw entieth-century historians, the
term 'race' typically signified the kind of cultural, social, and experiential
common ground u p on w hich slaves and free black w om en and men had
trod. The term also tended to homogenize African Americans and the terrain
they traversed. That com m on ground w as frequently uneven, and African
10 Evelyn Brooks H igginbotham , "African-American W omen's History and the Metalanguage
of Race," Signs 17 (Winter 1992), 270.
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Americans often walked different and sometimes diverging paths. This
dissertation tracks som e of those paths and how they helped outline black
identity in the north.
Other scholars, including Gary Nash, James Oliver H orton and Lois E.
Horton, Shane White, and Clarence Walker, along w ith Painter and
Higginbotham, have all called for more scholarship that unpacks the
meaning of fractures in black comm unities.11 Few have answ ered the call.
This dissertation uses those fractures as an entry point, and legal actions as an
analytical tool, to uncover im portant elements of ind ividu al and corporate
identity formation. Africans became African American n o t only in
opposition to w h ite people, but also through countless interactions w ith one
another. M any of those interactions took place in the legal realm.
This dissertation exam ines how black w om en and m en became African
Americans by exam ining a trajectory of identity formation in one locale,
namely Boston, from the seventeenth century to the eve of the Civil War.
How and w h y northern slaves and their descendants eventually formed an
identity defined by national boundaries has been insufficiently explored.
Many African Americans w ere attracted to the potential o f the Revolution.
There w as a disjunction, how ever, between the prom ise o f the Revolution
and the life experiences o f black people: black folks knew that m any whites
view ed them in a less than favorable light, and it is doubtful that all black
wom en and m en assum ed that white prejudices w ou ld easily dissipate in

11 James Oliver Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American Community
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The
Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1988); Clarence Walker, Deromanticizing Black History: Critical Essays and
Reappraisals (Knoxville: U niversity of Tennessee Press, 1991); Shane W hite, Somewhat More
Independent; The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810 (Athens: U niversity of Georgia
Press, 1991).
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revolutionary fervor. The vestiges of an African w orldview that taught
Africans about life's uncertainties, com bined w ith their ow n experience of
white (and black) duplicity, w ould have rem inded them that things are often
not what they seem . The assumption, then, that slaves and ex-slaves accepted
the Revolutionary rhetoric at face value and subsequently identified
them selves w ith a n e w country that had b een the site of their exploitation for
over a century need s to be interrogated on tw o counts: first, by exam ining
w hat processes m ay have been at work to facilitate black people's accepting
membership in this n ew country; and second, by questioning if the process
w as complete at the establishment of the U nited States of America.
On the first count, this dissertation explores how engagem ent w ith a
central social institution, the law, contributed to African Americans
exchanging an identity forged in slavery for an identity forged in freedom.
William Piersen has demonstrated h ow N e w England slaves' incorporation
into white fam ilies exposed them to 'Yankee' habits of m ind and work,
which helped sh aped eighteenth-century Africans into African Am ericans.12
I argue that interacting w ith the law in a variety of forums for over a hundred
years before the R evolution was also an integral part of shaping an identity
that facilitated enslaved and free blacks accepting a conception of them selves
as African and Am erican.
On the second count, this dissertation argues that after em ancipation in
Massachusetts during the 1780s, African Am ericans' engagem ent w ith the law
accelerated from that point and throughout the Early Republic era.
H eightened interaction w ith the law am ong black peoples of all ranks thus
continued to shape black identity in the n ew nation. African Am erican
12 William D. Piersen, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in
eighteenth Century New England (Amherst: U niversity o f Massachusetts Press, 1988).
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identity w as not a fa it accompli after emancipation, but an ongoing process of
negotiation and contestation between black and w h ite peoples, between black
peoples and social institutions, and among African Americans them selves as
they frequently w ield ed the law and notions about the law against one
another as w ell as w hite citizens.
A host of cross-cultural influences shaped African American identity.
Ira Berlin, Mechal Sobel, and William Piersen and others have revealed a
good deal of the eighteenth-century process of transformation through labor,
culture, and social exchanges; Albert Raboteau, Jon Butler, Betty W ood and
Sylvia Frey have done likew ise in the area of religion.13 This study
complements that historiography by tracing black interaction w ith a
pervasive and central institution of colonial and Am erican society, the law,
and how that interaction shaped African American identity.
The law rem ained one arena in which African Americans in
Massachusetts stood som e chance of contesting w ith w hites on a relatively
level playing field and an arena that remained accessible. This made
emotional and mental investm ent in the legal system all the more attractive.
The law came to play an important role as African Americans turned to the
legal system for redress w h en other avenues were grow ing more restricted.
Economic advancem ent w as difficult, political advancem ent nearly
impossible, but legal success w as realistic. Black Bostonians knew this from

13 Ira Berlin, M any Thousands Gone: The First Tzoo Centuries of Slavery in North America
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1998); Mechal Sobel, The World They Made
Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987); Piersen, Black Yankees; Syliva R. Frey and Betty Wood, Come
Shouting to Zion: African American Protestantism in the American South and British
Caribbean to 1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Jon Butler, Awash
in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press,
1990); Albert Raboteau, Slave Religion: The "Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South
(N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
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personal experiences of having their testimony m atter in court, signing deeds,
having w ills validated, using justice of the peace courts, and succeeding in
appeals to higher courts. In short, the law m ade a real difference in their lives
for nearly tw o hundred years.14
This argument contributes a historical perspective to an ongoing debate
in another discipline. W ithin the law and society field, critical legal studies
scholars have raised intriguing questions challenging the notion that rights
and a rights discourse are effective tools for w eakening w hite hegemony.
These scholars argue that rights talk merely stifles challenge. In response,
critical race theorists, w hile acknowledging the potential that a rights
discourse can be muted, have argued that legal consciousness and rights do
matter in a variety of w ays and can indeed be w ield ed to mount effective
challenges. After examining the historical evid en ce of African Americans'
ability to frequently "harness the power of the law ," this dissertation comes
dow n on the side of the critical race theorists.15
This dissertation speaks to two related areas in the law and sotiety field.
The first involves the degree to which litigants' court experience reinforces or
sustains hegemony. Douglas Hay and E. P. Thom pson have argued for an
understanding of law as an ideology w ielded to m aintain hegemony. But

14 Gary Nash and Shane White both document the w orsening conditions for northern African
Americans during the Early Republic era. See Gary Nash, Forging Freedom; and Shane
White, Somewhat More Independent; and " 'It Was a Proud D ay': African Americans,
Festivals, and Parades in the North, 1741 - 1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1984)
13-50.
15 For two seminal artides outlining critical race theory, see Patricia J. Williams, "Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review 22 (Spring 1987) 401-433; and Kimberle W illiams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrim ination Law," Harvard Law
Revieiu 101 (May 1988) 1331-1382. The phrase "harness the p ow er of the law" is taken from
Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-class
Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 180.
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Thompson, and to a lesser extent Hay, note that the la w w as often contested
ground betw een the ruled and the rulers. Thompson sees the law as an arena
of conflict, in which the ruling class usually has the upper hand, but in order
to m aintain an advantage they have to ascribe to the la w a certain amount of
real justice and impartiality. This in turn limits the pow er of ruling classes
and to som e extent protects the com m on man. Im buing the law with som e
real justice can even provide a m eans to attack hegem ony - though it also can
stifle rebellion. Instrumentally, the law is used by the ruling class and thereby
serves existing class relations; ideologically, the law transcends class relations
and possesses at least the potential to have a real im pact on social relations.
The dom inant groups continually strive to m inim ize that potential, w hile
subordinate groups persistently w ork at maximizing that potential.16
Radical challenges can be m uted through transm ission of the norms of
social control articulated by the courts. Marc Galanter has argued that
litigants 'carry' back the values and norms of the legal culture to their
com m unities as they use it to gain leverage over their neighborhood
antagonists or merely through relating what happened to them in court.
Sally Engle Merry and others have complicated this picture of hegemonic
dom inance b y arguing that by m aking the court accessible for ordinary folk to
litigate grievances, the law cannot hide all the cracks in the armor: litigants
learn h ow to manipulate the system to their ow n advantage, they learn
w here the law breaks dow n, and they learn the limits of the courts' reach. But
they do absorb and become subject in varying degrees to the social control
m echanism s of the court. Merry sees "a continuing struggle" between

16 D ouglas H ay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law" in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (N ew York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 3-64; E. P.
Thom pson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (N ew York, Pantheon Books, 1975).

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subordinate groups seeking to "harness the pow er of the law" and the pow er
of the law to reinforce hegem ony. M y argum ent aligns with Merry's. African
Americans w ere clearly a subordinate group, b u t w ere able to 'harness the
power of the law '.17 D oin g so meant gaining som e control over their lives
while sim ultaneously sacrificing a kind of cultural autonom y that existed to
varying degrees under slavery. It also m eant that black identity w ou ld be
informed by the law , w h ich would influence the language and m ethod of
challenges to society's oppression of black America.
Rights rhetoric becam e a primary language for challenging oppression.
Hendrick Hartog poin ts out that the developm ent o f rights consciousness
potentially lim its the effectiveness or range of challenges to accepted
conventions. The critical legal studies m ovem en t believes that the term
'rights' effectively lim its the challenges of subordinate groups, frequently
because in the A m erican context of liberal individualism rights stresses
individual rights at the expense of group rights and needs. Some in the CLS
school argue that a 'rights' discourse should be discarded and the discourse
should instead be govern ed by needs. By conceptualizing their challenges in
the acceptable language of 'rights', the potential of fundamental change that
might threaten existin g relations of pow er has been safely channeled into a
discourse about constitutional rights.18
The evolu tion of legal consciousness and the incorporation of a legal
rights ideology that stressed individual rights into black identity m ay have
17 Marc Galanter, "The Radiating Effects of the Courts" in Empirical Theories about Courts, ed.
Keith O. Boyum and Lynn Mather (New York: Longman, 1983), 117-142; Sally Engle Merry,
Getting Justice and G etting Even, 180.
18 See Hendrick H artog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us
AH'" Journal of American History 74 (December 1987), 1013-1034; Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty,
and the Law: Trade U n ionism and the Problem of the Am erican Constitutional Order," Journal
of American History 74 (Decem ber 1987), 904-925.
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indeed eventually lim ited black challenges by underm ining the possibility of
constructing legal challenges based on group rights and needs. But legal
consciousness and legal rights ideology also em pow ered black citizens. This
type of trade-off in the experience of African Americans in Massachusetts
suggests further am biguity within black identity and experience. But the
historical evidence indicates that having, claiming, and using rights had
tangible and intangible m eaning in the lives of black Americans; the
confidence that the constable could be called and the court used to punish or
remove neighborhood antagonists cannot be easily dism issed as hegemonic
control.19 Through the law , m any free blacks learned that at times, som e of
the articulated goals of a democratic and egalitarian republic could actually be
realized. That confidence also m eant absorbing concepts and ideals that
helped shaped black identity, at times producing conflict w ith the black
community. African Am ericans did not then, and d o not now, always agree
on how the law could 'm ake you smart.'

19 I am borrowing here from Patricia J. Williams' critique of the CLS school. See Williams,
"Alchemical Notes."
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Chapter One

Becom ing African American: Building Boundaries of Self, 1641-1783

The story of slavery's legal end in Massachusetts frequently begins in
1781 w ith the rather well-known tale of Quock Walker's law su it against
Nathaniel Jennison, who claimed to be Walker's owner and w h o resorted to
violence in an attempt to drag Walker back into bondage. The few historians
w h o have bothered to pay attention to w hat prompted Walker's decision to
use the court instead of resorting to other alternatives — he could have
submitted, retaliated, or run off — have surmised that W alker w as likely
instructed by w hites motivated either by sympathy for Walker or by their ow n
private feuds w ith Jennison.20 Little consideration has been given to the
possibility that Walker needed no prom pting or instruction on available legal
options. It is entirely likely that Walker not only knew he had legal recourse
against a w hite man, but that he k n ew exactly what court to go to, w hen the
court met, and h ow to go about getting justice. While he m ay have had
assistance from w hites at the outset, as he did later in w hat turned out to be a
drawn-out court battle, there is no reason to suppose that Walker was
ignorant of the legal processes; in fact, his actions are remarkably consistent
20 See John D. Cushing, "The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts:
More N otes on the 'Quock Walker C ase/" American Journal of Legal H istory 5 (1961), 118-144.
There has been som e debate on whether this case w as solely responsible for abolition in
M assachusetts; see Arthur Zilversmit, "Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of Slavery in
M assachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly 25 (1968), 614-624; and Elaine MacEacheren,
"Emancipation of Slavery in Massachusetts: A Reexamination 1770-1790," Journal of Negro
History 55 (October 1970), 289-306. M oreover, w hile the Walker case did in som e respects
represent a culmination of several legal decisions resulting in abolition, sporadic cases of
enslavem ent continued for a few years after the resolution of this case. See William E. Nelson,
Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society,
1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 102.
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w ith the Body o f Liberties of 1641 that instructed servants to seek refuge from
"the Tiranny and crueltie of their masters" b y goin g to a freeman neighbor
and ensuring that "due notice thereof be sp eed ily given" to a m agistrate as
w ell as the master. These instructions w ere repeated in the general law s of
the colony in 1672 and reiterated in a w id ely circulated catechism in 1726.
Walker w as only one of many slaves during the course of the century w ho
exercised the ability to appeal to neighbors and, more importantly, the law .21
While other historians have docum ented that black N ew Englanders had
been actively engaged in the courts for over one hundred years by the time
Walker pressed his case, none have considered h o w this ongoing engagem ent
w ith the law shaped identity as Africans, and later African Americans, m oved
from slavery to freedom.
During the seventeenth century, a tension existed betw een Puritan
faith that dem anded legal recognition of persons created in the im age of God,
and Puritan practice of protecting property and using bound labor. First and
second generation Africans in N ew England foun d opportunity to exploit that
tension. Other historians have docum ented the latitude and apparent
impartiality of M assachusetts courts w h en dealin g with free and enslaved
blacks, but no consideration has been g iv en to w h at this m eant to Africans as

21 Collections o f the Massachusetts Historical Society, v.8, 3rd series (Boston: Charles C. Little
and James Brown, 1843), 230. This volume reprinted the 1641 Body of Liberties in their entirety
on pages 218-237. The Body of Liberties were recategorized, expanded, and in som e cases
am m ended in The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony (C am bridge, 1672),
reprinted in The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts (Boston: 1887). The law referred to here is on
p. 105 of this reprint. This law w as again recom m ended as the appropriate course o f action for
slaves in Sam uel W illard's A Compleat Body of D ivin ity in Two Hundred and Fifty Expository
Lectures on the Assembly's Shorter Catechism... (Boston: 1726), 616-17, serm on #179 (the
pagination in W illard's volum e w as repeated; this reference is the second set o f pages so
numbered). The Body of Liberties and Willard w ere no doubt relying on an interpretation of
Deuteronom y 23:15-16, which stipulated that Israelites "shall not hand over to his master a
slave who has escaped fro his master to you. H e shall live w ith you in your m idst, in the place
which he shall choose in one of your towns where it pleases him; you shall not m istreat him."
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they transitioned into N e w England society and culture. D ue in part to the
unique combination o f the law 's ambiguity regarding the legal status of
slaves, and black N ew Englanders' familiarity w ith the day-to-day business of
their owners, including whites' court activities, som e slaves and free blacks
m anaged to construct legal boundaries betw een them selves and their
ow ners.22 M undane legal acts such as committing one's name to a property
deed, as Sebastian Kaine did in 1656, fixed a claim to land that whites could
not legally violate.23 W hile anthropologist James Clifford has pointed out
that identity is not m erely a matter of m aintaining boundaries but is also "a
nexus of relations and transactions actively engaging a subject,”24 for first and
second generation Africans, establishing boundaries w as a critical stage during
these early years of slavery. The law helped slaves and free blacks perform
tw o vital functions of identity formation: m aintaining boundaries, and
actively engaging in a "nexus of relations and transactions" with white and
black N ew Englanders. That the law was an integral part of negotiating
identity also m eant that a central institution of N e w England society played a
role in the construction of an African American identity, as slaves had
notions of self influenced by English definitions of the legal person.

22 On the apparent impartiality of the law, see Robert C. Tw om bly and Robert H. Moore,
"Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century M assachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly
24 (April 1967), 224- 242; and Lorenzo Greene, The Negro in Colonial Nezo England 1620-1776
(N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1942); also see Cornelia Dayton, Women Before the
Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995). On fam ily slavery, see W illiam D. Piersen, Black Yankees:The
Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England (Am herst:
University of M assachusetts Press, 1988), 25-36.
23 Sebastian Kaine appears in the Thwing Database at the M assachusetts Historical Society.
This database, an ongoing project at the MHS, contains references and notes on over 4000 African
Americans in Boston w ho appear in a variety of records, primarily before 1800. While som e
references are very brief, m any contain a significant am ount o f information.
24 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature
and Art, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 344.
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This chapter aims to uncover the experience of Africans and their
descendants as they engaged the legal system in colonial Massachusetts, and
how that experience contributed to the gradual formation of an African
American identity. Because the few sources are rarely in the words or from
the perspective of black N ew Englanders, how ever, this chapter interprets
their actions and serves in som e respects to lay the groundwork for
succeeding chapters by establishing that black interaction w ith the law and
Africans' knowledge of the workings of the legal system was far from atypical.
Their experience with the law proved to be an integral part of the ongoing
process of negotiating an African American identity w ell into the nineteenth
century.

Determining Africans' place in N ew England society was not sim ply a
matter of whites im posing law s that defined black m en and wom en as
property for life. The legal relationships of pow er betw een colonists and
enslaved Africans were murky for much of the seventeenth century, in large
part because, unlike the rest of the N ew World, there w as no slave law from
the mother country to transfer to the colonies. Historian Alan Watson has
noted that in the British colonies the law in general w as made by colonial
courts and legislatures and not sim ply taken straight from England. This w as
especially true regarding slave law; because England had no slave law,
colonial courts did not even have a standard from the hom e country to use as
a referent. By contrast, in the Spanish colonies the pow er of making law
resided in Spain. But in British North America, as the institution of slavery
evolved, slave law "came into being bit by bit, either by statute or by judicial
precedent, sometimes based on w hat people did."25 Though African slaves
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came to Massachusetts during the first generation of settlers, the law dealt
w ith them by name only sporadically. In 1652, the General Court stipulated
"that all Scotsmen, Negeres and Indians" had to attend m ilitia training along
w ith the English, but m odified that order four years later w ith a racial
exclusion: Indians and blacks, w h eth er free or slave, w ere barred from
training or carrying arms. In 1680, the General Court prevented any vessels
from sailing from the colony w ith any "Passengers, or any Servant or Negro"
un less the Governor had granted perm ission.26
Nevertheless, in the seven teenth century and the first half of the
eighteenth century, when racial id eo lo g ies and concepts defining 'race' in
British N orth America were still nebulous and fluid, the law, as much as any
other m echanism , gradually cam e to play an important role in defining for
the w hite and black peoples of N e w England how Africans w ou ld fit into
society.27 But because Africans w ere an unplanned part o f the errand into the
w ilderness, and because they w ere few in number, seventeenth-century law
in M assachusetts was largely silen t regarding the black presence. When the
General Court compiled the B ody of Liberties in 1641 and stated that "There
shall never be any bond slaverie, villinage or Captivitie am ongst us," they
added a significant qualifier to the absolute term "never" by permitting
slavery in cases of "lawfull C aptives taken in just warres, and such strangers
25 Alan. Watson, Slave Law in the Americas (Athens: University o f G eorgia Press, 1989), 64;
Jonathan A. Bush, "The British C onstitution and the Creation o f Am erican Slavery," in
Slavery and the Law, ed. Paul Finkelman (M adison: M adison H ouse, 1997), 382.
26 George H. Moore, Notes on the H istory o f Slavery in Massachusetts, (N ew York: 1866), 243;
The General Laws and Liberties, 281.
27 Concerning the ongoing construction o f race in seventeenth-century British America, see
W inthrop Jordan, White over Black, American A ttitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (N ew
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 3-98; T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, "Myne Owne Ground":
Race and Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (N ew York: Oxford University Press,
1980); Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries o f Slavery in North America
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1998).
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as w illingly selle them selves or are sold to us."28 The apparent contradiction
is understandable w hen the context w ith in w hich the Court articulated this
conditional 'antislavery' law is taken into account. Three types of slavery
existed in early Puritan N ew England: Indians captured in w hat the colony
defined as 'just wars', such as the Pequot War in 1637 or other wars
considered to be in self-defense or in defense of allies that had been
authorized by the General Court;29 African slaves; and white servants w h o
had been convicted of a crime and sentenced to slavery. But w hite servants
either had tim e lim its placed on their slavery, or had their sentences
terminated by the court. In 1638 W illiam A ndrow s attacked his m aster and
w as "delivered up a slave to w hom the court shall appoint"; less than a year
later he w as released "upon his good carriage" and the promise to pay
restitution to his victim. In 1640 Thom as Savory w as whipped for theft, and
sentenced to w ork as a slave until he p aid double the value of w hat he stole.30
The targets of this early 'antislavery' law w ere freemen like A ndrow s and
Savory.31
Puritan lawmakers relied heavily, though not exdusively, on O ld
Testament precedent to construct a slave law that permitted slavery, but

28 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 231. Repeated in The General Laws and
Liberties , 10.
29 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 217. Repeated in The General Laws and
Liberties , 73. I conclude this as the Puritan's v ie w o f 'just war' because this statute stated that
"no man shall be compelled" to serve in "offensive" wars, while they could be com pelled to
serve in defensive wars. Presumably, defensive w ars were always considered just, w hereas
offensive wars, in the English experience were frequendy unjust. Therefore, captives taken in
offensive wars were not seen as people w ho had in som e manner forfieted their liberty, as had
those who attacked the colony or 'willingly' sold them selves.
30 Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. Helen Tunnicliff Catterall
(Washington: The Carnegie Institution of W ashington: 1936), vol. 4, 469.
31 George H. Moore m ade this argument over one hundred years ago; see Moore, Notes on the
H istory of Slavery in Massachusetts, 15-19.
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ensured that slavery of fellow countrymen for debt, criminal offenses, or any
other reason w ould remain beyond the pale. Old Testam ent law permitted
Israelites to "acquire m ale and fem ale slaves from the pagan nations" around
Israel, and stipulated that "if a countryman of yours becom es so poor w ith
regard to you that he sells him self to you, you shall not subject him to a
slave's service. He shall be w ith you as a hired man" and be released to go
back to his ow n property in the year of jubilee. Other passages similarly
instructed Israelites to free kinsm en in the seventh year of their service.32
The "Liberties of Servants" section within the 1641 Body of Liberties echoed a
similar principle by forbidding masters to send aw ay faithful servants emptyhanded after seven years service. But the law s forbidding bond slavery, w ith
the significant exceptions noted above, were in a succeeding section on the
"Liberties of Forreiners and Strangers."33 Africans w ere neither kinsmen nor
countrym en.
Though the lawmakers did not mention Africans, they were
undoubtedly aware of the foothold black slavery had acquired in neighboring
colonies as w ell as their ow n. The phrase m entioning "strangers" w ho were
"sold to us" was likely written w ith African slaves in m ind. Thus, this first
'antislavery' law was actually N ew England's first law codifying slavery — the
final phrase made this clear, noting that "this exem pts none from servitude,
w h o shall be judged thereto by Authority." This in effect gave the General
Court or any governing body the authority to make the final determination
on whether Africans or others fit within the perm itted exceptions to the
'antislavery' law. This law actually codified a racially-based slavery—black

32 See Leviticus 26:44 and Deuteronom y 15:12. Quote taken from the N ew American Standard
B ib le.
33 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 230-231.
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w om en and m en were the only people w ho as a group fit the description of
"strangers" being "sold to us" and w ere not captives of just wars.
Recently, one researcher has stated that black m en and w om en
"according to law , were not considered special targets for slavery because of
their race. W hite, black, and red captives of wars were all considered to be fair
game." Evidence for this argument is Robert Keayne's 1652 purchase of a
Scotsman w h o w as one of 270 captured at the battle of Dunbar and sold in
Boston as slaves, and the return of a group of Africans to Africa w h o had been
judged as not captured in the course o f a war, but captured and shipped to
Boston aboard the Rainbowe solely for the purpose of being sold as slaves.34
But m ost Africans came to N ew England through the Carribean, so Puritan
authorities could ignore the original cause of enslavem ent. The Africans on
board the Rainbowe were an exception. And white 'slaves' such as Keayne's
Scotsman could expect freedom after a period of time, as general practice
dictated. A s A lan Watson points out, in societies like N e w England, slave
law formed largely by common practice. The 1641 Body o f Liberties made it
difficult to place w hites into bond-slavery, and the com m on practice, as
demonstrated by court decisions that placed time limits o n or freed convicts
sentenced to enslavem ent, established a pattern that virtually ruled out w hite
slavery. M eanwhile, the Body of Liberties left a loophole for the bond slavery
of Africans. Com bined w ith the 1656 law banning black and Indian men from
the militia, Puritan law even within the first two generations, w as slow ly but
surely constructing a racially-based slave law.
W hile the O ld Testament provided a framework for lawm aking,
Puritans did not bind themselves too closely by divine pronouncem ents. God

34 Melinde Lutz Sanborn, "Angola and Elizabeth: A n African Family in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony," New England Quarterly 72 (March, 1999), 122.
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had instructed the Israelites to not only provide refuge for escaped slaves, but
to go further by allow in g the escaped slave to "live w ith you in your m idst, in
the place w hich h e shall choose in one of your tow ns where it pleases him."35
The Puritans, how ever, m odified this freedom by injecting the legal process
that Quock Walker utilized. Slaves could flee to a neighbor w ho w as
obligated to provide refuge, but either the neighbor or the slave w a s obligated
to contact the judicial establishment in order to settle the matter. N o doubt
m any judges returned runaway slaves to their masters. Instead o f perm itting
runaway slaves to live where they pleased according to Old Testament law,
Puritan lawm akers built a mechanism into the law that enabled m asters to
procure their slaves" return.
And yet this statute can be read as both safeguarding slaveowners'
property, and as acknow ledging slaves' hum anity and personhood. Though
som e southern slave law also internalized this am bivalent tension, the
dominant interpretation in the south leaned heavily towards seein g slaves as
property. W hen slaves w ere recognized as persons, it was frequently for the
purpose of continued maintenance of the peculiar institution. Southern
colonies tacitly acknow ledged slaves' hum anity in a backhanded legal fashion
by noting that slaves w ere not on the sam e level as inanimate property or
animals, since neither of those kinds of property could be charged w ith a
crim e.36 But M assachusetts law recognized the personhood of slaves in a
positive manner by declaring that slaves "shall have the liberties and
Christian usage w h ich the Law of God established in Israel doth m orally

35 Deuteronomy 23:15-16, N ew American Standard Bible.
36 See William W. Fisher HI, "Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery," in Slavery and
the Law, 44-45; Carl D egler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil
and the United States (N e w York: MacMillan, 1971).
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require." Lorenzo G reene points out that this Puritan perspective conferred a
"dual status" upon slaves as property and persons.37 Under Puritan law ,
slaves were not m erely property w ith no legal status as persons. And though
this law did not elaborate o n w h at "liberties" slaves might expect, it
presumably referred to O ld Testament passages such as the one above and
Deuteronom y 24:17-18, in w hich God had adm onished the Israelites to
remember that they had once been slaves in Egypt, and so not to "pervert
justice due an alien." Other passages made clear that slaves were in m any
respects the equal of their owners: expectations for worship and eligibility for
m embership within G od's covenant with Israel through circumcision w ere
the sam e for master and slave.38 Puritan law carried an implicit view of
personhood since it w as w ritten within the context of an understanding of
the Old Testament's v ie w of slaves as persons.
Defining slaves as persons w as made explicit in other laws. An
expectation of justice before the law was apparently one of the liberties
intended by the early slave law . The Body of Liberties declared that
every man, w hether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free
shall have libertie to com e to any publique Court, Councel, or
Towne meeting, and either by speech or w riteing to m ove any
lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any
necessary m otion, com plaint, petition, Bill or information.39
W hether or not Puritan law m akers envisioned African slaves as being part of
the "not free" is unknow n; it is possible that the intent may have been sim ply
to ensure that white servants had free access to the courts and other legal

37 Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 167.
38 See Deuteronomy 12:12-18 and Genesis 17:9-15.
39 Collections of the M assachusetts Historical Society, 218. Repeated in The General Laws and
Liberties , 90.
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forum s. But in light of the O ld Testament context within which Puritans
attempted to build their city on the hill, it is likely that this law w as written
w ith both black slaves and w hite servants in m ind. The book of Job m ade
clear that in both a legal and moral sense, slaves possessed full personhood:
"If I have despised the claim of m y male or female slaves w hen
they filed a complaint against me,
What then could I do w h en God arises, and w hen He calls m e
to account, w hat w ill I answer him?
D id not He w ho m ade me in the womb make him, and the
sam e one fashion us in the womb?"40

Biblical precedent com bined w ith a lack of fear of slave rebellion or
disorder, due to slaves' relatively small numbers, to foster a Puritan slave law
that permitted this type of legal space to exist. By contrast, South Carolinians,
convinced that Africans, being "of barbarous, w ild, savage natures," were
"w holly unqualified to be governed by the laws, customs, and practices of this
Province" subsequently lim ited slaves' ability to use the law for prosecution
or defense 41 South Carolina's 1696 Slave Code, and much of southern slave
law , interpreted the law as som ething to be im posed upon slaves by w hites in
order to protect the increasingly large pool of slave labor and maintain order
in societies with growing black populations. W illiam Fisher describes h ow
southern slave law was frequently driven by conflicting images of Africans:
the lazy, comical slave, and the murderous savage. In Massachusetts, similar
im agery existed but it w as m itigated both by biblical injunctions that the

40 Job 31:13-15.
41 Fisher, "Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery," 49. Quote taken from South
Carolina's 1696 Slave Code.
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Puritans tried to follow , and by the lack of a perceived large-scale threat due to
the sm all proportion of slaves in the population.42
Puritan law, then, opened the door for a more thorough black
engagem ent w ith the legal system than w o u ld be possible in m any other
colonies. W hether coming to court as plaintiffs or defendants, w hether
appearing before tow n selectmen or com m itting their nam es to legal
docum ents such as w ills or property deeds, black m en and w om en came to
understand that certain processes w ere due them despite their lo w status in
M assachusetts society.
This understanding meant black litigants participated fully in legal
procedures long before the Revolution. In a recent essay, T. H. Breen argues
that "at a critical moment in the d evelop m en t of Western liberal thought, the
slaves o f M assachusetts brought the testim ony of their ow n lives before a
public increasingly unwilling to defend" slavery. Breen questions if abolition
in M assachusetts resulted "as a gift of w h ite leaders," those "thoughtful,
moral, reflective members of a professional elite" w hose "grow ing
abhorrence for slavery" shaped public opinion. He seeks to inject black
participation in pushing public opinion towards abolition, and not just
through the four well-docum ented freedom petitions m ade b y Massachusetts
slaves in the 1770s. Instead, by focusing primarily on tw o black m en
convicted as criminals, Breen exam ines h o w the crimes these tw o m en
com m itted "provoked doubt—a defen sive reaction—am ong w h ites already
uneasy about slavery." This chapter dem onstrates that the public 'testimony'
of black lives had been regularly brought before whites through

42 Samuel Sew all's diary, for instance, provides evidence of this imagery, as w ill be seen
below .
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confrontations w ith the law long before the Revolutionary era.43 T hough the
intention here is n o t to focus on changes in w h ite opinion, the evid en ce both
com plem ents and challenges Breen's argum ent. It complements his
argum ent b y docum enting the long public record of tension resulting from
slaves' expressions of contention against w h ite oppression. W hile w h ites had
been w ell aware of this tension, virtually no m om entum pushed w h ite
public opinion tow ards abolition until just before the Revolution. This
chapter challenges Breen's argument, w hich points to the 1760s as the
beginning of w hites' consideration that slavery itself might the problem . The
evidence presented here suggests that som e w hites recognized this lon g
before the R evolutionary era.
African slaves came to Massachusetts early, possibly even before the
establishment of the Massachusetts Bay C olony in 1629, and certainly before
m id-century. Lorenzo Greene and others have fixed the 1630s as the arrival
time of the first Africans, though some anecdotal evidence suggests that at
least one w hite m an brought his slaves into the colony before 1630.44 D u e to
the Puritan culture, the needs of N ew England slave-owning fam ilies for
dom estic and farm labor, and the am biguous legal status of Africans, slaves
were com m only incorporated into the fam ily. They lived in the house,
shared the sam e food, and some sat at the sam e table—or at least in the sam e

43 T.H. Breen, "Making History: The Force of Public O pinion and the Last Years of Slavery in
Revolutionary M assachusetts" in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in
Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 71, 74.
44 Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 16-18; T w om bly and Moore, "Black Puritan: The
Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," 225; John D aniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study
of the Boston Negroes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com pany, 1914; reprint, A m o Press and the
N ew York Times, 1969), 1.
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room. The familial connection, not simply a m eans of assuring subm ission
and securing control, w as often genuine.45
Nonetheless, w h en it came to assessing taxes in the seventeenth
century, Massachusetts slaves w ere considered property, and not family, along
w ith horses, sheep, and sw ine, and would be sealed into this category until
emancipation after the Am erican Revolution. A s in the south, slaves could
be legally sold at w ill b y their masters, and could also be sold to settle civil
suits or criminal charges brought against them selves or their masters. In 1672
Silvanus Warro adm itted to forging a key to his master's box and taking
m oney. While sentencing Warro to 20 strokes of the w hip and repayment of
the stolen m oney along w ith the court and prison fees, the court ordered him
to pay "for the maintenance of bastard child he fathered in Roxbury." If he
failed to pay the child support, Warro was to be sold. Warro apparently did
fail to do so, but his m aster decided to put the child out as a servant until it
w as thirty years old. In 1681, Chefalia, a slave to Thomas Walker, was jailed
on suspicion of burning dow n the houses of tw o w hite homeowners in
Roxbury. Though not yet convicted of a crime, the court decided that Walker
had to send Chefalia ou t of the country—in other w ords, sell him. The
judgment also stated that if this were not done in one month, the court
w ould do it for him, and give Walker whatever w as left after deducting court
and prison expenses. In 1677, Nicholas threatened his master with a loaded
gun and wounded him w ith a knife; after being "severely whipt w ith tw enty
nine Stripes" and paying a fine, he remained in jail until he could be sold out
of the country. By contrast, the case following N icholas' involved a w hite

45 Piersen, Black Yankees, 25-36; Joanne Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual
Emancipation and "Race" in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998),
7-41.
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servant w ho ran away and attacked a constable in the process. H e w as fined
heavily. On the same day, the court fined one white man for w ounding
another white man "with a quart p o t fetching much blood." There are still
more cases in which Africans received fines or corporal punishm ents, as did
whites, but w ith the additional consequence of being sold out o f the country.
The point is not to highlight potential inconsistencies in the court's
sentencing practices. Rather, it is notable that black slaves, unlike w hite
servants, could be sold into perm anent bondage, even out of the colony.46
In other instances, an accusation of criminal w rongdoing w as not
necessary for slaves to be taken or so ld off. Michael Powell's youn g slave was
confiscated in 1670 through a writ of attachment after it w as claim ed that
Powell had not returned items and m on ey he was supposed to have held in
custody. Others slaves were passed to surviving kin through a deceased
slaveowner's will. Slaves w hose ow ners died without heirs, or died w ith
substantial unsettled debt, faced the likelihood of being sold by the tow n along
w ith other real and personal properly. This practiced continued w ell into the
eighteenth century; in 1757 slaves H ercules and Sharper were sentenced to be
w hipped and to repay triple the value of goods they had stolen—a debt
am ounting to less than one pound. T w o months later, w ith H ercules and
Sharper still ow ing Elizabeth Dabney, w id ow of the man w ho had accused
them of the theft, the court granted D abney's request that she "be allow 'd to
dispose of the sd negros' Life to any o f his majesty's subjects to satisfy the

46 Warro and Cheffaleer are in the Thwing Database. Many of the African Am ericans listed in
the Thwing Database appear solely due to b ein g listed in a probated w ill. N icholas and the
other cases are in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, v.30
(Boston: The Colonial Society, 1933) 884-890.
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sum." In these circumstances, the law and w hites clearly view ed slaves as
property, and the dem ands of property superseded those of personhood.47
W hile southern states like South Carolina w ere developing slave law
that in m ost respects denied Africans' legal personhood—slaves could not
litigate civil suits as plaintiffs or defendants, and in criminal cases could only
be defendants—in Massachusetts, the law did at tim es impart a degree of
personhood and created space for slaves to situate them selves as beings w h o
could operate w ith in the legal system.48 Because, as Samuel Willard w o u ld
preach in 1726, even "the Soul of a Slave is...of as m uch worth, as the Soul of
his Master, having the sam e noble Faculties and Powers, and being alike
Immortal; and being alike Precious to Christ," and because the law w as m eant
to embody God's perspective in earthly society, every person, even black
slaves, had to be accorded certain liberties under the law.49 Slaves could
testify in court regardless of the color of the litigants, were able to sue their
masters or other w hites, make contracts, and could expect to have a trial by
jury in criminal cases.
Overlaying these tensions within Puritan law w as African slaves' ow n
experiences previous to being imported to N e w England. Though m any N e w
England slaveow ners preferred young slaves brought directly from Africa,
their choices were often lim ited to slaves that the m ore demanding southern
and Caribbean markets cast aside. Seventeenth century purchases from the
W est Indies were com m on. Mixed in w ith these less desirable slaves w ere

47 Hercules and Sharper are in the Thwing Database. Account of Powell's slave in Greene, The
Negro in Colonial New England, 172.
48 On South Carolina, see Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, 71-73.
49 Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of D ivinity in Two Hundred and Fifty Expository
Lectures on the Assembly's Shorter Catechism, 616.
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creolized Africans w h o had encountered English law through time spent in
ports on the African coast or in the Caribbean. Ira Berlin notes that in the
seventeenth-century Caribbean, some slaves attem pted to use the courts to
gain freedom. Southern slaveowners at tim es avoided slaves w h o possessed
broader experience because they feared that su ch slaves w ould at best contest
for personal freedom , and at worst agitate other slaves to do likewise.
Encountering Puritan legal procedure w as therefore not a completely novel
experience for som e slaves w h o had som e familiarity w ith English law in
other settings, and ev en Africans unfamiliar w ith the legal process m ay have
received som e instruction from more cosm opolitan slaves.50
Occasionally, slaves em ployed legal know ledge, whether gained
through w atching w h ite masters, personal past experience, the experience of
other slaves, or com binations of these sources, to exploit what space the law
provided to redefine them selves as a free legal being. One remarkable case
that began w ith a contract in 1694 and did not reach a conclusion until 1703
has been noted only in terms of what it m eant for the w hite participants, and
only passing reference has been given to its significance for Adam, the slave
w ho initiated legal proceedings against a man w h o w as not only a member of
the colonial elite, but also a judge. Throughout this see-saw legal battle,
Adam demonstrated n ot only perserverance, b u t a shrew d understanding of
how to use the law and of the law's advantages. In the end, he m anaged to

50 Piersen, Black Yankees, 3-6; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 34-38. On
creolized Africans, see Berlin, M any Thousands Gone, 17-28 and 47-63; and John Thorton, Africa
and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, second edition, (N ew York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Similarly, a good deal of scholarship on the African
diaspora docum ents the lon g history of opportunties m any Africans had to interact with
European legal and social institutions; a good overview essay is J. E. Harris, "The African
Diaspora in the Old and N e w Worlds," in UNESCO's General History of Africa: Africa from
the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century, ed. B. A. O got (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988), v o l . 5,113-136.
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use the law to shape his circumstances, but w as him self shaped in turn by the
law.

According to a nineteenth-century historian, John Saffin came to
Massachusetts around 1645, and after a brief hiatus in Virginia, established
himself as a successful merchant in Boston. Part, perhaps most, of his success
stemmed from "the clandestine importation of negroes from Guinea."
Saffin's life was marked by tragedy; he outlived all eight of his sons and two
wives, and in one sorrowful span of two weeks in 1678, he watched helplessly
as the smallpox robbed him o f two teen-aged sons as w ell as the "enjoyment
of her m y Sw eet Martha," his w ife of twenty years. N ine years later, while
burying one son, new s of the death of his only rem aining son arrived from
London. Two m onths after that, his second w ife died. Even by the
sometimes austere standards of the seventeenth century, w hat Saffin
described as his "allmost insuportable grief" was surely justified.51 Perhaps
personal tragedies made Saffin a difficult man to deal w ith—his third
marriage was n ot a happy one and resulted in a separation sometime before
his death in 1710. Perhaps he had a tenacious personality regardless;
whatever the case, he used every means at his disposal trying to keep one of
his slaves in perpetual bondage.
Saffin kn ew the courts w ell. He appears repeatedly in court records
over a period of thirty years before his slave pursued legal freedom. Saffin
came to court frequently as a plaintiff and occasionally as a defendant in civil
cases, in addition to appearing as a witness, court official, attorney, and
finally, judge. H is relationship w ith the law w as at tim es a bit murky; in 1671

51 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 (Boston, 1895),
vol. 1, 86, 362.
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he was accused by another freeman of tampering w ith a jury and a judge, and
two years later he w as briefly entangled w ith a wanted man — though it is not
clear of Saffin w as know ingly involved.52 In 1696, the General A ssem bly
assessed him w ith a sm all fine for being connected with the denial o f a trial by
jury to one John W ilkins.53
Saffin w as also a slaveowner, and one of his slaves, Adam , w anted to
be a free man. Little is known about A dam before he appeared in the legal
records w hen h e took Judge Saffin to court in pursuit of liberty. H e had
resided in Bristol County, south of Boston, since at least the early 1680s, and
before coming under Saffin's hand had served a minister and later the
minister's w id o w .54 Adam displayed som e legal savvy early on, m anaging to
secure a contract, signed by Saffin and three w itnesses, that prom ised
eventual m anum ission. In 1694, John Saffin, claiming that he w as m otivated
by "meer kindness and for the Encouragement of m y negro m an Adam," had
agreed to "Enfranchise clear and make free" Adam after seven years of service
to Thomas Shepherd, one of Saffin's tenants in Bristol. Saffin did attach
conditions to the seven year term, requiring that Adam served "chearfully
quietly and Industriously...and doe behave and abear him self as an H onest
true and faithful Servant."55

52 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
190-91, 348-49.

Collections (Boston, 1933), vol. 29,

53 Suffolk Court Records, vol. 40, 361, 372, 393.
54 Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File # 5941
55 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , v o l.l , 88. M ost
of the legal docum ents concerning the Adam v. John Saffin case—court records, depositions, and
the 1694 contract betw een Saffin and Adam —are reprinted in this volume. I have checked
these reprints against the original documents and microfilm copies of the originals located at
the Massachusetts State Archives, listed as the 'Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court,
Suffolk Court Files and Suffolk Court Records' (hereafter referred to by either 'Suffolk Court
Files' or 'Suffolk C ourt Records'). The reprints in the Publications of the Colonial Society
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In March of 1701, seven years to the m onth after the contract betw een
Adam and his master had been entered into the record, Adam w as told to
leave Boston, m eet Saffin in Bristol, where he w o u ld be bound over to serve
another man. In response, A dam launched a cam paign of defiance and
established a pattern of behavior that w ou ld frustrate and infuriate John
Saffin for the next tw o years. John Saffin later argued that Adam had always
been a "Desperate D angerous Villaine, and of Turbulent humour," possessing
a "proud, insolent and dom ineering spirit7'—th ou gh for some reason he had
seen fit to let Adam w ork alone in Boston. H ere a corrective to the 'family
slavery' depiction arises; Adam , regardless of the truth of Saffin's character
assassination, spent a g o o d am ount of time in Boston alone. According to
Saffin, Adam "had nothing to do but to work in the Garden, make Fires and
the like, was kindly used , did eat of the same as the English servants." This
semi-autonomy m ade it easier for Adam to defy Saffin's orders. Instead of
going to Bristol, Adam "took his Cloaths out of the house by stealth, and w en t
about the Town at his pleasure." Adam made his defiance a public matter.56
John Saffin eventually came back to B oston to get Adam. To his
chagrin, Adam came to him first "in a saw cy and surly manner" and told
Saffin—Saffin the prom inent judge, Saffin the successful merchant—that he
had to go speak to Judge Sam uel Sewall in his Boston residence. There,
Saffin, making the acerbic com m ent that he "obey'd this Negromantick
Summons," was confronted w ith the contract h e had made with Adam seven

volum e are accurate, and because of greater of accesibility and legibility, will be referenced
here. The Publications of the Colonial Society volum e is not, how ever, an exhaustive source for
the records of this case. The depositions in Adam's favor (referenced below), for instance, were
not included, as Abner C. G oodell, the nineteenth century com piler of these records, was
primarily concerned w ith John Saffin's perspective on his dispute with Samuel Sewall.
56 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 104-05.
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years previous.57 Adam had done more than flaunt his rebellion about
Boston; he had m ade preparations for the next volley in his battle w ith Saffin.
It is reasonable to assum e that it w as A dam w ho took the contract to Sewall,
and rather than run off or wait for Saffin to come to Boston, h e likely gave
Sewall his version of events w hen he passed along the legal p roof of his
emancipation. There is no evidence of any previous relationship between
Adam and Sam uel Sewall, but som ehow Adam knew of Sew all's sympathies-there w ere other judges in Boston to w h om he could have turned. It cannot
have been coincidence that he took his case to the judge w ho felt strongly that
the legal and theological justifications of slavery were exceedingly thin.
Sewall had published his famous antislavery tract "The Selling o f Joseph" less
than a year previous,58 and Adam, no doubt aware of Sewall's antislavery
proclivities, counted on his support. Sewall confirmed that trust when,
understanding that Adam's entire case rested on one legal docum ent, he
initially refused to even permit Saffin to handle the m anum ission contract.
At this m eeting between Sewall and Saffin, a meeting brought about by
Adam's hand, the legal battle w as joined. The central issue in this see-saw
affair w as w hether Adam fulfilled the terms of the contract by serving out his
term "chearfully quietly and Industriously." Adam argued that he had
fulfilled the terms adequately; Saffin disagreed strenuously. Sew all, declaring
that "Liberty w as a thing of great value, even next to life," enjoined Saffin "to
stand to it" and honor the contract. Judge Addington, w ho w as also present at
this initial m eeting, chose a tack probably not to Adam's liking by arguing that
"there was m uch to be allowed to the behaviour of Negroes, w h o are so

57 Ibid., 105.
58 The Dairy of Samuel Sewall, Harvey Wish, ed., (N ew York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967).
Sewall's tract is reprinted in this edition of his diary following the entry for June 19 1700.

40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ignorant, rude and brutish, and therefore to be considered as Negroes." This
judge, seeking to interpret the contract in a fashion that w ou ld grant Adam
his freedom, attempted to broaden the stipulation o f faithful obedience to
allow for w hat he considered the limitations of black character. Saffin w ould
have none of it; "small faults," he said, "I should have w inkt at them, but he
having behaved him self so diametrically contrary" to the terms of the
contract ruled out any possibility of freedom.59
H aving failed to resolve the dispute through an informal meeting, the
dispute escalated to the next level. The next day, Saffin called in another
justice, Penn Townsend. Townsend and Sewall, w hile not in agreement w ith
Saffin, did consent to hold Adam until the matter could be decided in a
formal hearing before the Superior Court. To ensure Adam's appearance, a
surety was tendered. Sureties were akin to promissory notes of a certain sum
of money that w ould be sacrificed if a defendant did not appear at the
appointed date, and w ere often put up by relatives or friends if the defendant
did not have the required amount. In Adam's case, how ever, the surety w as
not money or property: a free black man named Dick offered himself (and w as
accepted) as Adam's surety. Adam may have recruited Dick himself, or
perhaps Dick volunteered to help a friend. This sim ple act demonstrates
their awareness of w hat w as legally possible, which they likely learned from
seeing whites do the same. The town of Boston had accepted the practice of
individuals offering them selves as sureties for new ly arrived immigrants or
relatives for quite som e time; Adam and Dick probably knew individuals
w ho had done so.60 Presumably, if Adam ran away, Dick w ou ld have been

59 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 105-06.
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obliged to offer his time and labor as payment. Dick apparently believed
Adam trustw orthy enough to take the risk.61
More importantly, A dam 's fate now lay in the hands of the court.
Adam m ay have believed this m o v e w as to his advantage; after all, Sewall,
Townsend, and A ddington had all expressed a desire to see him freed. W hen
the Superior Court heard the dispu te in May, however, they m oved
jurisdiction of the case to next m eeting of the Superior Court in Bristol nine
w eeks later, since both Adam and John Saffin had lived there. In the interim,
Saffin stew ed. The "Rascally Negro," w ho "went about the Town swaggering
at his pleasure in defiance of m e his Master" vexed Saffin, and likely made
him all the m ore determined to ensure Adam's permanent bondage by
sealing his legal defeat and selling him south.62
Before the Court m et again, Saffin pulled off a coup of sorts -- he
m anaged to have him self prom oted to the Superior Court. N o doubt to
Adam's dism ay, this meant that Saffin w ould be one of the judges sitting on a
case in w hich he w as the plaintiff. A jury found Adam guilty of not honoring
the terms of the contract, based largely on depositions offered by Saffin that
characterized A dam as "Turbulent outragious and unruly." The depositions
also accused A dam of striking the daughter of John Saffin's tenant, Thomas
Shepard, as w ell as threatening Shepard's wife and Shepard him self w ith an
ax, a pitchfork, and a knife. But in the face of this testim ony, the judges
(excepting Saffin) were hesitant to enter a judgment. Perhaps the judges took
note of the apparent incongruousness of these w hite m en w h o claim ed that
60 See A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing Miscellaneous
Papers (Boston: Rockwell and Churchhill, 1886), 63-82. These pages contain a list of people
w ho offered them selves as sureties betw een 1679-1700.
61 Publications of the Colonial Society o f Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 106.
62 Ibid.
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Adam w as "a vile Refractory fellow" bu t w ere not hesitant to let him work
for other w h ites. Additionally, the nineteenth century historian w h o
commented on this case reported that Sew all's notes on the case questioned
the propriety of Saffin adjudicating w h a t w as essentially his o w n dispute.
Sewall also accused Saffin of tam pering w ith the jury foreman — not the first
time Saffin had been so accused — and com plained that Saffin had "Connived
at his Tenant Smith's being on the Jury, in the case between him self and
Adam."63
Saffin w as at least partially mistaken: Adam had not sp en t the w hole of
the interim betw een court hearings sw aggering about Boston. Adam
demonstrated his legal savvy and took advantage of the space the legal system
afforded black slaves by obtaining testim ony in his own behalf. H e apparently
traveled to Bristol before the trial in order to secure favorable testim ony from
white folks—not that of other slaves or free blacks, whose testim ony w ould
have been perm issible but probably n ot given the same w eigh t by the justices.
The deponents, w ho, according to the justice of the peace w h o took their
statements, w ere not sum m oned by the court but appeared voluntarily in late
June of 1701, no doubt prompted by Adam . They had nothing bu t good to say
about Adam . Mary Thurber, w ho k n ew Adam for at least eighteen years,
testified that w h en Adam had been a servant to the minister John M iles and
his w idow , he had been reliable en ou gh for her to hire him on occasion for a
day's work. Furthermore, since she liv ed next to Saffin and his tenant
Shepard and had m any a day w alked past Adam at work, she stated
unequivocally that she had never seen him anything but "D iligent and
Faithfull." John Martin and his father both stated that Adam "so far as ever I

63 77ze Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729, ed. M. H alsey Thomas (N ew York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 1973), vol 1,453. Entry dated Septem ber 11,1701.
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heard was counted a FaithfuU and a good Servant" and had even "heard Mr.
Thomas Shepherd say that sd Adam was more Faithfull of his Business than
himself." Martin, Thurber, and four others testified that not only w as Adam
a "true Faithful and D iligent Servant," but that he had "suffered m uch for
want both back & belly, that is to say for Victuals & cloathing" at the hands of
his masters.64
With conflicting testimony and questions concerning the propriety of
Saffin's judicial behavior in mind, the justices w ere no doubt uncomfortable
telling Adam, w h o had approached them im m ediately after the trial to ask
about his fate, that he had no hope of liberty. The justices secured a promise
from Saffin that he w ou ld not sell Adam to another province, and then held
the case over for another year, but stipulated that in the meantime Adam
m ust remain in the service of his master. This w as not sufficient for Saffin,
however, w ho m ade it clear that since the court w as not forthcoming w ith a
final decision, he considered his promise not to sell Adam no longer binding.
With the other justices looking on, Saffin ordered Adam back to
Boston, presumably to collect his belongings, and then proceed im m ediately
to Castle Island to w ork under a Captain Clark. Adam complied, but not
without ratcheting up the tension another notch in this skirmish of w ills
between himself and Saffin. Instead of marching forthwith to Castle Island,
he spent nearly tw o w eeks in Boston. W hen he finally did arrive in the
m iddle of September of 1701, work under Captain Clark apparently w ent
smoothly for the first few weeks. But trouble did not take long to catch, up to
Adam .

64 Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File #5941.
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The w itnesses' depositions seem to be incontrovertible and Adam does
not appear to have contested their accounts. On October 7th, he "was
rem oving som e Earth, but did it n ot to Captain Clark's mind." d a r k told him
to do it differently. One w itness m erely stated that Adam refused; another
said A dam "shewed himself very Surley and gave Saucy Answers" in his
refusal.65 It is entirely possible that any refusal, no matter h o w civil, would be
seen in this light by white men, m any of whom, even at this early stage of
racial formation in British North America, had developed specific ideas about
the character of black people. Sam uel Sewall, for instance, blithely used an
apparently comm on idiom of the day w hen he m entioned n ot w anting to
treat Increase Mather "as a Negro," and how Cotton Mather had scolded him
"as if I had used his father w orse than a Neger."66 W inthrop Jordan points
out that in N ew England, as early as the 1640s "there were scattered signs that
N egroes were regarded as different from English people n ot m erely in their
status as slaves."67 Using 'Negro,' and not 'slave' for a com m on descriptive
standard of contemptible treatment indicates that by the end of the
seventeenth century, those scattered signs had become a part of m ost whites'
everyday perception of black people. A ny response by A dam that w as less
than im m ediate and total com pliance to the commands of Captain Clark,
regardless of whether or not an order w as reasonable, w o u ld have been seen
by som e w hites as "surley" and "saucy."

65 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 112-113.
66 The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729, ed. M. Halsey Thomas, 454-455. Entry dated
October 9 and 20,1701. Likewise, Twom bly and Moore noted other w ays in which Africans were
used in standard language to express w hat w as undesirable. See Twom bly and Moore, "Black
Puritans" 226.
67 W inthrop Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812
(N ew York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 71.
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The w itnesses do agree on what happened after Adam's refusal.
Captain Clark called A dam a rascal and possibly other names. Adam refused
to allow him self to be defined by the terms that Clark and Saffin had used,
and replied that "he w as no Rogue, no Rascal, n o Thief." Clark then struck
Adam's tobacco pipe out of his mouth w ith a stick, shouting "you R ogue you
shall do as I bid you," and shoved Adam, w h o shoved Clark in return. A dam
warned Clark that if he w as struck, he w ou ld respond in kind, but Clark,
likely m otivated by a need to keep face in front of the other laborers, land ed a
blow or tw o w ith his stick on Adam's shoulders. Adam, "in great Fury &
rage...wrested the Stick out of [Clark's] hand and broke it" and then m ade
good on his w arning by launching a strike at Clark w ith his shovel. Clark
deflected the blow w ith one arm, and then the other workers w ere on Adam .
Adam's fury w as hardly spent; he was "so furious and outragious and putt
forth so great Strength that it w as as much as Six or Seven of us could d o to
hold and restrain him," and one of those m en m ade the mistake of pu ttin g
his hand w ithin range of Adam's teeth, w h o "like to have bit it off."
Fortunately for that man, his hand w as retrieved from Adam's m outh before
m uch damage w as done, and Adam w as carted off to the dungeon.68
Saffin quickly m oved to have Adam sold abroad. Likely sm arting from
Sewall's charges and w anting to be careful not to appear deceitful, he sen t a
boat to get A dam w ith instructions to take him to Judge Addington, "not
doubting but this Wretch negro in regard of his late bloody attempt, sh ou ld by
Authority be forthwith sent aboard." To his surprise, Addington did n o t
concur and instead had Adam jailed until the Quarter Sessions court dealt
w ith the Castle Island incident.69 That court jailed Adam for three m ore

68 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 112-113.
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months b u t did not resolve the question of Adam's status as free or slave.
Ironically, this w ou ld gall Saffin further. Since Adam w as still legally a slave,
Saffin w as responsible to pay the jailer for Adam's keep. Furthermore, w hen
Adam w as released but still aw aiting the next hearing of the Superior Court,
Saffin rem ained liable for his upkeep. Massachusetts tow ns regularly
dem anded that slaves not becom e the responsibility of the town, and required
sureties from slaveow ners w h o m anum itted slaves in case the freedm en
were unable to take care of them selves. The result, com plained Saffin, w as
that he had been made "a m eer Vassall to his slave in being at continuall cost
and charges about him to su pp ly him w ith all manner of Necessarys, as
Cloaths, B edding food and Phisick."70 Furthermore, w hen Adam w as
afflicted by sm allpox that year, Saffin w as responsible to attend to him. For
Saffin, this w a s the antithesis of h ow the law was meant to function—it w as
he, John Saffin the judge, merchant, and property owner, and not A dam the
slave, criminal, and property, w h o had become the one "greatly Injured &
oppressed...in a manner...there hath not been the like done in N ew
England."71
M eanw hile, back on less turbulent shores, events w ere w orking in
Adam's favor. A new governor excluded Saffin from his appointm ents to the
Superior Court, possibly because of the serious charges earlier leveled by
Sewall. W hen this court m et in N ovem ber of 1702, Saffin's claims against
Adam w ere dism issed. Adam, having undoubtedly learned a good deal about
the court's procedures, im m ediately presented a petition for his freedom
along w ith the original contract Saffin had signed. The court appointed tw o
69 Ibid., 111-112.
70 Ibid., 101.
71 Ibid., 96.
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lawyers to represent Adam and m oved the case to the Inferior Court of
Common Pleas. There, Adam pressed h is advantage, not only suing for his
freedom, but argued that "he being a freem an and ready to prove his liberty"
and that Saffin "doth unjustly vex him" b y claiming he was still a slave. To
repair the damage done, Adam had the audacity to ask the court to have
Saffin pay him one hundred pounds. It is easy to imagine how infuriated
John Saffin m ust have been when Bristol's sheriff appeared at his hom e to
deliver a sum m ons requiring Saffin "answer to Adam Negroe of Boston."72
For reasons not clear, this court v o id ed the summons and refused to
allow Adam's appeal. His lawyers, prom pted by the fact that "Adam dayly
pursues [us] for the Tryall of his sd liberty" and that he was "being dayly
threatened by the sd Mr. Saffin, to be sen t out of this province into forreigne,
parts to remaine a slave during his life" w en t back to the Superior Court to
seek redress in M ay of 1703. The court responded with a som ewhat legally
ambiguous statement, defining Adam as neither slave nor free, but declaring
that he "be in peace untill by due process of Law he be found a slave."73
Saffin, quick to go back on the offensive, circumvented the courts and
now petitioned the legislature.

He not only outlined the previous two plus

years of trying to secure his property, but tried a new strategy. Saffin, once
again revealing h o w deeply Adam had gotten under his skin, told the
legislature that "the said vile Negro is at this D ay set at large to goe at his
pleasure." H e then raised the specter o f black rebelliousness, a fear that
already had a deadly history before 1700. Adam, claimed Saffin, had not only
told a jailer that "he w ou ld make no m ore to Twist or wring off the N eck of

72 The summons and the sheriff's brief account that he delivered the summons to Saffin's home
can be found in Suffolk Court Files, vol. 55, File #5542.
73 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 95.
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your petitioner then he w ou ld of a Snake" , b u t had also threatened "all them
that have cross't his turbulent Humour, to the great scandall and evill
example of all N egros both in Town and country w h ose eyes are u p o n this
wretched Negro." D esignating Adam as still a slave w ould have perm itted
Saffin to sell him and ensure that no one w o u ld be "exposed to any
Detriment by the sd N egros villainous practices." The Assem bly ordered the
Court of General Sessions, upon which sat justices of the peace, to hear the
case in August and for A dam to be jailed in the meantime.74
Samuel Sewall registered his indignation at Saffin's m achinations w ith
a poem:
Superanuated Squier, w igg'd and pow der'd w ith pretence,
Much beguiles the just Assem bly by his lyin g Impudence.
None being by, his bold Attorneys push it on w ith might and
m ain
by which m eans poor sim ple Adam sinks to slavery again.75
Sewall aptly described the forces against w hich A dam struggled in his quest
for freedom—Judge Saffin, his attorneys, and n o w the 'beguiled' legislature.
But the prize w as worth the fight, and Adam stated his case in court w ith his
attorney. N onetheless, a jury found Adam gu ilty of not performing the
conditions of the original contract. D enying defeat, Adam promptly appealed
the verdict.
In Novem ber of 1703, the Court of General Sessions heard John Saffin
em ploy the same argum ents he had used throughout, and appeal once again
to a fear of black insurrection. His attorney testified that Adam threatened to

74 Ibid., 96-7.
75 The Diary of Samuel Sezuall, 1674-1729, ed. M. H alsey Thomas, 487. Entry dated June 8,
1703. Sewall also stated that A dam w as "again im prisoned" for the trial ordered by the
General Assembly, therefore I have surmised that A dam w a s also imprisoned by order of the
Assem bly.

49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"ring [Saffin's] neck if he had opportunity," and persistently displayed "cros
carriage" and "needless malignance" and did n ot heed Saffin or his attorney.76
A dam 's lawyer asserted that A dam had indeed perform ed the conditions of
the contract, and more im portantly, that even if A dam had not done so, there
w as no penalty stipulated in the contract. Here A dam 's attorney em ployed a
n ew tactic: he argued that nothing in the contract, on w h ich the entire dispute
had hinged for well over tw o years, stated that Adam should "forfeit the
freedom or liberty thereby intended." He focused on the phrase in the
contract that stated "Allways provided that...Adam...go on chearfully quietly
and Industriously," and argued that the word "provided" w as "a
consideration and not a Condition." In contrast, "Enffranchisment is positive
& not conditional! and liberty being a privilege the greatest that can be given
to any m an save his life, it o u g h t not to be forfeited u p on trivial and
frivolous matters as is pretended by the Defendant." A dam 's lawyer made
Saffin's obsession w ith A dam 's behavior irrelevant. H e also cast Adam 's
status into doubt; the im plication of his argument w as that Adam entered
into this contract on the sam e lev el as any white man, despite referring to
A dam as a slave in other petitions—in this appeal, he carefully om itted any
reference to Adam as anything but the "sd appellant."
The attorney's argum ent w on the day and A dam 's freedom. Either
sw ayed by his novel interpretation of the contract or looking for any grounds
to grant the petition for freedom , the jury, w ith A dam and Saffin present,
found in Adam's favor. The court declared "That the sd A dam & his heirs be

76 John Saffin's attorney Daniel W illard's deposition in Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File #
5941.
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at peace & quiet & free w ith all their Chattels from the sd John Saffin Esqr. &
his heirs for Ever."77
Adam slides quietly out of the records after this final decision, despite a
final futile attempt by Saffin to get the legislature to order the court to rehear
the case. Adam settled in Boston, the site of his legal triumph and defiant
stand against John Saffin. In w hat w as perhaps a final thrust aim ed at his
former master, A dam took Saffin's last nam e for his own, thereby finalizing
his self-identification as a free man. Though free from John Saffin, he did not
remain entirely free from the law; in 1711 he was ordered by Boston's
selectm en to give three days labor for cleaning and repairing the highw ays.
This com plied w ith an ordinance that had been instituted for free black men,
w h o w ere not perm itted to serve in the militia but could not be allow ed to get
by w ithout som e kind of service to the community. A few years after that,
Adam Saffin cam e to the selectmen along w ith four other free black m en and
proposed that they be bound to support Leblond, a poor black w om an living
in Boston. The selectm en denied their request.78
Adam Saffin's story, given only a passing reference by other historians,
deserves to be told. Adam's actions indicate that on some level he defined
him self as a legal being—not a legal being w ith rights as white colonials and
Americans w ou ld at the end of the eighteenth century, but at the very least as
one w h o could enter into a contract and call upon the law to enforce it. For
an African man in early N ew England to perceive himself this w ay is not
surprising since the law in Massachusetts stated that even slaves ou gh t to be

77 Publications of The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-1894 , v ol. 1, 100.
78 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1700 to 1728 (Boston: Rockwell and Curchhill, 1883); A Report of the Record
Commissioners containing the Records of the Boston Selectmen from 1701 to 1715 (Boston:
Rockwell and Churchill, 1884), March 13, 1713.
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accorded som e rudimentary legal privileges. What has been given little
consideration in the accounts of Adam Saffin's legal battle is the degree to
w hich he understood h o w the process worked and h is reliance on the law .
Adam, w h o stood near the bottom of the social hierarchy, m anaged to
harness any fear of the law's power. Seemingly small acts such as spending
tw o weeks in Boston after being ordered by Saffin in court to go im m ediately
from Boston to Castle Island are significant because they demonstrate that a
black man, a slave, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, accurately
understood the w eak links in the law. H e surely understood that the court
could potentially levy serious punishments for som e o f his m isdeeds, but
Adam shrewdly perceived that the dynamics of the court, w ith Sewall and
others being Saffin's rivals—or at least disapproving of Saffin personallylim ited the effectiveness or likelihood of enforcement. He knew h ow to
em ploy the pow er of the law for his own benefit, and h e knew how far he
could push on the w eak links without bringing legal consequences d ow n on
his ow n head. There w as always an element of risk lurking in the unknown;
he could not know w hat the court's final decision w o u ld be, and he gam bled
that men who disapproved of slavery but did not necessarily hold high
opinions of black m en in general would care enough to prevail in his favor.
Adam played his cards well.
But there is a question of w h y Adam w ent to Castle Island at all, and
w h y he complied w ith other orders to appear in court, instead of sim ply
absconding. Adam 's readiness to use the law instead o f flight or continued
rebellion was likely spurred by his rootedness in the Boston and Bristol
communities. John Saffin testified that Adam seem ed to have enough
connections in Boston to allow him to loiter w ithout w an t of room and
board; so, too, Dick's w illingness to offer himself as a surety testifies to
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Adam 's network of friends and possibly relatives in the area. Lawrence
Towner noted some years ago that servants w ith that kind of community
grounding were more likely to u se legal m eans of challenging owners, w hile
servants less grounded in their com m unities were more likely to resort to
unruly behavior or running aw ay. In this sense, Adam fits the description of
a creolized African: he had established relationships in this non-African
society and exhibited a high degree of familiarity w ith how this society
functioned.79
Perhaps he also believed if he openly defied the orders of the entire
court and not just John Saffin, chances w ere good that eventually the law
w ou ld catch up to him — that despite the sympathies of Sewall and some of
the other judges, they w ou ld be bound to try and catch and hold him. Instead
of flight, Adam pushed the boundaries of obedience to the lim it without
actually putting him self in a p osition of losing all recourse to the court in his
effort to gain freedom. H is actions indicate that he believed his best bet w as to
rely on his contract, on his ability to convince influential w hite m en that his
interpretation of it w as the correct one, and to trust that Sewall and the other
justices—m en he apparently k n ew on som e level—w ould w ork within the
legal process to w in his freedom . A nd perhaps m ost importantly, Adam
perceived that if he succeeded in gaining freedom through the court, it w ou ld
be final—whereas running aw ay m eant that freedom w ould alw ays be
precarious, liable to be snatched aw ay at any moment. Here the law offered

79 Lawrence W. Towner, " 'A Fondness for Freedom': Servant Protest in Puritan Society,"
William and M ary Quarterly 19 (April 1962), 201-219, 213; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 1763; Thorton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World. There is little doubt
that som e of the slaves in M assachusetts fit the description of being creoles. One example is
the w ill o f John Stoughton, which lists "one man Negro named John & one Negro boy named
Peter." Stoughton (or his family) traded a good bit in Barbados; so it is likely that is where
they acquired these slaves. See Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 29, 46-47.

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

security, and A dam knew it and pursued it; in a way, he pursued it again for
Leblond a decade later, but failed. W hen h e came to the Selectm en in 1713
seeking legal validation of his and the other free black mens' support of
Leblond, it is doubtful that influential m en like Samuel Sewall gave any
attention to a seem in gly m undane matter. Relying entirely on his ow n
standing and that of four other black m en proved insufficient. H aving
experienced the benefits of the law, A dam also experienced its lim itations.
The legal battle Adam Saffin w a g ed for tw o and half years points to
other tensions for Africans in N ew England. When he w ent to court, Adam
attempted to im p ose his interpretation of events and of the nature of the
conflict--that the heart of the dispute w a s John Saffin's desire to violate a legal
contract and d en y a freeman his liberty. Through his ow n testim ony and the
testimony of his w h ite allies, Adam presented the court with a picture of
himself not as a m an fighting against a social institution of exploitive labor,
but as a laboring servant w ho had faithfully fulfilled the terms of a contract.
Against that, John Saffin presented an interpretation of a black m an w h o
epitomized the negative character traits that w hite society w as already
beginning to ascribe as inherent to black slaves. A legal conflict, though
typically interpreted by courts as a sin gle issu e dispute, involves m ultiple
struggles over interpreting the conflict.80 The various courts that adjudicated
this case did not d en y John Saffin's interpretation of black men; nor did the
courts m ove in any w ay to threaten slavery. Again, the w inning argum ent
m ade by A dam 's attorney is instructive: he appealed not to the injustice of
slavery, but to the legal w ording of the labor contract. Given the distaste the

80 See Sally Engle M erry, Getting Justice and G etting Even: Legal Consciousness among Workingclass Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 87; and Barbara Y ngvesson and
Lynn Mather, "Courts, Moots, and the D isputing Process" in Empirical Theories about Courts,
ed. Keith Boyum and Lynn Mather (N ew York: Longman, 1983), 52.
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jurists appear to have held for John Saffin, it is probable that they w elcom ed
an argument that gave them a legal hook upon w hich to hang a judgm ent
against him that in no w ay threatened slavery. In order to secure his
freedom, Adam and his attorney, far from challenging slavery, used a
construction of the conflict "which orders facts according to normative
claims" that successfully persuaded the court to decide in their favor.81
Resorting to those normative claims validated the court's authority to
reinforce and perpetuate those norms in their ow n lives.
Thinking of identity as a continual process that, for African slaves,
involved establishing and maintaining boundaries as w ell as negotiating
relationships and transactions, points to h ow Adam 's court battles likely
affected his self-conception in a variety of w ays. Clearly, Adam attempted to
define himself as a freeman before the court concurred. But establishing this
sim ple yet vital boundary of freedom that achieved permanence betw een
him self and John Saffin—or, for that matter, betw een him self and every w hite
m an or wom an—came only by negotiating through the legal process.
Achieving his goal only through the decree of the court likely worked to both
reinforce and mitigate Adam's sense of self as an individual who controlled
his ow n fate. Success, accom plished largely because of his own tenacity and
understanding of the legal system, reinforced this im age of self. But A dam
had also experienced defeats in his battles for freedom. Failure—even though
not permanent—com bined w ith a victory achieved not on the word of A dam
or his witnesses, but due to a clever argument by his attorney, reinforced an
im age of self bounded by and dependent on Puritan systems of authority. The
point is not that subm ission to governing authorities w as a novel experience

81 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 92.
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for Africans in N ew England, but that the governing authorities had
distinctly Puritan and English forms, symbols, and process.
Legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has pointed out that conflicts
often "have m eaning for h ow the person thinks about him self or herself and
his or her social world, her ability to cope and to defend herself, and her
ability to create an acceptable image of herself and her life."82 Adam's
resiliency during this conflict signified that he indeed had the ability to cope
and carve out a place for him self in this society. H is actions during this
conflict, such as loitering about Boston long after being ordered to Bristol by
John Saffin or insisting that his work on Castle Island w as good enough,
signified that Adam 's acceptable image of him self w as that of a freeman w h o
controlled his ow n fate. H e felt, however, that the best m ethod of making
this self-image a m eaningful reality lay not sim ply through the public
statement of his ow n actions, but through the public statement of one of the
central institutions of w h ite sodety--the law.
Adam Saffin provides perhaps the m ost v iv id exam ple of how
transitioning to N ew England society and the space provided within Puritan
law could come together to influence Africans' evolvin g identity. Other black
m en and wom en, both slave and free, also experienced the power of the law
to affect their daily lives to varying degrees . A few , like Adam, experienced
the law's ability to protect them from slavery by gaining permanent legal
freedom. Some, convicted of serious or minor crimes, felt the heavy hand of
the law; others, cleared of crimes, experienced the law 's ability to protect them
from grievous consequences.83 Whether encountering the law's ability to

82 Ibid., 98.
83 Several cases of this nature appear in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
Collections, vol. 29-30 (Boston: The Colonial Society, 1933). These volum es are a reprint of
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protect, punish, or sim ply regulate daily life, Africans in M assachusetts had a
long record of persistent engagem ent w ith the law well before Q ouck Walker
and other African Americans played their part in dism antling slavery after
the American R evolution. It is to that record this chapter n o w turns.

N ot long after the arrival of the first black slaves, an African w om an
encountered the opportunity for both fear and protection under the law .
Zippora, slave to John Manning in Suffolk County, stood accused of
fornicating w ith another slave, Jeffea, and murdering her new born son by
cutting off its head in September of 1662. There was som e conflicting
evidence, how ever, as Zippora, in a petition pleading for the court7s "pious
consideration," confessed to the sin o f fom ification w ith Jeffea but later
insisted that the child had been b om dead and she had buried it. Apparently,
a decapitated child had been exhum ed, but Zippora argued that her child had
been "not so w h itish7' and "not so bigg" as the one that had been found. She
testified that three w hite wom en, one her owner's wife w ith her during and
after the delivery, and that a Mrs. Parker told her to bury the child. Zippora,
w h o said she had not even known she w as w ith child and probably in a daze
from shock, pain, and grief, obeyed and dug a hole about a foot and half deep
in a m uddy plain and there placed her son "with its head on."
Further depositions hinted at a conspiracy to blame Zippora for the
crime. Betty, a black woman, testified that a w eek or more before the incident
she had spoken w ith Mrs. Sands, one o f the three white w om en present
during Zippora's labor, and informed Sands that Zippora w as pregnant. On a

Suffolk County Court Records. Also, the Thw ing Database has many exam ples o f cases like
these from the Suprem e Judicial Court and the Court of Assistants; i s o see Tw om bly and
Moore, "Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts,"; and Towner, " 'A
Fondness for Freedom / "
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Thursday, the day after Zippora's tragic delivery, Betty ran into Sands, w h o
said she had talked w ith Zippora's mistress, and that Zippora was not
pregnant. Another black woman, Mary, testified that "hearing her
countrywoman zipporah w as still a bed," she w en t pay her a visit. This was
the same day that Sands had told Betty there had been no pregnancy, m uch
less a stillborn baby. W hen Mary arrived, Mrs. Manning, Zippora's m istress,
confronted her, saying that "she was bold to com e & see her countrywoman"
and that Zippora w a s w ell and on her feet. Perhaps the most dam m ing
evidence came from a w hite servant w om an o f Mrs. Parker's, w ho testified
that she had been in the house the night of the birth, and that Mrs. Parker had
"bid her take up [illegible] for her negro w as delivered of a dead child." She
heard the three w hite w om en tell Zipporah to bury it "since it was dead
borne," and that Zipporah obeyed. This servant woman also expressed
puzzlem ent concerning w h y the w om en seem ed so clandestine, sayin g "she
never heard such a thing kept secret" and that she had overheard Mrs.
Manning speak of sending Zipporah to Barbados. The testimony of these
three women, one w h ite and two black, painted a picture of Sands, Parker,
and Manning trying to hide som ething.84
In the light o f this testimony, the grand jury did not allow the
indictment to proceed to a trial. It is possible that the white w om en killed the
infant and told Zippora her son was stillborn; it is also possible that the child
had a light com plexion, indicating that the father was not Jeffea, but perhaps
one of their husbands, a fact they w ished to hide. Zippora's claim that her
dead son had been "not so whitish" as the decapitated child suggests that her

84 Suffolk Court Files vol. 5, File #605
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child had indeed been light-skinned—just not as w hite as the other m urdered
infant.
Regardless, the legal process worked for Zippora. It is likely she is the
same free black wom an named Zippora w ho obtained a deed to a p lot of land
and a house in 1670, becoming perhaps the first property-owning black
w om an in M assachusetts.85 The law's ability to protect directly impacted
Zippora by providing security from false prosecution and, seven years later,
through the security of a property deed.
For a few other black m en and wom en, the law in seventeenth-century
Massachusetts worked to help establish boundaries, though in a less dramatic
manner than the case of Adam Saffin and Zippora. Zippora's case drew other
black wom en and men into the legal sphere—not only did Betty and Mary
gain some familiarity w ith the legal process; so, too, did their husbands,
Angola and Frank, though indirectly. This may have very well been part of
the genesis of the black comm unity in Suffolk County. At a time w h en there
were few slaves in Massachusetts, it is notable that at least two other black
w om en were involved w ith Zippora.

Angola later w itnessed the law 's

pow er to reinforce his claim on his personal property w hen he successfully
prosecuted three Indian m en for breaking into his house in 1672, for which
each received twenty stripes. Frank was likely the same Frank w ho w as
acquitted by the grand jury—lead by the same foreman as the grand jury in
Zippora's case—in 1668 after being charged w ith helping a white man awaiting
trial for murder escape from jail.86

85 Twombly and Moore, "Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," 236.
86 Angola's case is in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, vol. 29,
119; Frank's case is in Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay
1630-1692 (Boston: Suffolk County, 1928), vol. 3,194. Hugh Mason was the foreman o f the grand
jury for both cases involving Zippora and Frank.
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Angola, a slave of Robert Keayne, achieved freedom at som e point after
Keayne's death. In 1653 Keayne had stipulated in his w ill that Angola, along
w ith tw o other slaves, were to receive "some young Heifers to rayse a stock"
tw o years after his ow n death. A ngola's time had been sold to another free
black m an—which appears to have m eant that A ngola him self had been sold—
and he either earned or w as g iv en his freedom in 1656. The man w h o bought
A ngola's time, Sebastian Kaine, p u t his mark on a legal docum ent that
com m itted his house in Dorchester and over four acres along w ith its wheat
crop if he did not pay the balance o f A nna Keayne's selling price of sixteen
pounds. Angola, like Sebastian Kaine, became a property owner. Part of his
property came in an unusual m anner, w hen Governor Richard Bellingham
gave him a 50ft. square plot for savin g the Governor from drowning. Angola
had been paddling dow n a river w h en he came across Bellingham in a
sinking boat.87 For both of these m en, and Zippora and a few other black
property owners, the law established permanent ownership of a valued
com m odity in seventeenth century N e w England. W hites could make no
claims on their property. The legal pow er of the deed granted a measure of
distance betw een black property ow ners and white N ew Englanders through
the security promised in the legal docum ents on which they put their marks.
In the first few decades of freedom, these Africans—w ho w ere likely among
the first brought to M assachusetts shores—navigated their w a y comfortably
through legal territory to lay d o w n important boundaries securing personal
freedom .

87 See A ngola and Sebastian Kaine in the Thw ing Database and in Tw om bly and Moore, "Black
Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century M assachusetts," 235-36. Kaine also w ent by 'Bus Bus',
and his name is spelled variously as Bostian Ken, Busse, and Bastian Kenn.
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After A ngola's death, Elizabeth also experienced the law 's ability to
protect property w h en the county court validated her inheritance of the
house and land, and that her property w ou ld pass on to her children upon
her death.88 T hough neither Angola or Elizabeth would be alive to w itness it,
the law also conferred mixed blessings for their family: in 1681, their infant
granddaughter, w h ose mother had d ied and whose father had been banished
from the colony, w as committed by the court into the selectm en's hands, who
"may put out the said Child being a Negro" as a servant until she w as thirty
years old. Though the courTs order m ay seem harsh, it ensured that the
infant Mary Sapato w ould have som e provision. It m ay be that there were no
other relatives or friends who could have cared for Mary w ith ou t binding her
to servitude for thirty years, but the court's reasoning— "the said Child being a
Negro"—indicates that one key factor in their order w as equating blackness
with legal servitude.89 For the A ngola family, as for Zippora w h o lived under
the threat of being sent to Barbados, and other black w om en and m en, their
status as African and black was never entirely removed from their
relationship w ith a legal system that could define them as property. It proved
to be a relationship beneficial and constricting, em powering and oppressive.
Seventeenth-century Africans d id not have to be personally involved
with the law to be acquainted w ith legal process or power. They frequently
witnessed or w ere aware of the legal im broglios that envelop ed their masters.
In 1672, one slave contributed to a strident legal dispute am ong w hites sim ply
by complaining that a white neighbor w as causing trouble by taking a pin out
of a water pum p, thereby preventing this African slave from accom plishing

88 Publications o f the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, vol. 30, 598.
89 Mary Sapato appears in the Thwing Database.
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an assigned task o f fetching a pail of water.90 In 1675, a white man w as
charged for killin g a dog and threatening the d og of a young slave—and
though the charge w as not proved, the defendant found himself fined for
"behaving him selfe very rudely & unmannerly."91 It is probable that the
young slave came to court to testify, and subsequently witnessed not only the
court's expectations of respect and decorum, but the mechanics of h o w a court
case proceeded.
The m ost pow erful witness of the law 's pow er to punish cam e through
public executions. In the summer of 1681, Maria, slave of Roxbury resident
Joshua Lamb, "being instigated by ye devill," took live coals from a fire and,
laying it on the floor near a door, burnt dow n the house of a Doctor Thomas
Swann. Maria then crept back into her master's house through a hole at the
back door and set it ablaze with another coal. Maria not only confessed to the
details of the crime, but accused the slaves of tw o other white m en of aiding
her arson spree, Chefalia and Coffee. The Grand Jury did not return a bill of
indictment against these two, but deem ing them to be dangerous slaves based
on the suspicion o f their involvem ent, the Court of Assistants ordered both
men to be sold ou t of the country. The 'space' of personhood that N e w
England law supposedly afforded slaves closed very quickly for Chefalia and
Coffee, even though there had been no verdict against them. Maria, w h o
admitted her guilt, w as sentenced to be burned to death.92 This sentence was
apparently carried out. According to a nineteenth-century historian, Increase
Mather's original diary had an entry for September 22, 1681, briefly noting the

90 Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 29, 196.
91 Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 30, 601.
92 Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692 (Boston:
Suffolk County, 1901), vol. 1, 197-99.
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burning to death of "a negro w om an w h o burnt 2 houses at Roxbury July 1 2 in one of w ch a child w as burnt to death." Mather also noted that this w as the
first execution by fire in N ew England.93
Just days after Maria burned dow n the Roxbury homes, another slave,
Jack, was caught and accused of arson in North Hampton. Whether or not
Jack, if he was indeed guilty, had know n of and been inspired by Maria's act is
unknown. Tried on the sam e day and in the same court, Jack initially
confessed, then recanted, but to no avail. He w as sentenced to be "hangd by
the neck till he be dead & then taken dow ne & burnt to Ashes in the fier w th
Maria negro." Five years previous, a Boston slave named Basto w h o insisted
upon his innocence w as accused, convicted, and executed for raping the three
year old daughter of his owner.
Being public affairs, executions carried w eighty symbolic m eaning.
W hen a young slave nam ed Bristol w as executed in 1763, a number o f slave
and free black men and w om en were present; it is not unreasonable to
suppose that there w ere som e black faces in the audience at public executions
in the seventeenth century.94 Executions were the ultimate example o f the
ability of the law to rem ove all boundaries provided by personal liberties,
w hile sim ultaneously m aking a public statem ent that the law protected the
lives of the rest of the community by elim inating alleged murderers.

93 The Case of Maria in the Court of Assistants in 1681 (Boston: n.d.) 10.
94 From Sylvanus Conant, The Blood of Abel, and the Blood of Jesus considered and improved, in
a Sermon Delivered at Taunton, December the First 1763. Upon the Day of the Execution of
Bristol, A Negro Boy of about Sixteen Years Old, for the Murder of Miss Elizabeth M cKinstry
(Boston: 1764) 34. On the sym bolic importance of executions to maintain the image of the
majesty and power of the law, see Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law"
in Albions' Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (N ew York: Pantheon
Books, 1975), 3-64.

63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Furthermore, sentences in Puritan N ew England w ere not m erely punitive;
they functioned to m aintain political and social order.95
Maintaining the place of slaves and free black w om en and m en in that
social order receives little consideration. Historians note that N ew England
and m ost of the northern colonies did not possess an intense fear of slave
insurrections that occasionally convulsed the southern states, primarily due
to the low density of slaves in m ost of N ew England. W hile it is true that
there w as little reason to fear the kind of broad slave rebellion that seemed
plausible in other areas, this does not mean that w hite N e w Englanders did
not fear slave rebelliousness. In som e respects, w hite slave ow ners had good
reason to fear slaves rising u p against them—perhaps not in an organized,
w ide-scale rebellion, but on an individual level. The 'fam ily slavery' that
existed in much of N ew England gave slaves opportunity to bond with their
ow ners and families, but it also fostered an environm ent in w hich personal
friction and resentment could grow intense. Some of the crimes that slaves
in Massachusetts committed, such as Maria's arson, if she w as indeed guilty as
she confessed, seem to have had a decidedly personal ed ge—w h en she planted
the coals in her master's h ou se during the night, she placed them in the bed
chamber, probably hoping to trap both her master and D octor Swann in the
resulting infernos.
Piecing together the experience of Africans w ith the legal system fills in
som e of the spaces in the picture of 'family slavery' that scholars such as
W illiam Piersen and Joanne P ope M elish have constructed. Piersen
convincingly argues that N ew Englander slaveowners typically set out to
95 See Howard Schweber, "Ordering Principles: The Adjudication o f Criminal Cases in Puritan
M assachusetts, 1629-1650," Law and Society Review 32 (No. 2, 1998) 376-408; Cornelia Dayton,
Women before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill:
University o f North Carolina Press, 1995).
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incorporate slaves into familial and subordinate relationships. Slaves were
often bought as children or infants, m aking the inculcation of their place
within the fam ily easier. Naturally, genuinely close relationships often
resulted; Cotton Mather w en t so far as to assert that slaves were not only "of
our ow n household," but were "more clearly related to us than m any others
are." Piersen states that w h en white and enslaved black children grew up
together, "close relationships usually developed."96 Melish points out that
the familial relationships characterizing N e w England slavery w ere
frequently genuine as far as the existence of emotional ties. Many ow ners not
only considered slaves as a part of the family, but experienced acute grief
w hen a slave died.97
But m any slave-ow ning families lived in a state of tension w ith their
African charges, and not all contemporaries held Cotton Mather's rather
benign im pression of the relationships betw een slaves and their owners. In
1700 Samuel Sewall observed that slaves' "continual aspiring after thenforbidden Liberty, renders them U nwilling Servants." He also questioned,
perhaps w ith Mather in m ind, the notion that slaves could actually becom e
part of a white fam ily. Taking into account the "disparity in their Conditions,
Colour & Hair," Sewall doubted that Africans could ever "embody w ith us,
and grow up into orderly Families."98 Sewall knew firsthand of slaves'
'continual aspiring' for the freedoms that their w hite slave-ow ning fam ilies
daily lived out in front of them, as well as the persistent unw illingness of
som e Africans to remain in bondage. Sew all's grow ing discomfort, prom pted

96 Piersen, Black Yankees, 26.
97 Melish, Disowning Slavery, 23-34.
98 The Dairy of Samuel Sewall, ed. Harvey Wish (N ew York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967).
Contained in "The Selling of Joseph," reprinted after the entry dated June 19 1700.
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by issues before the A ssem bly concerning the slave trade and a petition to free
tw o 'unjustly' enslaved Africans, lead him to write this early antislavery tract,
w hich may have been aim ed at his fellow jurist and staunch supporter of
slavery, John Saffin." Sewall's early antislavery activism, while in part due
to his own theological convictions, was also due to the agitation of slaves
them selves— Adam and others who, through their more vociferous public
misbehavior, w ere a part of the cadre of 'unw illing servants' that helped
convince a vanguard of m en like Sewall that slavery was at best a
troublesom e institution.
Piersen and M elish and other scholars w h o have studied N ew England
slavery have described the 'distance' within the familial slave-master
relationships. Slaveow ners m ay have considered their chattel as part of the
family, yet they did n o t forget that Africans were still chattel. And though
'family slavery' m ay have mitigated som e of the harsh reality of what was in
the end an exploitive relationship, it also frequently reinforced relational
distance through sim ple mechanisms such as seating arrangements.100 For
som e slaves that duality of being 'in' the family but persistently reminded
they were not 'of' the fam ily must have been a persistent irritation. For a
few , that irritation sp illed over into outright antagonism that found release
in criminal acts. The argum ent here does not so m uch undermine 'family
slavery' as suggest that the connotations of the term can obscure the
animosity and outright hostility that caused som e slaves to find them selves
answering to the law.

99 Lorenzo Greene described Saffin as Sewall's "bitter enemy." See Greene, The Negro in
Colonial New England, 297; also see Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition
of Slavery in the North, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 58.
100 Piersen, Black Yankees, 31.
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Though the cases docum ented here may seem few in light of a time
span of several decades, o n ly the stories of m en and w om en w ho were caught
and brought to the superior courts are readily available in the records. Other
slaves certainly com m itted crim es against their m asters that w ent undetected,
or were dealt with personally or at the justice of the peace level, w ithout ever
reaching the higher courts. O ne Boston justice of the peace examined Cesar, a
Boston slave, for a series o f thefts he committed over a period of seven
months. Running away during the early winter of 1717, Cesar told the justice
about his exploits in great detail—so much detail, in fact, that the im pression
is of a slave, knowing the gam e is up, boasting of h o w easily he frustrated
those w h o thought they h eld pow er over him. Cesar regaled the justice w ith
stories of he "oft times" broke into his master's house for food and clothing;
of breaking into another B oston hom e where he "took about half a cheese
[and] a Silver cup in w h ich he drew beer upon"; of enlisting an Indian named
Toby to help him steal butter and two-gallon stone ju g filled with rum"; and
acquiring geese, pork, and veal—all the while rem aining in Boston. That
Cesar chose to target his m aster's home repeatedly again speaks to the kind of
personal antagonism that cou ld run high in a close environm ent. The record
of this examination, a sin gle sh eet of paper among the justice's private papers,
happened to survive; certainly there are far more that have disappeared.

In

1734, Answer, the slave o f a Boston blacksmith, was indicted but acquitted for
burning dow n his ow ner's b a m and house. In 1747, tw o slaves from the
Boston area, both nam ed Cato, w ere indicted for "entering w ith force & arms"
and stealing bills of credit w orth cel250 old tenor from one of their masters.
One confessed, the other p lead not guilty but w as found guilty, no doubt in
large part due to the confession o f his partner, and both w ere sentenced to 20
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stripes and to repay triple the valu e of the bills. Cesar epitom izes the kind of
'unw illing servant' Sewall had in m ind.101
The m ost extreme expression of being an 'u n w illin g servant7 came
from slaves w h o murdered their masters. In the m iddle of the eighteenth
century, there were three docum ented instances of Boston area slaves
assassinating their masters by poison. The most com plex m urder directly
involved three slaves, Mark, P hillis, and Phoebe, and indirectly involved
others w h o heard of or assisted their scheme. According to Phillis' testimony,
Mark first planted the idea of d oin g aw ay with their ow ner, Captain John
Codman, during the winter of 1755. Mark had apparently given this a good
deal of thought; Phillis said Mark had read through the Bible and discerned
that "it w as no Sin to kill him if they did not lay violent H ands on him So as
to shed Blood, by sticking or stabbing or cutting his Throat." The plan came to
fruition that summer. W hen the w om en finally agreed, Mark procured some
poison—apparently arsenic—from Robbin, an acquaintance and slave of an
apothecary in Boston. Phillis testified that Robbin served as their guide for
h ow to adm inister the poison and h ow much to use. A sid e from working for
an apothecary, Robbin apparently had experience in the matter, having
previously assisted another group of slaves in murdering their master.
Phillis said this crime had gone undetected.
In his testimony, Mark insisted he knew nothing o f a plan to murder
Codman. Phoebe, he claimed, h ad asked him for som ething lethal so she
could kill three of her husband's pigs, possibly under the gu ise of submitting
to a tow n ordinance prohibiting slaves, free blacks, and Indians from keeping

101 Cesar's case is found in the papers o f James Otis, Sr., 1642-1747, Box 1. Located at the
M assachusetts Historical Society. Basto appears in Records of the Court of Assistants of the
Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692, vol. 1, 74; Answer and Cato appear in the Thwing
D atabase.
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hogs.102 Phoebe and Phillis, w ho should have epitom ized the m odel of
'family slavery/ having been bought as a little girl and served Codman
virtually her entire life, made absolutely sure that their ow ner w ou ld die:
they pu t a black powder called Potter's lead in Codman's soup (who had
complained it w as a bit gritty), and pu t another kind of poison, this one a
white pow der and thus less visible, in "his barly Drink, and into his Infusion,
and into his Chocalate, and into his Watergruel." Admitting that "I felt ugly"
after lacing nearly everything in sight w ith poison, Phillis claim ed she had a
change of heart, and poured out the barly and tried to clean the m ug. But her
accomplice Phoebe had already poisoned his other food and drink.
The court did not buy Mark's alibi. Supplementing Phillis' testimony
was that of Phoebe's husband, Quacoe. Quacoe told the justice of the peace
w ho perform ed the initial examinations that another black man, Kerr, had
come to him during the previous winter and told him of conversations with
Mark about getting poison. Mark had also asked Kerr if Phoebe had gotten
any poison. A concerned Quacoe warned his w ife not to have anything to do
w ith Mark, for "she would be Brought into Trouble by him." What happened
to Phoebe is not clear; Phoebe does not appear in the indictm ent or in the
judgment. Phillis and Mark were both sentenced to be executed near a public
highw ay on the afternoon of September 6, Phillis by burning and Mark by
hanging. Both were "drawn" to the place of execution, described by a
nineteenth century historian as pulling the condem ned on a sled behind a
horse, presumably to extend the public spectacle of execution. The spectacle
continued after death; Mark's body w as hu ng in chains from a gibbet (an

102 Boston selectm en had passed an ordinance preventing the keeping of hogs within the d ty in
1746 that specifically targeted black and Indian city dwellers. See A Report of the Record
Comissioners of the C ity o f Boston, containing the Boston Records from 1742 to 1757 (Boston:
Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), May 23, 1746.

69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

upright post w ith a crosspiece) along the highw ay, and remained there for
several years afterward—long enough for the spot to become such a familiar
landmark that P aul Revere referred to it w h en he recounted his fam ous ride
as the place "w here Mark was hung in chains."103
Unlike A d am Saffin, Mark, Phillis, and Phoebe did not conceive of
themselves as free legal beings. While they m ay have understood that they
could enjoy the privilege of being tried in a court, their intention, if they did
indeed murder Captain Codman, was not to gain freedom: Phillis claim ed
that Mark, com m enting on Robbin's com plicity in the murder of another
slaveowner, had said "Mr. Salmon's N egros poison'd him, and were never
found out, but had got good masters, & so m ight we." The objective, then,
was to improve th e situation by im proving the master.104
The m otive o f another slave, also nam ed Phillis, for murdering her
master is not kn ow n . But she may have been the example for Mark and
Phillis, preceding them by five years. This Phillis had even more direct access
to the means for murder; her owner, John Greenleaf, was an apothecary.
When the Superior Court met in February of 1750, they sentenced Phillis to
be executed in M ay of 1750, nearly a year after Greenleaf died. In April the
Boston selectm en w ere instructed by the Court of General Sessions to
"consider of som e suitable place for erecting a Gallows," so apparently Phillis
was hung.

103 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 5, 107. David Hackett Fischer
notes that in order to g e t to Boston from Charlestown, one had to go past "a rusted iron cage that
held the rotting bones o f Mark." See Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 10.
104 Account of Mark, Phillis, and Phebe is in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society (Boston: M assachusetts Historical Society, 1884), vol. 20, 122-157.
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The selectm en chose a small knoll on a stretch o f land comm only
referred to as Boston N eck .105 The Neck had been u sed before for hangings
and, like the gibbeting o f Mark, became a geographical reference point well
know n to Boston residents. In December of 1749, for instance, the selectm en
identified a piece of property as being "on Boston N eck, where the Gallows
now stands."106 The gallow s, "the first structure that greeted a traveler"
heading north into Boston, w ou ld have been im possible to miss on this
desolate stretch of land that w as nearly devoid of bu ild in gs or trees.107 The
N eck w as frequented by slave and free black travelers; one of the ordinances
renewed annually by the selectm en set up Sabbath-day watches on the Neck,
w hen the regular m ilitia w atches were not operating, for the expressed
purpose of to prevent disorders caused by "loose vain Persons Servants
Negroes &c U nnecessarily Travelling or Walking to & from Boston &
Roxbury w ith N eglect of A ttending on the Publick W orship of God in either
place and bringing from the Neighbouring Towns C om A pples & other fruits
of the Earth to the great disturbance of the Publick peace & Scandal of Our
Christian Profession."108 Here the power of the law converged in two
important ways: the daily reminder of terror of the execution of justice
represented by the gallow s, and the daily reminder of the ability of law to

105 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Selectmen's
Minutes from 1742-1753 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), April 17 1750/51.
106 Ibid, December 1749.
107 Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride, 10; Walter Muir Whitehill, Boston: A Topographical History
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard U niversity Press, 1968), 74-75.
Whitehill notes that it w as not until 1801 that the selectm en tried to develop the virtually
empty Boston N eck area. Even then, there was little success until m uch later; the selectmen
informed the tow n m eeting in 1811 that there was little dem and.
108 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Selectmen's
Minutes from 1742-1753 , Septem ber 1743 and annually thereafter.
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exercise pow er over their daily lives. Som e black folks were probably glad to
have the m ilitia and watchm en acting as a form of crowd control; others
likely resented it. But in this and other subtle ways, slaves and free black men
and w om en encountered the ability o f the law to shape the form of their daily
lives.
They frequently encountered law s directed with black and Indian
peoples in m ind. A s early as 1723, the selectm en drew up "Articles for the
Better Regulating o f Indians N egros and Molattos" that penalized free blacks
and Indians w ith a fine and a severe w hipping if they allow ed a slave into
their "House yard garden or outhouse" w ithout permission o f the
slaveowner. Furthermore, the selectm en stipulated that to ensure
enforcement, "any tw o free holders m ay Enter the House of any such free
Indian N egro or Molatto." Other ordinances prevented these three groups
from ow n in g firearms, selling "strong drink Cakes or any other Provision"
on highw ays or on the Common, and several more aim ed at circumscribing
nighttime activities among free and slave blacks and Indians.109 Attempting
to come up w ith "some M ethod for the better and more Effectual Watching
the Town of Boston," a committee appointed by the tow n m eeting in 1736
made several recomm endations. The only recommendation targeting a
specific group of people, though, called for the watchmen to "take up all
Negro and M olatto Servants, that shall be unseasonably A bsent from their
Masters Families" after ten o'clock at night. The town returned to this issue
periodically, seeking in 1750 to find if "any more effectual M ethod than is

109 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1700 to 1728 (Boston: Rockwell and Curchhill, 1883), April, 1723.
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already prescrib'd by Law can be taken, to prevent the Disorders that are
frequently comm itted by Negroes in the night."110

Some ordinances, though ostensibly aim ed at whites, effectually
impacted blacks. In 1761, the selectm en w arned that sellers of "Rum & other
Spiritous Liquors to N egro & Moletta Servants, not bringing Certificates from
their Masters" w ou ld be penalized. Though directed at the white merchants
and masters, this abridged som e of the informal freedoms of black servants
and slaves—som e of w hom surely had u sed their masters' taste for liquor as a
pretext to get som e for themselves. Other ordinances persistently rem inded
free black m en and w om en that their freedom w as mitigated by racial
ideologies that expected African Americans to be a drain on society. Sdpio, a
free black Philadelphian w ho m oved to Boston in 1761, knowing that he
w ould be the object of such expectations, came to the selectmen offering £100
as a surety against becom ing a charge to the town.111
Though it is not possible to determ ine the rigor of enforcement, the
persistence efforts in the town m eetings and by the selectmen to regulate the
lives of black m en and w om en indicates that this was an ongoing tension, a
tension that m ust have been felt by black Bostonians. Furthermore, this
illustrates the ambivalence that African Americans likely held regarding the
law: it could be a pow erful instrument for protection or freedom, and a
powerful instrum ent for oppression.

110 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), April 1736; A Report of the Record
Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records from 1742 to 1757 (Boston:
Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), March 1750/51.
111 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Selectmen's
Minutes from 1754-1763 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), August 1761.
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Occasionally, savvy African Americans, follow in g in the footsteps of
people like Adam Saffin, managed to protect them selves from the oppressive
side of the law by using the law against itself. In 1769, when the selectm en
once again attempted to put some teeth into the ordinance aimed at
preventing free and enslaved blacks from bein g out late at night, they
required the watchm en to patrol in pairs in order to ensure the arrest o f "all
negroes found out after dark without a lantern." Presumably, the selectm en
had decided that any black man or w om an w ith ou t a light was skulking about
for no good reason. Soon thereafter, the w atch picked up an elderly black
man "prowling about in total darkness." They held him overnight, brought
him before a judge the next morning, only to hear him plead not guilty and
hold up an old lantern as evidence of his innocence. The lantern, how ever,
had no candle or oil. The ordinance w as quickly rewritten to specify that any
black man or w om an had to have a lantern w ith a candle. The same m an
w as caught by the watch again, pled not guilty again, and once more h eld up
an old lantern — w ith a fresh candle that had obviou sly never been lit. The
judge, probably irritated by the old man's flirtatious run-ins with the law ,
discharged him this time w ith a reprimand. The law was rewritten a second
time, and this time specified that any slaves ou t after nine o'clock had to be
"carrying Lanthoms w ith light Candles and can give a good and satisfactory
Account of their Business."112 Though w h ites m ay have repeated this story as
an example of w hat was in their view a literal-m inded black sim pleton
managing to dodge legal consequences, it is m ore plausible that this m an,

112 Edward H. Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, from 1631 to
1865; Together with the Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or Boston by Daylight and
Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 33; A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston,
containing the Selectmen's Minutes from 1769 to April, 1775 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill,
1893), November 9 1769.
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acting as sort of a hum an trickster, intentionally d id as little as possible to
com ply w ith a law that he considered a nuisance. H e apparently knew he w as
on safe ground in pleading not guilty, and k n ew w h en to stop. For a tim e, he
succeeded in using a literal interpretation of the la w to evade submitting to
an oppressive ordinance.
W hile the town w as busy seeking w ays to confine the daily lives of
black Bostonians, there were other instances o f African Americans using the
law for their ow n ends. While not quite as dramatic as Adam Saffin's story,
James, a slave to Samuel Burnell, pursued his freedom after his master of 40
years died in 1736. James insisted that his m aster had always intended to free
him upon his ow n death. Burnell's w id ow and children claimed that James
w as part of the estate. James petitioned the legislature for his freedom, w h ich
suspected that the final w ill had been "by som e ill Arts conveyed away, and
probably destroyed, so that there cannot be a legal Probate thereof, yet there
being sufficiently Evidence that ...the Testator had ordered the freedom of the
Petitioner." The legislature, giving a black m an the benefit of the doubt
against a w hite wom an and her children, granted James' freedom in October
o f 1737, so long as he could provide a security to the town, and in Decem ber
his freedom w as finalized w hen tw o w hite m en stepped forward to give a
bond of £200.113 In 1740, John W oodby, a free black man, complained to the
selectm en that "he w as taken up in the street" by one of the watchmen as he
w as going hom e from work at night, subsequently im prisoned and fined 13
shillings, "all without any legal process - w h ich he hum bly Apprehends is
against Law and Justice." The watchman w as probably acting according to the
ordinances restricting night activity by black Bostonians, but perhaps w as too
eager and accosted W oodby too early in the evening. W oodby apprehended
113 James appears in the Thwing Database.
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correctly; the selectm en told the watchm an to be more cautious and to "act
prudently in all such matters in the future.114
As the eighteenth century wore on, and the number of freed African
Americans in Boston increased, their lives w ere shaped by law s that were
intended to regulate life, regardless of color, in w hat was becom ing an urban
environment. The selectm en passed a series of rather m undane law s in 1757;
some fined "persons w h o dug holes or broke the ground on streets or lanes;
left dirt, rubbish, dung, carrion," levied fines against "playing or kicking of
Foot-ball w ithin any of the Streets or Lanes", required hom eow ners to rake
up the dirt from their doors into the streets so farmers could pick it up,
mandated that no one over 12 years old could undress and w ash them selves
in the streets until one hour after sunset, and so on.115 As Boston grew, so
too did the pervasiveness of legal authority governing daily life. Black
Bostonians' awareness of the power of the law grew as well, since they too
butted up against the increasing number of regulatory ordinances. By
encountering not only law s aimed at governing urban life in general, but also
governing black people specifically, and experiencing the liberating pow er of
the law, the seeds of a legal consciousness grew among African Americans,
including those w h o never entered a courtroom.
But many did enter the courtroom, and their familiarity of doing so
meant that Q uock Walker's prosecution against his former ow ner w as no
aberration. On April 30 of 1781, according to Walker, Nathaniel Jennison beat
him with his "fist and a large stick," and then imprisoned Walker for two

114 A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), June 1740.
115 A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1742 to 1757 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885).
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hours. The next day, Walker resorted to the law, charging Jennison w ith
trespass. Jennison did not dispute the facts of the case—probably because in
addition to Walker, there w ere at least tw o w hite w itnesses. Instead, Jennison
expanded the dispute b y arguing that because he had married the w id ow
Caldwell, w hose previous husband had ow ned Walker, he was now Walker's
owner. Walker countered that his former owner, Caldwell, had long m ade
oral promises that up on his death Walker w ou ld be a free man. Caldwell's
brother testified that "my brother said always he should be free at 25,"
Jennison insisted upon his rights as the owner of the since deceased w id o w
Caldwell's property. In an earlier time and place, the case might well have
gone against Walker; b u t in this revolutionary era, his appeal fell on
receptive ears.
Overlooked in this w ell-know n case is Quock Walker's legal strategy.
He did not go to court for the explicit purpose of obtaining legal freedom. He
w ent to get a measure of protection and to extract som e vengance upon
Jennison. It is notable that Walker did not file criminal charges of assault
upon Jennison: he filed a civil charge of trespass, based on Jennison's
kidnapping him and holding him prisoner for tw o hours. This enabled
Walker to do more than have the court punish Jennison for assault w ith a
fine and, perhaps, a brief imprisonment. Walker sued Jennison for £50 in
damages—which a jury awarded. Walker was no novice; he knew how to
work the legal system to his greatest advantage.
Walker's decision to charge Jennison w ith trespass instead of assault
also speaks to his sense of self—Jennison had done m ore than beat him,
Jennison had crossed a boundary that violated his rights as a freeman.
Assault was not unheard of; but to imprison him likely pushed the offense to
another level in Walker's m ind. Had he charged Jennison w ith assault, it
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w ould have left the larger question o f his legal status unresolved; slaves
could successfully prosecute their ow ners or other whites w ith assault
w ithout changing their status as slaves. By charging Jennison w ith trespass,
Walker forced Jennison to defend him self by arguing that W alker w as his
slave, and therefore no trespass h ad occured. This pushed the case from the
Court of C om m on Pleas to the Suprem e Judicial Court. In effect, Walker —
perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not — gave the court the opportunity to
expand the dispute to address the issu e that was closest to his heart.
His tactic paid off. The presiding judge noted that slavery had been but
a custom — "a usage"—that had "been heretofore countenanced by the
Province Laws formerly, but now here is it expressly enacted or established."
Since, how ever, "a different idea has taken place w ith the p eop le of America,
more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural innate
desire of Liberty, w ith which H eaven (w ithout regard to color, complexion, or
shape of noses features) has inspired all the human race." The state
constitution, argued the judge, declared "that all m en are b o m free and equal-and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the
laws, as w ell as life and property—and in short is totally repugnant to the idea
of being b o m slaves." Therefore, "there can be no such thing as perpetual
servitude of a rational creature."116
Like A dam Saffin, Quock W alker's identity became intim ately tied to
the law . Like Adam Saffin, Q uock W alker defined him self as free man, and
asserted his self-definition by leavin g Jennison, believing that the promises of
his dead master had freed him. But it took a legal act to form ally establish his

116 Quotes and reconstruction of events taken from The Case of Nathaniel Jennison for
Attempting to Hold a Negro as a Slave in M assachusetts in 1781. From the M inutes of Chief
Justice Cushing, w ith references to contemporaneous records.(Boston: John W ilson & Son, 1874).
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status. When. Judge C ushing dedared that "every subject is entitled to
liberty," it shaped Walker's identity in tw o w ays: first as a free man, and
second as a subject. D efining Walker as a subject gave him certain d a im s
u p on the polity; nam ely, the right to have his status as a free m an "guarded
by the laws." D efining Walker as a subject tied him to the com m onw ealth
and to its law s, it created a bond between the m an w ho had formally m oved
from slavery to freedom not by his ow n d aim (saying that his dead m asters
had made certain prom ises) or actions (running away), but by the act of the
court. This dearly does not deny Walker agency. H e initiated the entire
proceeding by first asserting his freedom w h en he left Jennison, and escalated
the conflict by charging Jennison with trespass. But the final definition of his
status came only w ith the court's dedsion, a d ed sio n that laid important
boundaries betw een him self and others, esp e d a lly m en like Jennison.117
Quock Walker, far from being a pioneer in the pursuit of legally
recognized liberty, w as one of a long line of black m en and w om en w h o
depended upon the law to manage conflicts. But because Walker's case and
others like his came at time when, as T. H. Breen points out, white public
opinion had turned against slavery in M assachusetts, the legal conflict could
be phrased in a manner that challenged slavery. Eventually, in the spring of
1788, Massachusetts offidally abolished slavery. But even that act w as
tempered, as w as m uch of African Americans' experience with the law . On
the same day of the abolition act7s passage, another act passed that em pow ered
justices of the peace to expel any black m an or w om an that the justice deem ed
as not being a M assachusetts resident. With state-w ide legal freedom cam e

117 Ibid. On the importance of the law creating or reinforcing boundaries, see Patricia
W illiams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights," Harvard
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 22 (Spring 1987), 401-433.
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legislation aimed at lim iting the grow th of the black population.118
N evertheless, the persistent engagem ent of black men and w om en w ith the
law over the course of a century, as plaintiffs as w ell as defendants, proved to
be integral both in providing individuals like Walker a w ealth of experience
to draw upon, and in keeping the legal personhood of black w om en and m en
viable. Just as significantly, this century-long engagem ent shaped Africans as
they entered the Early Republic as African Americans.

118 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, House N o. 46, "Free Negroes and
Mulattoes," 14-15. This House docum ent notes that the emancipation w as 'official' in
M assachusetts when a law was passed on March 26,1788. The trigger event was when a man
decoyed 3 black men onto a ship in Boston harbor, and tried to sell them in the West Indies
island o f St. Bartholomew) The Govenor o f Massachusetts and the French Consulate wrote
letters to the Governor of St. Bartholomew, w ho stopped the sale. The m en returned to Boston
on July 29, which "was made a day of great rejoicing." The document also comments about the
law permitting justices to expel blacks, stating that "the constitutionality of which has been
called into question, and which it is w ell known was passed on the sam e day as the abolition
act o f march 1788." Also see Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts, 228.
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Chapter Two

Delivering Tustice and Shaping Identity: The Law and the Form ation o f Black
Identity in Boston. 1783-1820

In June o f 1787, Jack and Silvia Austin sold a plot of land near the
center of B oston to Boston Smith. That same day, Smith turned around and
sold that plot to Cromwell Barnes, w ho, four months later, m ortgaged half of
it to John Brown, Esquire. Brown, how ever, apparently did n o t h old up his
end of the deal, and in 1791 the property returned to Crom well Barnes. Five
years later, Barnes sold the land to Abel and Chloe Barbadoes, w h o
im m ediately sold half of it to Prince Freeman. A year and a half later, in the
spring of 1798, the Barbadoes m ortgaged the remaining half to M ungo
Mackay, Jr. Part of the significance of the dealings swirling around this tract
of urban real estate is that all of the players but one—John Brown, Esquire—
were free people of color.119
Jumping ahead fourteen years to what may seem a very different story,
a young black w om an named Rebecca Freeman testified before a justice of the
peace in 1812 against a black m an accused and subsequently convicted of theft.
Over the next several years, Freeman w ould go on to appear nu m erous times
as a plaintiff, defendant, and w itness in this justice of the peace court.
Freeman, like m any other black Bostonians—especially w om en —discovered
that her w ord m eant som ething in this court. She doubtlessly com m unicated

119 From the T hw ing Database at the M assachusetts Historical Society. Each deed and
transaction is listed in the databse under the individual's name.
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her court encounters b y telling friends and neighbors of her victories and
setbacks. She definitely transmitted her legal experience by bringing other
black men and w om en to court either as her w itnesses or by leveling charges,
both serious and trivial, against them. In July of 1819, Freeman charged
another black wom an, Lucy DeCosta, w ith 'profane swearing' and brought
tw o other black w om en, A m y Jackson and Harriet Hubbard, as her w itnesses.
Found guilty, DeCosta had to pay a fine of just over three dollars. A m y
Jackson apparently learned the legal lesson w ell. O ne month later, Jackson,
w ith Hubbard as her w itness, managed to have a w hite woman thrown in jail
after charging her w ith 'profane swearing.' Black litigants like Freeman and
Jackson acquired a certain am ount of legal savvy through their court
experiences, and learned to expect a decent chance of success against black and
w hite antagonists.120
Two threads draw together these two seem ingly disparate stories. The
obvious one is that nearly all of the major players w ere African Americans.
The second is their participation in Boston's legal system . Both groups knew
h o w the law could w ork to their advantage. The wheelers and dealers o f real
estate experienced the law 's ability to establish pow er over a piece of property.
Litigants experienced the low er court's ability to deliver justice quickly.
Building on more than a century of experience, black Bostonians during the
Early Republic era n o w engaged the law as citizens, heightening an awareness
of them selves operating as legal beings in a free society. That heightened

120 From the record book o f justice of the peace Stephen Gorham, Criminal Actions from July 19
1812 to November 24 1813, George Reed v. James Williams, A ugust 3 1812; and Criminal Actions
from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820, Freeman v. DeCosta, July 3,1819, and Jackson v Betsey
Francis, August 5,1819. This book and eight others, documenting cases from April of 1806 to
November of 1820 (except for one m issing book covering October of 1816 through January of 1818)
are part of the A dlow Collection in the Rare Books Room of the Boston Public Library. There is
no pagination of these record books; all references w ill be according to date.
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awareness continued to nuture a legal consciousness in the m idst of a salient
period in the formation of an African American identity.
In m aking this argument, this chapter employs a conceptualization
similar to that used by legal scholars D avid Engel and Frank Munger. They
described "the variety of w ays in w h ich rights can become active in 'day-today' life, even w hen individuals d o not choose to assert them....Rights may
may interw oven w ith individual liv es and w ith particular social or cultural
settings even w h en no formal claim is lodged." The authors also argue that
law, culture, identity, and experience act in concert to shape one another.
Everyday life experience interacts w ith the law to shape identity; in turn one's
identity influences how individuals use, avoid, and perceive the law. And
since identity is in many respects an ongoing negotiation betw een the Self
and the social and cultural environm ent, use of avoidance of the law "can
redefine cultural categories and self-perceptions over time." This study
argues that relatively simple and unremarkable legal actions, joined w ith the
unique life experience of a people m oving from slavery to freedom in a
period o f rapid social and cultural change, shaped their identity at a key
historical m om en t.121
For free and enslaved blacks in the seventeenth century and m ost of
the eighteenth century, the law provided an arena for participating in a
netw ork of relationships w ith neighbors, selectmen, court officials, jury
members, or witnesses, any of w h om m ight be allies or enem ies. Black
participants took on a variety of roles in those legal relationships as plaintiffs,
defendants, property owners, or petitioners, thereby establishing a black
presence in the legal arena and confirming the power and utility of the law
121 David M. Engel and Frank W. Munger, "Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of
Difference," Law and Society Review 30 (N o. 1, 1996), 14-16.
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for defining blacks as legal beings during northern slavery. The ability to play
these roles was severely restricted for southern blacks, but black N ew
Englanders could take center stage in attem pting to maintain some measure
of control over their daily lives or in pusuit of greater freedom.
And take the stage they did. After the court rulings of the early 1780s
freed virtually every slave in Massachusetts, African Americans took on legal
roles in increased numbers. Gradual judicial reforms after the Revolutionary
War, in part a response to Shay's Rebellion and other expressions of
dissatisfaction w ith legal formalities, made the la w even more accessible to
ordinary citizens, including African Americans.122 Playing those roles helped
erect and maintain legally defined boundaries around the individual w hile
simultaneously tying the individual to other legal actors — property deeds, for
instance, dearly marked out a physical and legal boundary over which others
could not trespass w ithout consequence, and sim ultaneously defined the
property owner by nam ing the neighboring property owners. Cato Ransom's
land in Salem was delineated as lying "westerly on land of Joshua
Dodge...northerly on land of Benjamin Crowning" and so on.123 A black
plaintiff who charged som eone with 'threatening' invoked the power of the
law and justice system to provide protection and create a legal distance
between the plaintiff and his or her antagonist. Even though the law could
not guarantee that an antagonist would respect that distance, it did enable the
plaintiff to identify a behavioral boundary, and gave the individual recourse
if that boundary was violated.

Like Quock Walker, Adam Saffin, and many

122 See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change
on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1975), 67-88.
123 From the deed of Cato Ransom's sale of this lot to Nathan W ood in 1795. Contained in the
Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
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others, free people of color found the law a valuable tool, but b y engaging the
law, they becam e subject to and dependent upon its pow er to define, in part,
their social and legal identity.
M ost o f these m en and w om en left few traces of how they tried to
maintain control over their ow n circumstances during the Early Republic era.
Their legal trail is usually short and barely discernible. They left no known
written observations of how they perceived their encounters w ith the law;
they did n ot g o on record to articulate in clear and unam biguous terms that
their legal experience encouraged a consciousness of individual rights; they
did not publicly proclaim a faith in the pow er of the law to maintain
personal boundaries. Nonetheless, their actions hold m eaning. Historian
Rhys Isaac notes that "the searching out of the m eanings that such actions
contained and conveyed for the participants lies at the heart of the enterprise
of ethnographic history. Actions m ust be view ed as statements."124 Grafting
ethnographic m ethodology w ith the w ork o f legal scholars studying race,
rights, and the courts yields understanding of w hat those statem ents meant.

D espite the increase in m anum issions in M assachusetts before and
during the R evolution, and despite the legal dem ise of slavery in 1783, the
law rem ained oppressive for free people of color in m any respects. Only black
residents, for instance, risked im prisonm ent or deportation if unable to prove
citizenship.125 There is also evidence that not all slaves were freed after 1783;
124 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790 (N ew York: W.W. N orton & Co.,
1982), 324.
125 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, H ouse N o. 46, "Free N egroes and
Mulattoes," 14-15; George H. Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts, (New
York: D. A ppleton, 1866), 228; John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of the Boston
Negroes (Boston: H oughton & Mifflin, 1914; reprint, A m o Press and The N ew York Times, 1969),
26-28. The M assachusetts legislature passed a law in 1788 aimed at controlling "rouges,
vagabonds, com m on beggars, and other idle, disorderly, and lew d persons," and stipulated that
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court cases in 1784 and 1786 involved slaves, and the portrait gracing the
frontispiece for a 1786 volu m e of Phillis W heatley's poetry was engraved by
"the slave of Rev. John Moorhead."126 N evertheless, black w om en and m en
staked their claim to the right to participate in the life of the polity. A few did
so through more v isib le and traditional m ethods such as the fam ous freedom
petitions drawn up b y Massachusetts slaves in the 1770s.
Many other free blacks engaged in unobtrusive exercises aim ed not at
forcing legal change, but intended to gain som e control over their ow n lives.
Through simple and practical interactions w ith the legal system, free black
wom en and m en b egan to demonstrate certain expectations of h ow the law
applied to them and h o w they could apply the law. When Sdpio and Tobias
Locker, tw o former slaves, ignored orders by the selectmen in 1762 and again
in 1766 to perform w ork for the dty under an old ordinance labeled "Act for
Regulating of Free N egros," they showed an aw areness of where the law
broke down—they d o not appear to have suffered any consequences for their
noncompliance. H avin g only recently been em andpated, Sdpio and Tobias
were unwilling to su b m it their time to labor for others. M eanwhile, they
signed deeds to the land that they bought and sold in Boston. John Thurber,
freed in Novem ber o f 1761, bought land less than tw o weeks later, and a year
later was also d ted b y the selectmen for noncom pliance with an order to work
on the highways. Both he and the Lockers com m itted their nam es as sellers

any black man or w om an had to have proof of United States citizenship from their state of
origin.
126 See Nelson, Americanization of the Common Laiu, 102; Scipio Moorhead, John M oorhead's
slave, refered to in the T h w ing database. It is possible that Scipio had done the w ork w hile a
slave, previous to the legal eradication of slavery, and w as a free man in 1786 w hen he
received credit for his w ork. It seem s unlikely, how ever, that Scipio would have still been
refered to as a slave and unlikely that he would have been com issioned to do the w ork several
years before publication o f the volum e.
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to deeds dedaring "KNOW all Men" that they "have good right to sell and
convey" a plot of land, and as buyers to docum ents stating that they were
protected from the "daim s and demands of any persons." This language
denied the ability of others to make daim s on the property of those w ho had
once been property. N o doubt this sense of pow er, this sense of control, w as
not lost on John Thurber or the Lockers. Their refusal to comply w ith the
selectmen's orders m ay have very well been fed by this sense that there were
som e things that they had a right to control—such as their property and their
labor.127
The Lockers w ere not the first black property owners in Boston;
Angola, slave of Robert K eayne in the seventeenth century, received a 50
square foot plot of land from in 1673 from Governor Richard Bellingham as a
reward for saving the G overnor's life. Angola w as probably a free man w hen
he acquired this property, as Keayne, w ho had died several years previous, left
a w ill stipulating Angola's manumission. A ngola w as preceded as a black
property owner by his acquaintance, Bus Bus, a free black w ho ow ned a house
and a small plot in 1656. Even enslaved Africans could ow n property in
Massachusetts, though at som e point it apparently became accepted legal
practice that they could buy or sell property only w ith the consent of their
m asters.128

127 John Thurber's and the Locker's deeds and selectmen's orders in the Thwing Database. The
Database, however, does not contain the deeds in their entirety. The legal language of the
deed is taken from the 1795 deed o f Cato Ransom, a black m an w ho lived in Salem,
Massachusetts. Scipio , w ho initially kept the last name o f his master Capt. John
Fayerweather, was freed less than a year before the 1762 order, and Tobias five years before
Scipio.
128 In 1816, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that Caesar Elisha, a seventeenth-century slave,
"could acquire no property, nor dispose of any without the consent of his master." From judicial
Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. H elen Tunnicliff Catterall
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1936), vol 4, 493.

87

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first significant num bers of black Boston property owners do not
appear in the records until the Lockers' time, coinciding w ith an increase in
m anum issions by Massachusetts slaveow ners. From 1761 through the end of
the Revolution, seven black Bostonians signed eight deeds; betw een 1783 and
1800, twenty-one free blacks signed tw enty-tw o deeds. This m ay seem a small
number for building claims of a burgeoning legal consciousness among
African Americans. But there w ere less than 1000 African Americans—
including children—in Boston before the Revolution and only a hundred
more by 1800. As people of som e m eans, all of the property owners, several of
w hom had trades, occupied influential positions in the black community. As
they interacted w ith other black Bostonians, whether through passing along
their ow n experiences on how to secure property or deal w ith similar types of
contractual relationships, their evolvin g sense of self contributed to the
forging of a free black identity. A few eventually provided leadership in the
black community. Scipio Dalton, w h o bought property in 1799, became vicepresident of Boston's African H um ane Society in 1818. Abel and Chloe
Barbadoes' son James emerged as one of the Boston's nineteenth century
abolitoinists w ho also pushed to expand civil rights, and their daughter
Clarissa married another prom inent Bostonian civil rights activist.129
The 21 property owners include a handful of w ives, for w hom
participating in this simple legal act held a deeper significance. Married black
w om en in an age of emancipation w ere caught in a legal purgatory that has
129 Scipio Dalton and the by-laws of the African Humane Society are in a small booklet
labeled The By-Laws, rules and regulations, o f the African Humane Society (Boston: 1820).
Contained in the Robert Morris Box at the Boston Athenaeum. To the best o f m y knowledge, no
other record exists of this previously unknow n organization. The Barbadoes fam ily is well
docum ented in Franklin A Dorman, Twenty Families of Color in Massachusetts, 1742-1998
(Boston: N ew England Historic Genealogical Society, 1998). Population statistics taken from
George A. Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in Urban America, 17501860 (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 79, 86.
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been little appreciated. For enslaved w om en, emancipation m eant m o v in g
from a status of b eing legal property to being legally as free, but as a married
w om an, their legal personhood was denied. Married wom en had no right to
o w n property.130 N onetheless, som e black w o m en demonstrated an
awareness of both the limits and the utility o f the law , and gained som e
am ount of control over their own lives by obtaining property. In 1798 Chloe
Spear, African-born in 1750 and sold as a child in Boston, initiated the
purchase of an unfinished house on White Bread A lley in Boston. K now ing
that she could not legally buy the house and lot in her own name, C hloe had
to first get her husband Cesar to agree to the purchase, "cause he de head."
"Cesar, house to sell; I w ish w e buy it," Chloe declared. Cesar, taken aback,
responded w ith "I no got de money, how I b u y a house?" His thriftier w ife,
how ever had m anaged to save enough to m eet the $700 purchase price. After
the Spears obtained the deed, Chloe m apped ou t a plan to secure their
investm ent and enhance their independence. Since the house w as
unfinished, the Spears w ou ld live in the poorest part of the house, and rent
out the rest. Her intent w as to use the rent m on ey for improvements,
enabling them to charge higher rents, thereby providing for their future. Her
plan must have m et w ith some success; w h en Chloe died in 1815, she left
behind a house on one Boston's main thoroughfares, as well as $500 to a
grandson and other sm aller bequests.131 Black w om en like Chloe experienced
the confining pow er of the law throughout their lives—through being the
legal property of another and as a w ife 'covered' as a legal being by her

130 Nelson, Americanization o f the Common Law, 103.
131 We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Dorothy Sterling (N ew
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 93. Sterling reprints an excerpt from "A Lady of Boston" w ho
wrote a Memoir of M rs. Chloe Spear. The Spears are also in the Thwing database.
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husband—as w ell as its ability to em pow er by outlining the Spears' right to
ow n and im prove property as they w ished for their ow n benefit.
Signing deeds was a fairly routine act. But for black m en and wom en,
som e of w h o m had recently been enslaved and others w h o had relatives or
friends w h o had been slaves, this sim ple act, made during an age of slavery
and em ancipation, m ust have carried a different m eaning than it did for
w hite property owners. Some w ere probably more conscious than others of
the significance of these legal actions. Whatever their level o f awareness,
signing d eed s w as one legal act that delineated specific rights. Rights, as
Patricia W illiam s has argued, have the power to provide autonom y and
distance from potential oppressors. Rights also create m eaningful boundaries
that enable the holder to define w h en an intrusion occurs. The ability to
com m it one's name to a property deed did more than establish geographical
boundaries; it also helped construct boundaries around a sen se of self by
defining the individual as a legal and social being w ith certain rights.132
W hite Americans understood the importance of m aintaining those
boundaries. The freedom to possess property and the expectation that the
rule of la w w ou ld protect legal title w as a specific kind of liberty—the liberty of
secure p ossession —that colonials had long accepted as a norm ative part of
civil society. This kind of liberty stem m ed not from the particular form of
governm ent, "but rather from specific arrangements that in time became
institutionalized [and] were concrete and verifiable."133 By entering into
those institutionalized arrangements, free black property ow ners grounded

132 See Patricia W illiams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 22 (Spring 1987), 401-433.
133 Joyce A p pleby, Capitalism and a N ew Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s
(N ew York: N e w York University Press, 1984), 18.
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their claim to one kind of liberty that had becom e central to a developing
American identity.
The law, then, had something of value beyond emancipation to offer
black men and w om en like the Lockers and Chloe Spear. Individual
m anumissions and general emancipation in 1783 broadly defined black
w om en and m en as legally free beings; deeds helped further define black
property owners as legal beings by creating specific boundaries protecting a
fundamental liberty.
This in turn influenced black identity formation. The formation o f an
African American identity was shaped in part by simple, practical acts that
placed them in a legal context, a context in turn tied to a broad constellation of
ideologies in the Early Republic that intertwined liberty with independence,
independence w ith citizenship, and citizenship w ith what it meant to be an
American. Joyce A ppleby describes how the growth of commercial capitalism
in Britain and the colonies had undermined the traditional Old W orld social
and political hierarchical system, and how a more subversive ideology of
liberty bloom ed as individuals engaged in unregulated market relationships
for their ow n and society's mutual benefit. The market became the driving
force legitimizing the pursuit of self-interest and, combined with the im pact
of the French Revolution, presented a vision of m en freed from the chains of
custom. Jeffersonians eventually seized on this vision to promulgate a liberal
identity of Americans as free, autonomous, and independent beings.
The law —w hich, as Tom Paine had declared in Common Sense, w as
king in America—w as the central mechanism undergirding the liberties of
these independent Am ericans and ensuring their free participation in the
market. Seem ingly m undane acts like signing deeds or procuring badges that
protected one's vocation outlined the legal boundaries of liberty over w hich
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others could not trespass. D efining these boundaries in effect helped secure
liberty to "the enjoyment of legal title to a piece of property or the privilege o f
doing a particular thing w ith ou t fear of arrest or punishm ent."134 Former
slaves entered into this security w hen they were able to sign deeds, make
w ills, or gamer legal protection of their vocation as free African Americans.
W hen Tobias, a slave o f John Cookson w as em ployed as a chim neysweep in
1716, Boston's selectmen granted the license to Cookson, not Tobias. But
w h en Juba Andrew, a free black man in 1787, obtained Sweepers Badge N o. 2
from the selectmen "to sw eep Chimnies in the Town," his vocation becam e
protected by the law and publicly affirmed his rights as a citizen to earn his
o w n living as a chim ney sw eep .135 Andrew's legal affirmation stood in
contrast to the selectm en's punishm ent just four days previous of tw o w hite
sw eeps "charged w ith taking illegal Fees" w ho w ere subsequently forbidden to
practice their vocation in Boston. Just as engaging in commerce structured
Americans' self-conception as autonom ous and equal beings, engaging in
legal actions structured free blacks' self-conception as legal beings w ith equal
citizenship rights. W ills, contracts for labor, licenses to work, are all exam ples
of sim ple actions that established specific rights to do som ething and lim ited
the ability of others to infringe on those rights. All of these legal acts
contributed to defining a sense of self during an era of transition.

134 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 98;
A ppleby, Capitalism and a N ew Social Order, 17.
135 See Paul A. Gilje and H ow ard B. Rock, "Sweep O! Sweep O!': African-American Chim ney
Sw eeps and Citizenship in the N e w Nation," William and M ary Quarterly 57 (July 1994), 507538. Tobias is in the Thwing Database; Juba Andrew's liscensing and the punishment of the
w hite sw eeps appears in A Report of the Record Commissioners o f the C ity of Boston,
Containing the Selectmen's M inutes from 1787 through 1798 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill,
1896), N ov. 12,1787. The Boston Tow n Records document several other black chimney sw eeps
applying for and obtaining badges; Cesar Capen, for instance, obtained Badge No. 11 in 1794.
Ibid., N ov. 5, 1794.
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D eed s and w ills also affirmed black community. D espite black-white
interaction being the daily norm, and despite being less than 5% of Boston's
population, black property ow ners frequently sold land to other African
A m erican s.136 Black property ow ners also commonly bought property
adjacent to other African Am erican dwellings, thereby physically building a
black com m unity. In every w ill I have found thus far, black testators named
other African Americans as executors. A t times both forms of legal activity
converged: in 1780, Cesar W endell, a free black property owner, appointed
another free black man, his "Worthy and Honored Friend" Jack Austin,
executor of his w ill and recepient of all of his personal and real estate. Later
that year, W endell died. A ustin, a pewterer and shopkeeper, initiated the
exchange of property m entioned in the opening. On occasion, the intent to
affirm relationships was explicit: in 1839, the w id ow Remember Ransom,
shortly before her death, sold her lot for one dollar ou t of "the love and
affection I bear to John Brooks, of Salem." Though the intention may not
have always been to build 'com m unity', these legal acts formally bound black
w om en and m en to one as a free people that had not been possible as an
enslaved people.137
Black identity was reinforced by legal transactions that defined
boundaries w hile engaging African Americans w ith w h ites on a field where
136 Over half of the deeds involve transactions between African Americans, and the number
may be higher. Some of the individuals that appear may have been African American but,
since they do not appear in any other records that identify them as such, it is not yet possible to
be certain. On black-white interaction and residential living patterns in urban areas, see James
O liver H orton and Lois E. Horton, In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community, and Protest among
Northern Free Blacks, 1700-1860 (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 96-100; Henry L.
Taylor, "On Slavery's Fringe: City-Building and Black Com m unity D evelopm ent in Cincinnati,
1800-1850," Ohio History 95 (1986), 5-33; and Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
137 Cesar W endell appears in the Thw ing Database; Remember Ransom's deed is in the Robert
Morris box at the Boston Athenaeum.
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the same rules applied to each participant. Legal transactions also engaged
African Americans w ith one another in n e w w ays. Far from being static or
sim ply a matter of maintaining distance from w hite Americans, black identity
was dynamic and a matter of engaging w h ites and blacks in m ultiple arenas.
The law provided perhaps the only arena in w hich black men and wom en—
though for w om en it w as sometimes indirectly, as in the case o f Chloe Spear—
could forge equitable relationships w ith w h ites, w hile sim ultaneously
reinforcing connections w ith other African Americans.
While deeds and w ills demonstrate a more purposeful and
harmonious cooperation that indirectly created or reinforced social ties
through formal legal mechanisms, justice o f the peace records reveal a more
contentious and complicated picture of com m unity and identity. Here, where
the law m anifested itself through a relatively informal and accessible court,
an oppressed people found that at least one of the articulated ideals of a
professed democratic and egalitarian republic—equality before, and access to,
the law—could at times come close to being realized.
In early nineteenth century Boston, the path to justice had few
obstacles. A nyone w ho perceived them selves as a victim of an alleged crime,
the first step was getting a constable to arrest the perpetrator. George Reed,
the constable w h o m ade the arrests in m any of the cases involving African
Americans, was an easily identifiable and familiar figure for m any black
Bostonians. Standing six feet tall, wearing a "broad brimmed high crowned
felt hat, [and] a bright spotted red bandana," Reed's daily patrol took him
through the streets of Boston's sixth ward, w hich had the highest proportion
of black residents. H e became so familiar that one chronicler of Boston
remembered black mothers invoking the specter of "Old Reed cornin' to
gobble yis up" to keep their children in line. One account demonstrated how
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easy it was to engage Reed's services. Around 1830, a customer passed
counterfeit m oney to a boy working as a clerk in a shoe store. The boy
showed the storeow ner the counterfeits, w h o asked his young clerk if he
knew 'Old Reed.' The clerk, thinking "what manner of boy did not know
him," ran to the O ld Court H ouse in the center of Boston, found Reed, w h o
immediately follow ed the b oy back to the shoe store. Though the suspect
eluded capture for three m ore days, this account indicates how close at hand
justice lay: com m on folk knew the constable, knew where to find him, and
knew that his response w as likely to be im m ediate. In the same way, they
knew the justice o f the peace.138
The people of M assachusetts had long been in the habit of resorting to
the justice of the peace to resolve civil and criminal disputes. In keeping w ith
English law and custom , "Puritan reformers em phasized the role of the
justice of the peace, for it, above all other local legal institutions, had
weathered the effects of social and political change and had dem onstrated a
power and a flexibility lacking in the others....Puritan leaders placed great
responsibility on the justice o f the peace."139 During the latter half of the
seventeenth century, as the church and the tow n m eeting proved to be
inadequate venues to handle the w ide range o f disputes cropping up in a
society transitioning to n ew social and econom ic environments, the courts
"helped establish and enforce a 'totality of norms' to regulate the
relationships of private individuals."140 M any N ew Englanders became
138 George H ugh Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces: sketches of some odd
characters who have flourished in Boston during the past fifty years (unpublished m anuscript,
1881). Located at the Boston Athenaeum.
139 David Thomas K onig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629-1692
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1979), 5.
140 Ibid., 69.
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accustomed to using the courts to manage their conflicts, making litigation
and the law an integral part o f maintaining and interpreting social order as
"standards of neighborliness had to be dem anded and asserted in court."
While the law could specify w h at constituted a crime, it "could not set
standards of daily interpersonal activity which had to be tested and
established in court." P eople expected each other to conform to w hat the
court affirmed as norm ative behavior; anyone w h o did not could expect to
find them selves in front o f a justice of the peace.141
This had been the intent of the English court system . More serious
crimes were generally dealt w ith by higher courts, w hile the justices of the
peace were expected to handle the sort of persistent disruptions that m ight
regularly plague a com m unity. Justice needed to be easily available on a local
basis in order to ensure social order. Hence, justices of the peace could hear
cases and deliver verdicts individually in their ow n hom es or as a group
during one of the quarterly sessions in their ow n county. They were given
the authority to punish through corporal punishm ent, imprisonment, or
fines and sureties. They had the authority to act as a constable, accusing and
arresting suspected violators. Conviction in a justice of the peace court w as
meant to be "an easy prom pt matter upon the testim ony of one or tw o
witnesses."142 They w ere protected in English, and later in American, law
against countersuits—for instance, from being accused of trespassing if they
had gone on another's property to order an arrest. The authority and duties
of the justice of the peace rem ained fairly consistent throughout the
141 Ibid., xiv-xv. William N elson also notes that the courts becam e the primary m ethod of
dispute resolution. See W illiam E. N elson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth
County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1981).
142 Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts, 16; and N elson, Americanization of the
Common Law, 15.

96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. Late in the eighteenth century,
the jurisdiction of justices of th e peace actually expanded som ewhat, as postRevolutionary reformers so u g h t to m ake the judicial system more accessible
and efficient. During the first tw o decades of the nineteenth century, as
M assachusetts bounced judicial responsibilities from one court to another in
a spasm of attempted reforms, on e constant w as the continued jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace court ov er daily neighborhood civil and criminal
conflicts.143
That steady connection w ith the life of the neighborhood meant the
justice of the peace w as often a natural recourse for m anaging conflict. The
justice of the peace that black Bostonians resorted to m ost frequently
adjudicated cases in the new Suffolk County Court H ouse. Completed in
1812, the Court H ouse w as a rather im posing granite structure w ith a front
lawn in the heart of the dty, w ith space and style that com m unicated power
and authority. The initial com plaint, however, w as probably m ade to the
justice in his office in the Tudor building, at the end of a row of buildings
facing the back of the Court H ou se, and spoke less of pow er and more of the

143 Michael Stephen H indus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill: U niversity of North Carolina
Press, 1980); Nelson, Americanization o f the Common Law, 166. Com parison o f three manuals
written as guidebooks for justices o f the peace indicates that even as late as 1847, the justice was
expected to fulfill virtually the sam e function. While these manuals give no suggestion as to
how the types of cases brought to a justice o f the peace may have changed over time, the justice
of the peace records that I use here clearly indicate a pattern consistent w ith this description of
the justice's intended function o f d ealing w ith day-to-day disputes ranging from forgery to
assault to AWOL sailors. The m anuals are Sam uel Freeman, The Massachusetts Justice: Being a
Collection o f the Laws of the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts, Relative to the Power and
Duty of Justices of the Peace (Boston: Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. A ndrew s, 1802); Rodolphus
Dickinson, A Digest of the Common Law, the Statute Laws of Massachusetts, and of the United
States, and the Decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Relative to the
Pozoers and Duties of Justices of the Peace, to which is subjoined and extensive Appendix of
Forms (Deerfield, Mass: John W ilson, 1818); and John C Davis, The Massachusetts Justice: A
Treatise upon the Powers and Duties o f Justices o f the Peace. With Copious Forms (Worcester:
Warren Lazell, 1847).
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ordinary daily affairs of a growing city. This dichotomy epitom ized the justice
o f the peace: his position in the judicial hierarchy reconciled w hat was
intended to be an im age of the pow er and majesty of the law w ith an im age of
egalitarian justice and accessibility in the Early Republic.144
Once a plaintiff lodged a charge w ith either the justice or the constable,
the constable escorted the accused into the courtroom, where the defendant's
nam e was called and charges read aloud. For those new to the court, it could
be an intimidating experience; one w h ite defendant charged w ith stealing
m olasses remembered the command to plead guilty or not guilty "came forth
in a nerve destroying voice."145 Part o f the intimidation m ust have stemmed
from the powerful position held by the justice of the peace. Though a minor
judicial figure, he had a fair am ount of autonom y in early nineteenth century
B oston-enough autonom y, in fact, to worry the selectmen, w h o expressed
concern that too m uch pow er w as concentrated in the justice of the peace and
that the office could be easily abused. The long-standing practice of providing
the justices' salaries from the fines and court fees imposed by the justices
themselves was a primary reason for the selectmens' fears. In an attempt to
"give the justices of the peace an opportunity to exercise their offices in a

144 Photographs of the Court H ouse and the Tudor building in Old Boston in Early Photographs,
1850-1918: 174 Prints from the Collection of the Bostonian Society (N ew York: D over
Publications, 1990), 11, 37. According to an 1821 tax list, Stephen Gorham's office w as at the
Court House on Court St. Likewise, the Boston Directory lists his office at 6 Court St. up to 1809.
The 1813 Directory, however, has Gorham's office in the Tudor building. It makes sense that he
w ould have relocated to be immediately adjacent to the new Court House. The tax list may
have been noting the general location, whereas his office in is recorded as being in the Tudor
building in the 1813, 1816, 1818, and 1820 directories. Tax list in A t A Legal Meeting of
Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town o f Boston...a correct list stating the amount of
Real and Personal Estate on which the Inhabitants of the Town have been valued, doomed,
assessed and taxed for the year 1821 (Boston: True & Green, Merchant's Hall, 1822). Location of
the court house and jail also determined from John G. Hales' 1814 map of Boston, which, along
w ith the tax list and Boston Directory is located in the Massachusetts State H ouse Library.
145 Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces...
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manner more publick and responsible", the selectm en proposed establishing
a Police Court, com posed of three justices of the peace with fixed salaries. It
w as not until 1822, seven years after the selectmens' proposal and the sam e
year that Boston m oved from the status of tow n to incorporation as a city,
that the Police Court began functioning. Before that, a significant am ount of
power resided in the hands of the justices, w h o could dispatch the accused to
jail on the spot or levy fines that dem anded im m ediate payment.
Recognizing this, black Bostonians began to use this power as a tool in
managing conflicts across and w ithin racial boundaries.146
The justice of the peace court also w ield ed a significant am ount of local
power in part because of the unique space it occupied in the legal system .
Barbara Yngvesson and Lynn Mather have described how even in 'sim ple' or
'tribal' societies, institutions devised for dispute resolution m ay be
characterized by restricted participation, specialized language and procedures,
and several layers of organization for dispute resolution. More com plex or
m odem societies nearly always exhibit these characteristics in their court
systems. In both types of societies, "these contextual features often allow for
those of higher social status to dom inate in the handling of individual
disputes and, in so doing, to reinforce broader patterns of social order."
Similarly, the developm ent of an "official language of law increases the
pow er of certain political interests by restricting access to the disputing forum,
by defining the kinds of disputes w hich can be placed on the agenda o f the
forum ."147 The court system in Boston, a focus of reform during the first few

146 A Volume of Records relating to the Early H istory of Boston containing Boston Town Records,
1814-1822 (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 1906), 40-41; Theodore Ferdinand, Boston's Lower
Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 34.
147 Barbara Yngvesson and Lynn Mather, "Courts, Moots, and the Disputing Process" in
Empirical Theories about Courts, ed. Keith Boyum and Lynn Mather (New York: Longman,
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decades of the nineteenth century, exhibited these characteristics to varying
degrees. The low est court, how ever, was not highly specialized, and w h ile it
m ay have reinforced the basic pow er structure, the justice of the peace court
remained highly accessible and m inim ized those 'contextual features' that
facilitated dom ination by litigants of higher status.
This does not m ean the significance of status w as entirely mitigated; a
higher proportion of black defendants were penalized w hen prosecuted b y
w hite plaintiffs than w ere w hite defendants w h en prosecuted by black
plaintiffs. Also, a black defendant stood a greater chance of being convicted
w hen the plaintiff w as w hite than w hen the plaintiff w as black. Here the
justice of the peace court, at the bottom of the court hierarchy, did indeed act
to reinforce one of the m ost fundamental patterns of social order— w hite over
black.

Table 1
Success rates in interracial court cases. 1818-1820
# of cases

Black plaintiff-white defendant
W hite plaintiff-black defen dant

charge proved

68
75

40
60

not proved

28
15

Conviction rate, all cases —

Conviction rate

59%
80%
70%148

1983), 73; and Yngvesson and Mather, "Language, Audience, and the Transformation of
Disputes," Law and Society Review 15 (1980-81), 796.
148 'Conviction' may not be the m ost accurate term. Included in this term as I use it in this chart
are all adverse verdicts against a defendant. Certain charges, such as threatening, apparently
fell into a different category, as Gorham did not fine defendants he deemed guilty, but ordered
defendants to provide a surety, obstensibly for the purpose o f keeping the peace for a unstated
period. When defendants could not or w ould not provide this surety, however, they w ent to
jail, just as defendants did w ho did not pay fines when other types of charges, such as assault,
were 'proved.'
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Race, then, appears to have been a factor in this court. Stephen
Gorham, the justice of the peace in all of these cases, m ay or m ay not have
been conscious of his predilection borne out in the statistics. The 'haves' do
better in court for a number of reasons, and the higher conviction rate that
white plaintiffs attained against black defendants could be explained by a
number of factors in addition to race.149 When black defendants were brought
into court b y w hite plaintiffs, it w as for theft more than an any other charge,
and these plaintiffs tended to be merchants or other m en w ith occupations of
potentially m iddle class status. Though class may have w orked more in their
favor than race, statistics suggest that it was not a huge advantage: between
1808 and 1820, against black defendants, white merchants w on 85% of their
cases, w hile w hite traders and laborers w on 75%. More importantly, it is
doubtful that black Bostonians were acutely aware of this statistical bias. They
did, after all, experience more success than failure against w hite defendants.
And som e black defendants did succeed in obtaining judgm ents of 'charges
not proven'— Lucretia Hunt did so in 1818 despite being charged with theft by
a jeweler and a cooper w ho each had w itnesses. Her experience surely
heightened HunTs awareness, and that of her friends, that the law could
protect as w ell as prosecute. Twenty percent of black defendants charged by
white plaintiffs were acquitted- and the general acquittal rate w as around 30%,
not such a hu ge disparity that people at that time, from their lim ited
perspective, w ithout the benefit of statistical analysis, w o u ld have necessarily
perceived this as a glaring inequity.150

149 See Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Com e Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change," Law and Society Review 9 (Fall 1974), 95-148.
150 Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to [une 2 1819 H utchinson v. H unt and Clapp
v. Hunt, Feburary 26 1818.
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Black litigants also likely felt the court w as not grossly inequitable
because the system of private prosecution imparted some sense of control
over one's fate. Though the courts became more formalized as urbanization
accelerated in early nineteenth century Boston, a simple process of private
prosecution ruled the day in the justice of the peace court. The victim tumed-plaintiff opened the case by stipulating the charge and offering proof
and having any w itnesses testify. The defendant then cross-exam ined the
plaintiff and w itnesses, after which the plaintiff could question the defendant.
Each was allow ed a final rebuttal. The justice then rendered his d ecision .151
The looseness of the legal system proved to be a good match for the
needs and aims of black litigants. They could choose a justice of the peace
likely to be sympathetic, and the process of getting justice was informal
enough that even poor black women, w ho stood at the bottom of the social
and economic ladder, could press charges, argue their case as plaintiffs or
defendants, secure witnesses, and enhance their chances of succeeding in
court w ithout any formal legal help.152 The mechanics of the legal s y s te m legal term inology, arrest procedures, enforcem ent mechanisms, and the
appeal process—were fairly simple in Boston during the Early Republic era.
This sim plicity no doubt appealed to many African Americans, w h o se
opportunities to resolve disputes and m aintain order through other public
means were dim inishing in the early nineteenth century.

151 John C Davis, The Massachusetts Justice, 69. Rodolphus Dickinson's A Digest of the Common
Lazo, as well as Samuel Freeman's The Massachusetts justice, give similar descriptions.
152 On the minor judiciary and private prosecution, see Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of
Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1989); and Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity
Press, 1967), 1-8.
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The trend toward u sin g the lower courts coincided with the trend
towards form alizing popular political participation. In Revolutionary
America, mob action often functioned as one m eans of political expression by
ordinary folk.

On several occasions, w hen the protest expressed shared

values, these m obs w ere interracial—black and w h ite urbanites, for instance, at
times joined forces against neighborhood brothels. W hile mob actions
continued into the nineteenth century, voting and office-holding opened up
new and safer avenues for ordinary white m en to participate in politics. But
African Americans w ere increasingly marginalized in political affairs as
northern states persistently sou gh t to remove or lim it black voting rights. At
the same time, mobs in the north took on an om inous character. Though
nineteenth century interracial mob actions were n ot unheard of, white
working class m obs more frequently targeted black neighborhoods. In 1823,
when Boston's Mayor Q uincy led raids against brothels, he focused on the
black section of Beacon Hill. Squeezed out of traditional m odes of public
expression against undesirable neighborhood elem ents, many black m en and
w om en appear to have increasingly turned to the low er courts to reinforce
shared values.153
To som e extent, this turning to the courts also replaced cultural form s
of managing disputes that h ad existed during slavery. Election Day and
Pinkster festivals in N ew England had appointed black governors and kings
w ho crowned an "informal system of black government." Whites had
sanctioned their pow er to adjudicate disputes am ong slaves. After
emancipation, how ever, this system gradually disappeared. Historian Shane
153 Gordon W ood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution (N ew York: Vintage Books,
1991), 287-305; Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, 162-170; also see Paul A. Gilje, The Road
to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in N ew York City, 1763-1834 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987).
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White has noted that by 1820, black festivals occurred only sporadically, and
African Americans in the north develop ed more public and political means,
such as parades, of displaying them selves "as both African Americans and
citizens of the new nation." The low er court, while perhaps revealing a more
contentious side of black life, had advantages over parades as a forum to
exercise public citizenship: going to court w as not dependent on the black
elite's organizing, it w as not occasional, and it was not restricted to men.
Permitted no prominent public role in the parades, black w om en became
leaders in the black court experience and were integral to the grow th of a legal
consciousness as African Americans came to use the low er court with
increasing frequency during the second decade of the new century.154
Any possible rise in the crime rate does not adequately explain this
increase. Cases not settled at the justice of the peace level w en t to the
Municipal Court, and the number of criminal cases adjudicated by that court
did alm ost double betw een 1814 and 1816. But the increase w as due almost
entirely to a rise in cases involving property crimes, w hile assaultive crimes
declined steadily from 1814 to 1820.155 African Americans litigants typically
appeared in the justice of the peace court as plaintiffs or defendants in cases
dealing w ith assault or threatening; property crimes represent less than 13%
o f the cases involving African Americans, w ho were generally defendants in
property cases. In short, any rise in the crime rate—if indeed there was such
an increase—can at best explain only a small portion of black Bostonians'
increased usage of Stephen Gorham's court.
154 W illiam D. Piersen, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in
Eighteenth Century New England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 134-135;
Shane White, " 'It Was a Proud Day7: African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North,
1741-1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1994), 15-16.
155 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850, 135-148.
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Table 2

Frequency o f T.P. court appearances b y black Bostonians

Year # of black
plaintiffs

# of black
defendants

# o f total average # of appearances
appearances
per month

1808

20

55

75

6.25

1809

21

60

81

6.75

1810

24

53

77

6.4

1811

36

43

79

6.6

1812

40

76

116

9.7

1813

39

75

114

9.3

1814

39

56

95

8

1815

29

55

84

7

1816
31
(9 months)
1818
86
(11 m.)
1819
89

59

90

10

91

177

16.1

107

196

16.3

1820
72
(10 m.)156

63

135

13.5

The data pointing towards an uneven yet undeniable increase in is
drawn from nine record books of only one justice of the peace. Black
Bostonians did appear before other justices of the peace, made evident by
occasional references in writs, dockets, and summaries of cases that reached
the Municipal Court. It seems probable, however, that Gorham was the

156 Data assembled by counting each appearance of a black litigant in the criminal record books
of Stephen Gorham. By my count, black Bostonians made 1319 appearances in 877 cases.
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justice of choice for m ost black Bostonians, due to his central location and,
especially after 1817, the high numbers that came to him. Between February
of 1818 and the end of October in 1820, 350 African Americans appeared in 508
cases—this out of an adult population of about 1300.157 Unfortunately, the
nine record books are thus far the only extant records that consistently
document the court activities of any Boston justice of the peace. A nd though
these nine record books give a m inim um of detail—names, charges, fines, if
the defendant com plied or had to be jailed for nonpayment—Gorham typically
recorded occupations for white male litigants, marital status for w hite fem ale
litigants, and race for African American litigants. A typical page in Gorham's
book appears as follow s (cases used here did not appear together):

157 The Fourth Census o f the United States, 1820.
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Figure 1
Reproduction o f Gorham's record book
Offense & Officer

1819 th
July 13
Assault
constable
EV. Glover
1819 th
July 13
Theft

1819 st
July 21
absent from sch
without leave
constable

1819 th
October 5
Profane
Swearing

Complainant
Thomas Williamson of
Boston Cabinetmaker

Defendant
William Johnson
of Boston blackman

Witness
John West
James Gould of
Boston Col man, Trader

Proceedings

Fines & Costs

Tho' Williamson charges that
Wm Johnson beat him on this day...
defendant pleads not guilty, charge
proved. S1 plus cost defendant
refused and comitted to goal.

Lydia Raney
of Boston Wife of

Witness
Mary Jane Sewall

Capt. Thomas C. Stevens
Master of the
Schooner Laurel

Rebecca Freeman
of Boston blackwoman

John W. Smith jr.
blackman & cook

Mary Williams
of Boston Col woman

Witness
John Wlnthrop

Though these books do not reveal the details of the disputes or of what
transpired in court, Gorham's fairly regular identification of black litigants—
uncom m on for similar records—permits usefu l quantitative analysis.
Town records and other sources indicate that the first record book,
w hich begins in June of 1806, marked the beginning of Gorham's tenure as a
justice of the peace. Previously, Gorham had served as an Overseer of the
Poor, and m ay have had som e contact w ith m em bers of Boston's black
comm unity. Any such familiarity, however, d id n o t necessarily mean
African Americans were im m ediately attracted to his courtroom; for the first
year and a half of his service as a justice, only 8 cases before him involved
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black litigants, and none w ith black plaintiffs charging w h ite defendants.
W hen Gorham saw a black face in his courtroom, it w as typically a defendant
charged w ith theft, or an occasional runaway slave dragged to court and
ordered by Gorham to be held until the slaveowner could procure transport
back to the South. It w ou ld be over two years before Gorham adjudicated a
case w ith a black plaintiff and a w hite defendant, w hen Trim Tyng and three
black w itnesses managed to have a white man tossed into jail for threatening
Tyng.158
Black plaintiffs, especially black women, were responsible for the
increase in black litigants. W hile free men of color used the court as plaintiffs
against their fellow black Bostonians about twice as frequently as they did
against w hites, free w om en of color such as Rebecca Freeman demonstrated a
proclivity to pursue justice alm ost exclusively against other blacks. Rebecca
Freeman appeared on 13 occasions, five times as a plaintiff, five as a
defendant, and three times as a w itness. All of the cases bu t one were against
African Americans. Eighty-six percent of all black fem ale plaintiffs charged
other African Americans. The number of black defendants brought into court
by w hites remained fairly constant over a thirteen year span, w hile the total
number of black defendants rose due to black prosecution of other African
A m ericans.

158 Tyng v. M cDaniel, August 5 1808 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from July 16 1807 to November
18 1808.
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Table 3

Prosecuting Black Defendants

Year

# of black
defendants

% of black def.
charged by blacks

%of black def. charged
by black females

1808

55

22%

7%

1809

60

30%

7%

1810

53

47%

32%

1811

43

51%

9%

1812

76

45%

21%

1813

75

43%

28%

1814

56

64%

29%

1815

55

40%

24%

42%

22%

68%

53%

68%

51%

79%

52%

1816
59
(9 months)
1818
91
(11 m.)
107
1819
1820
(10 m.)

63

Ultimately, it is difficult to pin dow n causal factors that lead growing
numbers of African Americans to the justice of the peace court. The
constriction of opportunities to manage conflict and exert control w ithin their
neighborhoods no doubt pushed more black Bostonians to a forum that had
long been a part of N ew Englanders' dispute resolution. In addition, there
m ay have also been a simple human force behind the substantial jump in
number of appearances from 1818 to 1820.

From 1806 to 1816 the num ber of

w om en w ho appear more than once as plaintiffs varies from 0 in 1807 to a
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high of 14 in 1814. In 1818, the number of appearances by female plaintiff
repeaters jumps to 35 in 11 m onths. Many of these w om en, some of w hom
also came to court as plaintiffs before 1818, can be tied to other black litigants
or witnesses, w ho in turn can be tied to still others. In short, a relatively
small number of black w o m en w h o demonstrated a proclivity for going to
court introduced others to the court by charging them w ith various offenses
or enlisting them as w itnesses. As leaders in the black court experience, these
litigious black w om en w ere directly and indirectly responsible for
constructing spiraling netw orks of black litigants w h o became familiar w ith
the utility of the justice of the peace court, broadening the realm of court
experience in the black com m unity.
Occasionally sources m ake evident h ow these networks were
constructed within the black community. In January of 1816, William
Jackson managed to have another black man jailed after charging him w ith
assault. Jackson's w itness w a s his wife Nancy. N an cy Jackson appeared ten
days later as a w itness for Jane Robins, w ho succeeded in having another
black woman, Elsa Johnson, throw n in jail after charging her with
threatening. Robins appeared three more times over the next three years in
this justice of the peace court, tw ice as a defendant on the same day and losing
each case, and finally as a successful plaintiff. Her neighbor, John Francis,
pressed assault charges against a white mariner in 1818 and against a black
m an in 1819. It is easy to im agine Nancy Jackson, having served as her
husband's w itness in his su ccessfu l prosecution, being present w hen an
argument broke out b etw een Jane Robins and Elsa Johnson. Jackson, perhaps
motivated by a friendship w ith Robins, or anim osity towards Johnson, or
because she believed Johnson p osed a genuine threat to maintaining a
peaceful neighborhood, or all three motives, inform s Robins that Johnson's
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w ords constitute a prosecutable offense, and that it is a fairly simple process to
bring Johnson to justice. Som e time after finding that she can indeed charge
and prosecute Johnson w ith sp eed and ease, Robins hears about her neighbor,
John Francis, being attacked and instructs him accordingly: where the justice
of the peace court is, how the process works, and h ow to best make his case.
Though Francis w as not ultim ately successful, this type o f pattern appears
repeatedly, and often w ith p ositive results for black litigants. These litigants'
legal genealogy also dem onstrates h ow networks of com m unication spread
throughout Boston's black com m unity and the interconnectedness of the
black community: Robins and Francis, residing on Charter St., lived in the
northeast end of Boston in Ward 1, w hile Nancy Jackson lived a mile aw ay
on the w est side, near Belknap St. in Ward 6.159
Rebecca Freeman, w h ose court exploits outdid m ost of her
contemporaries, can be tied to m ultiple networks of litigious women.
Charged as a minor in 1813, she m anaged to defeat an assault charge; in 1815,
George Reed brought her to court for profane swearing, a charge that Freeman
w ou ld eventually use herself in July of 1819 against another wom an of color,
Lucy DeCosta, who w as found guilty and paid the standard fine plus costs.160
A ssisting Freeman's prosecution w ere three black w om en, A m y Jackson,
Harriet Hubbard, and Delia Jordan. These three black w om en, in addition to

159 W. Jackson v. Thomas Bush, January 19 1816 and Robins v. Johnson, January 29 1816 in
Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 28 1815 to September 2 1816 ; Robins v. Coatman and Robins
v. George, December 12 1818 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to June 2 1819;
Robins v. Freeman, October 23 1819 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6
1820; Francis v. Grice, September 18, 1818 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to
June 2 1819 and Francis v. Potter, September 28, 1819 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3
1819 to November 6 1820; Robins and Francis in the same cluster of hom es on Charter St. in the
The Fourth Census of the United States, 1820; location and distances determ ined from John G.
Hales' 1814 map of Boston.
160 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820; July 3, 1819.
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Freeman and one other w ho w as sim ilarly associated, w ou ld appear before
Gorham a total of eighteen times in fourteen cases over a tw o year span as
plaintiffs, defendants, and w itnesses. Their success rate w as remarkable; only
tw o of the w om en experienced defeat, and one of those w om en w on on an
appeal to the Municipal Court.
Jackson came before Gorham in three cases as a defendant, twice
charged w ith theft and once w ith assault; each time her antagonist w as white.
The decision in each case was "not proven." Two months prior to first being
charged w ith theft in October of 1819, she appeared as a plaintiff and managed
to have a w hite wom an jailed for one day on a 'profane swearing' charge.
O ne of the witnesses for Jackson w as Harriet Hubbard, who, after assisting
Freeman and Jackson in successful prosecutions, w ould appear in again as a
w itness in June of 1820, helping a black wom an nam ed Mary Williams
successfully prosecute another black w om an on the familiar charge of profane
sw earing.161
A m y Jackson's other w itness in her complaint against the w hite
w om an was Sally Garry. Garry w as accused of the same theft as Jackson in
October of 1819, and likewise received a decision of "not proven." One year
later Garry again escaped punishm ent w hen accused of assault by a black man
w h o could not prove his case. Her only defeat in court came in July of 1819
w h en charged w ith assaulting a wom an; instead of paying the fine, however,
Garry appealed the decision to the M unicipal Court, w ho declared her not
guilty. The Municipal Court records reveal that Garry's accuser, Hepzibah
Easte, w as found guilty of assault by another justice of the peace the day before

161 Ibid. Jackson appeared as a defendant twice on October 19,1819 and once on November 11,
1819; as a plaintiff on August 5,1819, w ith Hubbard as a witness. Hubbard appeared as witness
for W illiams on July 29,1820.
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Garry w as brought before Gorham. It is possible that Garry or an associate had
successfully charged Easte before this other justice. Delia Jordan, the third of
Rebecca Freeman's w itnesses, was brought to court twice later that sum m er by
other black Bostonians for threatening and assault. Both times Gorham
rendered a decision of n ot proven.162
The consistent success of these five w om en of color suggests an
"intricate network of exchange" of information and savvy regarding h o w the
justice o f the peace could be used as a w eapon against neighborhood
antagonists, and h ow to best defend oneself w hen charged. Since this
know ledge was used m ost frequently against other people of color, the sphere
of learning expanded. This sharing of experience and know ledge forged
relationships both amicable and hostile and w ere part of bedrock o f
'community', where the seeds for both solidarity and dissension lay.
Christine Stansell notes that w ithin female relationships there w ere
"structured expectations of reciprocal help" but that this "cooperation did not
automatically engender harmony" as quarrels w ere common, resulting at
times in fighting, cursing, or other manifestations of dissatisfaction.163 The
justice o f the peace court provided a stage upon which the conflicts of the
neighborhood were acted out, but also displayed the interconnectedness of the
black comm unity, particularly for black wom en.
M any of the black female plaintiffs charged black defendants w ith the
verbal crimes of threatening and profane swearing. From 1818 to 1820, of the
162 Ibid. Garry appeared with Jackson on October 19,1819, and was charged w ith assault onjuly
15,1819 and October 2,1820. Jordan appeared on July 20,1819 and August 24,1819. Accounts of
the trials on Garry's and Easte's appeals are in Boston Municipal Court Record Books, A ugust
1819, pp. 112 & 117.
163 Christine Stansell, C ity o f Women: Sex and Class in New York 1789-1860 (Alfred A. Knopf:
N ew York, 1986), 41, 57-58. 'Community', as I use it here, is clearly not synonm ous w ith
harmony, but connotes m ultiple and continuing layers of relationships.
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11 profane swearing charges, all were pressed by black w om en against other
wom en, and all but o n e w ere made against other African Americans. O f the
78 threatening charges brought by black plaintiffs, 60 w ere brought by w om en,
and 56 of those w ere issu ed against other African Americans. Assault charges
w ere evenly split, w ith 66 fem ale plaintiffs and 65 m ale plaintiffs. But again,
gendered differences arise: black wom en only charged 11 whites w ith assault,
whereas black m en d id so 38 times. Clearly, black w om en stood at the
forefront of transmitting legal experience to other African Americans. Like
Rebecca Freeman, by bringing others to court as defendants and w itnesses,
they broadened the scope of interactions w ith the legal system.
The procedures of the court itself, intentionally or not, encouraged the
evolution of networks of African Americans familiar w ith the workings of
the legal system. W hen proved, certain types of charges, such as threatening—
w hich black plaintiffs u sed more than any other charge except assault—d id not
generate fines for defendants. Instead, the court required a surety “to keep the
peace" for a specified period. The defendant had to then either dem onstrate
that she or he could p ay the amount levied by the court if the peace w as not
kept, or muster enough friends w ho were w illin g to permit a fine "to be
levied on their goods or chattels, lands or tenem ents, and in want thereof,
upon their bodies" if the defendant broke the peace and was unable to p a y .164
Between 1806 and 1820, 251 black defendants w ere judged guilty in cases that
required a surety instead of a fine or jail time. N inety-three of those
defendants (37%) w ere able to comply. It is doubtful that more than a
handful, if any, of those 93 had the personal w herew ithal to convince the
justice that a surety—w h ich ranged from a lo w of fifty dollars up to several

164

Freeman, The Massachusetts Justice, 178.
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hundred dollars—w ou ld be paid. It is probable, then, that m ost or all of the 93
defendants w ho com plied w ith the order to come up w ith a surety enrolled
the help of friends, perhaps several friends, som e of w h om w ere likely black.
Thus, the court's enforcement process acted as a kind o f 'radiating effect7 to
introduce still m ore black Bostonians to the legal system .165
This again places black w om en in the center of the expansion of the
black legal experience. O f the 93 black defendants w h o com plied with a surety
order, 55 had been charged by a black woman, and 48 o f those were charges of
threatening. W henever a black Bostonian, w ho m ay have had no previous
contact with the court, w as approached by a penitent friend seeking financial
support in order to stay ou t of jail, he or she could likely thank a black
w om an for connecting them to Boston's legal system.
Black w om en found that accusing som eone of threatening gave them a
good chance of succeeding in court. Only four black fem ale plaintiffs failed to
obtain some sort of verdict against white or black defendants w hen they
applied this charge. That type of success likely spurred black wom en to use
this charge more frequently; the incidence of threatening cases accelerated
over the course of the decade.
Overall, both w om en and m en experienced significant success—tw o out
of every three black plaintiffs succeeded in getting the justice of the peace to
m ake som e sort of judgm ent against their antagonist. The chance for success
no doubt encouraged their w illingness to use the court. In 1810, black
litigants appeared in an average of 6.4 cases a month, and defendants
outnumbered plaintiffs 2 to 1. By the end of the decade, black litigants
averaged about 15 appearances a month, w ith a nearly 1:1 ratio of plaintiffs to
165 Marc Galanter, "The Radiating Effects o f the Courts" in Empirical Theories about Courts,
117-142.
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defendants. Succeeding entailed required recasting their complaints in a
language design ed to elicit a response from the court.166
African Americans learned to rephrase disputes through the justice of
the peace's instructions, through informal discussion, and by being brought to
court. It w as probably not unusual for someone to come to the justice or the
constable, telling a story about an antagonist doing or saying certain things,
behavior labeled by the constable or justice as a criminal charge. Others
learned by being charged themselves, b y coming as w itnesses, or by having
others w ith previous court experience helping them define a particular
experience in legal terms. Being able to name an adverse experience in
prosecutable legal terms was a subtle form of power. N am ing an offense, and
claiming redress in court, publicly defined the plaintiff as attempting to
operate, at least for the moment, w ithin the norms established and reinforced
by the courts. Conversely, naming and claiming threatened to place the
defendant outsid e those norms.167
W hen African Americans rephrased their personal disputes in terms
that spoke to larger concerns of social order, they were, consciously or not,
publicly declaring their civic worth. The Municipal court reinforced this
more explicitly w h en Venus Synix, a black w idow , charged a black man, John
Bowers, w ith keeping a "bad noisy house." Synix was not just complaining
about late-night parties. This court found that Bowers "with force and
166 I deemed a prosecution successful if the plaintiff achieved one of six possible decisions
rendered by Gorham: 1) defendant paid a fine; 2) defendant fined but jailed for nonpayment; 3)
defendant sentenced to a jail term; 4) defendant pledged a surety; 5) defendant ordered to
pledge a surety b ut "refused" and subsequently jailed; 6) defendant ordered to pay a fine or
pledge a surety but appealed. Conversely, I deem ed a defendant successful if he or she managed
to avoid all of these and achieved a verdict of "charge not proven."
167 See W illiam L. F. Felstiner., Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Nam ing, Blaming, Claiming..." Laio and Society Review 15 (19801981), 631- 654.
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arms...did keep and maintain...a certain com m on ill governed and disorderly
house...for his o w n w icked gain, [permitting] diverse people of ev il nam e and
fame and dishon est conversation, both black and white, to frequent and come
together... there W horing and otherwise m isbehaving them selves... to the
common nuisance of all the good citizens." The court found Bow ers guilty,
fined him $100 and ordered him to post another hundred dollars to ensure
good behavior for six months. While the several references to the "good
citizens of the comm onwealth" were standard language for the court records,
it nonetheless carried som e meaning by casting behavior like Bowers' as
antithetical to go o d citizenship. Furthermore, cases of this sort w ere of
particular im portance to the courts and to the tow n government, w h o
sharpened the focus on organized vice in the first decades of the n e w
century.168 Synix's use of the justice of the peace court affirmed her status as a
"good citizen" and her success in punishing a neighborhood nuisance no
doubt increased her status in the black com m unity. Furthermore, it w as an
expression of her attempt—backed by the p ow er of the legal system —to
maintain som e am ount of control over her d aily life.169
African Am erican litigants also learned to exploit the pow er o f the
legal system and the moral codes it attem pted to reinforce for their o w n ends.
On a summer Sunday in 1820, while m any o f their fellow citizens o f color
were attending the African Baptist Church, tw o black men came across
N elson Mason, an African American bootblack, busily running a cockfight.
The two m en, H enry Steward and James H anson, probably had little trouble

168 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 , 23.
169 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820, Synix v. Bowers, A u gust 31,
1819; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, September 9, 1819, p. 129. Located at the
M assachusetts State Archives.
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finding Mason since the cockfighting likely took place in one of the public
markets that evolved o u t of w est African and slave culture and had a long
history in N ew England. Steward and Hanson k n ew that many w hites
frowned on these Sabbath-day markets and took advantage of that to have
M ason charged w ith "using sport on the Lord's Day." The justice found
M ason guilty and fined him four dollars plus costs. But it is doubtful that the
m otives of Steward and H anson were very-high m inded; Thomas H anson,
probably related to James, had unsuccessfully prosecuted Mason for beating
him up in December o f 1819. Steward had also assisted Thomas Hanson in
prosecuting another black m an in November of 1819. In the cockfighting
case, James H anson served as a witness for Steward, who, w ith several
previous appearances before the justice as plaintiff, defendant, and w itness,
prosecuted the case. U sin g Mason's violation of a moral standard as a
springboard, Steward and H anson jumped at the opportunity to gain revenge
through the legal system .170
Similarly, Rebecca Freeman found herself at the receiving end of a
prosecution aim ed at revenge w hen Mary M. W illiams, a black woman,
charged her w ith profane sw earing in Novem ber o f 1819. Freeman, unable or
unw illing to pay the $1 fine that w as assessed w h en found guilty, spent the
next three days in jail. Mary Williams' education in using the court came
from none other than Freeman herself, w ho had charged Williams w ith
threatening and profane sw earing a month earlier. W illiams, no doubt
chagrined at being forced to shell out the fines, turned the neighborhood
conflict into a legal d ispu te.171
170 Pierson, Black Yankees, 102-103; Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6
1820, Steward v. Mason, July 20,1820.
171 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820 , Steward v. Mason, July 20,
1820; Williams v. Freeman, N ovem ber 2, 1819; Freeman v. W illiam s, October 5,1819.
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W hether borne out of tensions emanating from racial or class
stratification, or personal anim osities, using the court to repay antagonists
was a deliberate choice. Vengeance, after all, can be carried out in a number of
ways, som e more acceptable to notions of social order than others.

Pursuing

vengeance m ay have often been an attempt "to restore sym m etry to
imbalanced social exchange" by preventing relationships from getting too
unequal and potentially exploding into more serious acts. Steward and
Hanson channeled their conflict w ith Mason through the court instead of
seeking private retribution that could have escalated violently. Freeman and
Williams m oderated w hatever tensions existed in their relationship through
the court, w hich offered a controlled environment that produced outcomes—
fines, rem oval to jail, or declarations of innocence— sanctioned by the law.
For these litigants, the law became "an instrument for private [and] public
vengeance." It w as private in that the conflict was not confined to the
incident rephrased for the court into a specific charge, but involved personal
histories of tangled relationships. By taking their private disputes to the
court, black litigants transformed their conflicts into a public matter before a
judge and spectators. In doing so they learned to rephrase and narrow
disputes into recognizable legal claims that could be dealt w ith quickly in a
venue that offered a decent chance of success.172
W hen Mary Jane Boylston charged John W illiams w ith bastardy in
June of 1812, she 'narrowed' a conflict that probably sprang out of a
complicated relationship. In contrast to the pre-Revolutionary concern w ith

172 On revenge and the law, see Jonathan Rieder, "The Social Organization of Vengeance" in
Tozuard a General Theory of Social Control, ed. Donald Black (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984),
vol. 1,132-133. On transformation of disputes and rephrasing, see Yngvesson and Mather,
"Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes." On court spectators, see Steinberg,
The Transformation o f Criminal Justice.
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immorality, courts in the early republic era were not interested in mediating
personal sexual relationships or in punishing potentially illicit w om en. The
focus had shifted to fixing paternity in order to ensure that u n w ed mothers
did not becom e a burden on com m unal resources. Here the interests of one
member of a group that stood at the bottom of the sotial, econom ic, and
political structures of pow er— black w om en— merged with the interests of
those w ho possessed power. W illiams w as ordered to come u p w ith $300 in
surety to ensure that h e w ould abide by the order of the M unicipal Court.
The records do not reveal what that court's order was, but it probably
compelled W illiams to shoulder som e responsibility for the care of Boylston's
child. Boylston w orked within the 'normative framework' to achieve a
desired end.173
Interpreting the meaning of black litigants' experiences has it dangers.
Court records, as Shane White has noted, are often characterized by "spare
details and dry language [that] tend to flatten out black behavior, m aking it
appear little different from that of w hites w ho broke the sam e law s."174 That
description fits the records used here. W ithout knowing w h at these black
wom en and m en said in court as they m ade their case, or w hat they said out
of court w hen they complained about adverse decisions or reveled in legal
victories, reading the growth of

a

legal consciousness from these records may

seem a bit tenuous.

173 Gorham, Criminal Actions from November 24 1813 to June 28 1815, Boylston v. Williams,
June 20, 1815; on the shift in attitude towards unw ed mothers, see Nelson, Americanization of
the Common Law, 111. N elson notes that in the post-Revolutionary era, "in paternity cases...
the courts not only overlooked the plaintiff's sinner status, but also rendered the sinner
affirmative help in obtaining relief from the consequences of sin."
174 White, Somexohat More Independent, 183.
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But that very lack of detail and the tight descriptions are in them selves
revealing, how ever. Courts have m ethods and procedures to keep a case
'cool'— to m ake a potentially explosive or em otional dispute that m ight be
accompanied b y an entire range of em otive display, a rational and orderly
presentation o f the litigants' interpretations o f the conflict. The rather dry
and flat language Gorham employed to record disputes suggests an attem pt
through the official record to keep these disputes 'cool/ Whether or not this
was indicative of the court/s atmosphere is hard to know, although it seem s
likely that if Gorham attempted to do this in the official record, then he m ay
have also done so in his demeanor and through the procedures o f the
court.175
And legal procedure held the potential to affect the identity of the
litigants. Sally Engle Merry notes that "conflicts are rarely matters of sim ple
interest and rational argument but instead tend to be passionate encounters
in which the w h ole person is on the line. Som e conflicts have m eaning for
how the person thinks about him self or herself and his or her social world,
her ability to cope and to defend herself, and her ability to create an acceptable
im age of herself and her life." Every time a black wom an or m an stepped
into Gorham's court, there was essentially a m eeting of cultures— the public
street culture of the neighborhood, w ith all its irritants, rage, frustrations,
poverty, hardships, and racism confronted the rationality and control that
legal culture attem pted to impose on conflicts. Even though interaction
betw een African American culture and the dom inant culture happened on a
daily basis, and w as therefore less remarkable from Black Bostonians'
standpoint, black litigants nevertheless w alked into the courtroom faced w ith

175 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 98.

121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the challenge of presenting a version of self that fit into the courtroom
environment—a version of self that w ou ld m erge w ith how the court defined
a rational, self-cotrolled being. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey have described
how the law recreates "social relations in a narrower, relatively discrete, and
professionally m anaged context."176 Though Ewick and Silbey m ay n o t have
intended the term 'social relations' to be defined as narrowly as literal
relationships and interactions between individuals, the concept applies: the
relationship of the litigants to one another, and o f each litigant to civil
society, w as played out in the more managed environm ent of the court. In
order to succeed in court, black plaintiffs and defendants learned to fit
themselves, to som e extent, into this recreation. They strove to present
themselves as responsible citizens exercising their right to use the court.
As a part o f that process, black litigants learned to manage conflict by
rephrasing both the dispute and them selves for the court. More than sim ply
learning to apply the correct legal categories to a dispute, rephrasing involved
"a particular construction of a dispute, a construction which orders facts
according to norm ative claims which are seen as persuasive." Black litigants
learned that "veracity consists of the extent to w hich situations can be
persuasively interpreted and presented." And perhaps m ost im portandy,
black litigants learned that arguing their cases in court was actually
"competing w ays o f construing events and selves within particular
normative frameworks." They presented not just competing versions of
events, but also com peting versions of selves against white and black
antagonists. D oin g so m ust have transformed, to som e degree, self
conception—it is unlikely that most black litigants neatly and com pletely
176 Ibid.; Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An
Account of Legal Consciousness," New England Lazo Review 26 (Spring 1992), 731-749.
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separated the self they presented to the court from their total identity. For
w om en and m en losing pow er in many other arenas, discovering one in
w hich they had a real chance to exercise some form of pow er through
presenting a version of events and self must have fostered a sense of the self
defined in part by the law .177
This is not to say that legal actions, whether litigation or signing deeds,
destroyed or overw helm ed African American identity. Legal actions did not
make black Bostonians 'Am erican/ One legal historian points out that while
law does not destroy culture, "law and legal consciousness can, however,
work in concert w ith other forces to alter culture." In early nineteenth
century Boston, because the law was accessible and did deliver justice where it
m attered~in personal relationships and drcum stances~it w orked in concert
with African Americans' dim inishing opportunities to shape black identity.178
African Americans in Boston used the court w ith increased frequency
through the first tw o decades of the nineteenth century. They took advantage
of an accessible forum to manage conflict to punish neighborhood antagonists
by fine or by removal to jail. They did so to such an extent that in less than
three years over one-fourth of Boston's black citizens appeared before one
justice of the peace. Their involvem ent in the lower court—and their
frequent success — likely developed a "conscious sense of legal entitlement
that encourages individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about
their status, rights, duties, and problems." Some of those beliefs certainly
w ould have included a self-conception as legal beings w ith the right to
protection, the right to prosecute, and the sense that the la w w as to som ehow
177 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 92.
178 Mari J. Matsuda, "Law and Culture in the District Court of Honolulu, 1844-45: A Case Study
of the Rise of Legal Consciousness," American Journal of Legal History 32 fianuary, 1988), 40.
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be responsive to their needs. This encouraged them to use the law to get
justice and to m anage conflict w ith neighbors, reinforcing a sense of self as a
legal being w h o could lay claim to a group of rights, and em ploy those rights
in ways that had im m ediate effects.179
Ideally, this argument w ou ld end by revealing that m any o f the African
Americans, or at least their sons or daughters, who participated in various
forms of legal activity eventually em p loyed legal beliefs in efforts to protect
and expand rights and opportunity for African Americans. There are som e
connections. S d p io Dalton, w h o b ou gh t land in Boston in 1799 and became
vice-president of Boston's African H um ane Society, probably had a hand in
writing or approving the Society's charter and by-laws. D udley Tidd, a
member of the Board of Directors, w as likely related to the Tidds w ho
appeared tw ice before Gorham in 1812 and once in 1816. Thomas Paul, the
pastor of Boston's first black church, w as President of the Society and also
appeared as w itness in Gorham's court in 1808.
The Society, founded in 1818, prefaced its by-laws w ith a preamble
refering to the Constitution, stating that "our laws protect all classes of m en
in all their rights." The Secretary and Treasurer had to be sw orn in as officers
in front of a justice of the peace, and the Board of Directors had the
responsibility of acting as a court to determ ine the veracity of any charge
against a m em ber of the society for m isconduct. The by-laws charged the
Directors to "impartially try the charge in question according to the evidence,
with due consideration." The leaders of this society chose to identify
themselves as African in naming the organization, as m any churches and
benevolent societies did in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
179 Michael G rossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in
Antebellum America (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
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but turned to the legislature and the courts for guidelines on how the
organization actually w en t about its business. They chose a public
identification of 'A frican/ w hile building the structure of the Society and
outlining its function w ith specific legal procedures. As James Oliver H orton
and Lois E. Horton h ave pointed out regarding the generational change from
African-born to American-born, for African Am ericans in the nineteenth
century, "Africa w a s m ore their heritage than their home." For the m em bers
o f the African H um ane Society, heritage com pelled them in naming the
organization, but their hom e dictated its form, function, and governance.180
Sdpio D alton em erged as one the leaders in Boston's black com m unity,
helping to organize the first black church in the city. His son Thomas becam e
the first president o f the Massachusetts General Colored Assotiation and
remained a prom inent figure in black activism for fifty years. Dalton also
worked closely w ith D avid Walker. Another likely associate of Walker w as
James Gould, a plaintiff before Gorham in 1818 and again in 1819. G ould w as
one of the Boston distributors of Freedom's Journal, the nation's first black
newspaper, and a toaster at a Boston antislavery banquet. Henry Tyler,
charged and jailed for bastardy in July of 1820 by a black woman, was also
listed as toaster at the sam e banquet and likely an associate of David Walker
in the late 1820s. Thomas Brown, another associate of David Walker and a
member of the African Lodge in 1828, appeared before Gorham as a boy in
1818, charged w ith assault by a white victualer. Robert Roberts, w ho
successfully prosecuted a w hite wom an for assault in 1819, eventually becam e
a member of the state's N egro Convention and w as a central figure in
pushing for the fulfillm ent of promised civil rights.

Finally, William

180 Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, 191; The By-Laws, rules and regidations, of the
African Humane Society.
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Brown, another leader w ithin Boston's black com m unity in the 1820s and
later, appeared num erous tim es before Gorham, three tim es as a plaintiff
betw een 1816 and 1818. A nd there are other more indirect connections.181
These are, adm ittedly, loose connections. M en like Dalton and Tidd
and the other founders of the Society could have been influenced by m ultiple
sources in addition to appearing in court or signing a property deed. But that
is in som e respects the point: the law shaped African Am ericans identity
through a variety of m eans. The African Hum ane Society's charter was a
product of that identity. Even if the founding m em bers had someone else
draft the by-laws, they adopted the charter and carried out the activities of the
Society under the charter's strictures and guidelines.
But m ost of the m en and wom en w ho engaged in legal activity,
particularly in the justice of the peace court, were not leaders in the
traditional sense. M ost w ere not even heads of households in the 1810 and
1820 censuses. It is not surprising, then, that they do not em erge later as
political leaders in the black community. But this did not m inim ize their
influence on the formation of individual and corporate identity formation as
they shared know ledge o f h ow to negotiate legal transactions or stories of
courtroom triumphs and defeats. In fact, the apparent sparsity of 'leaders' in

181 Some of the other possible indirect connections: other officers o f the Society may have had
relatives who appeared before Gorham—Dudley Tidd, for instance, w as likely related to the
Tidds w ho appeared before Gorham in 1812 and 1816. John Pero, also an associate of Walker
and a member of the African Lodge, was probably related to Henry Pero, w ho as a boy escaped
conviction when charged with assault in 1820. Many other members o f the African Lodge were
hairdressers, and may have know n Samuel Francis, a black hairdresser w h o appeared before
Gorham several times as a plaintiff over several years. Material on the African Lodge in Peter
P. H inks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of Antebellum
Slave Resistance (University Park: The Pennsylvannia State U niversity Press, 1997), 265-266.
On Thomas Dalton, see James Oliver Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American
Community (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 43-44.
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their ranks m ay have been a strength as common black fo lk communicated a
legal sense of se lf to one another in straightforward and effective ways.
On som e level, black litigants accepted the authority o f the legal system
and invested it- w ith a legitimacy that meant som ething in the black
community. E ven those who did not directly participate in the legal system
were likely affected. Through their experience, litigants gained leverage based
on knowledge o f w hat a court m ight do. By going to the justice of the peace,
black Bostonians gained know ledge of what norms w ere affirm ed and
enforced by the courts. Even losing defendants, forced to experience first
hand the pow er and procedure of the court, could have u sed this knowledge.
It is not difficult to picture a formerly punished offender, nursing a grievance
against a neighbor, threatening court action, and em ploying a type of
'bargaining endow m en t'—by giving weight to her threat b y communicating
what happened to her w hen she committed a similar offen se.182
In the late eighteenth century, holding pow er over a piece of property,
protecting one's vocation, or controlling an inheritance h elp ed establish
certain boundaries for free black m en and wom en w ho had directly or
indirectly experienced bondage. In the early nineteenth century, those bom
before em ancipation and the first generations of African Am ericans to be
raised in a free com m unity, while still no doubt aware of the law 's Dower to
be oppressive, learned to "harness the power of the law" in their attempt to
maintain som e boundaries over their daily lives.183 M any of Boston's black
citizens either reinforced or constructed concepts of personal rights and a
sense of self b ein g expressed, protected, and perhaps even expanded, through
182 Marc Glanater, "The Radiating Effects o f the Courts," in Empirical Theories about Courts,
ed. Keith O. Boyum and Lynn Mather, (N ew York: Longman, 1983), 117-142.
183 Phrase borrowed from Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 180.
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their legal activity, w h eth er in signing deeds or through courtroom litigation.
Legal actions began to structure the w ay black folks perceived them selves.
Legal actions helped construct notions of self as a legally defined individual
w ith certain rights. For African Americans, though, it may have also m eant
corporate conceptions, as they cemented com m unal connections through
formal legal m echanism s like deeds and w ills, and by building alliances
through enlisting w itn esses against neighborhood antagonists. This m ay not
have been their intent, and it may have been a natural thing to do—it w as
w hat whites did—b u t it d id n ot necessarily m ean the same thing for black
people as it did for w h ite people. For black Bostonians, a sense of the legal self
w ould play an im portant role in their struggle for full citizenship. It m ay
have even been a necessary precursor to their corporate attacks in the m id
nineteenth century o n segregationist laws and practices in the North.
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Chapter Three

Limits and Possibilities of Legal Consciousness- 1822-1855

John Robinson w as a m an w ith a problem. It w as, by m ost measures,
not a serious problem; definitely not as serious as the difficulties that many of
his fellow free people of color faced from time to time in a racially oppressive
society. As an occasional figure am ong black Boston's cadre of leaders during
antebellum era activism , Robinson was well aware of those obstacles, minor
or major. This particular problem , though, w as an obstacle of the literal sort.
Robinson dealt w ith it b y drafting a letter in the late sum m er of 1842, signed
by several other residents of Bridge Court. His letter m ay have been aimed at
the d ty selectmen, or it m ay have been intended for circulation in the
im mediate neighborhood. Robinson stated that the he and the other
residents of Bridge Court had been "and are still annoyed by certain
obstructions being placed in the passage-way of said Court, m uch to our
inconvenience." Robinson took the lead in rectifying this nuisance — the
letter begins "This is to Certify that I, John Robinson, w ith others." The
annoyed residents of Bridge Court stipulated "that such obstructions be
forthwith removed and said Court in future be kept clear" and directed that
"there shall not be any thing placed in the said passage-w ay of said Court, and
w ill also discountenance the sam e in others."184

184 Letter of lohn Robinson in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum. Signed by
six other residents.
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The Bridge Court petition never mentioned exactly w hat type of
obstructions plagued the residents. Boston had been steadily grow ing in
population, and as a regional econom ic center. A large portion of the region's
exports and imports flow ed through the city, causing increased problems with
traffic in the narrow streets of the city and w ith construction materials being
left in the streets. Boston's truckmen, carting heavy loads of these goods
about town manually, or carpenters leaving planks or rubbish, m ay have
been the perpetrators of the inconvenience irking John Robinson and his
neighbors. Ordinances had been passed long before to deal w ith these
problems; the obstruction of streets m eant the obstruction of commerce, an
intolerable circumstance in an expanding economy.185
Robinson's petition dem onstrates a certain sensibility and expectation
that control and use of this public street belonged primarily to the residents,
and not to the truckmen or w hoever w as placing the obstructions in the
court. Streets labeled as courts in Boston typically denoted either a dead end
street or a narrow street that connected two major streets, so the passage-way
Robinson referred to was probably the entrance into the court from the main
street. Blocking the passage-w ay effectively made the court inaccessible.
Though there had been attempts to regulate traffic and obstructions to traffic,
it w ould not be until 1846, four years after Robinson's letter, that the city's
police force actually put any significant effort into enforcing those
ordinances.186 Robinson knew that any improvement in the situation w ould
have to come at the initiative of the Bridge Court residents.

185 Francis X. Blouin, Jr., The Boston Region 1810-1850: A Study of Urbanization (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1980); Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 68, 109-110.
186 Lane, Policing the C ity, 62.
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Robinson clearly m anifested a legal consciousness. Legal scholars
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey define legal consciousness as "the w ays in
w hich people make sense o f the law and legal institutions" and h ow those
understandings "give m eaning to people's experiences and actions." Legal
consciousness is that and more: it is, as the previous chapter suggested, not
only how people perceive the law, but a "conscious sense of legal entitlem ent
that encourages individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about
their status, rights, duties, and problems." Legal consciousness is revealed in
h o w individuals choose to p u t those perceptions — those 'legal beliefs' — into
action.187
One of the signifiers of John Robinson's legal consciousness w as his
choice of words in his brief letter: in a manner mirroring the language of
formal legal documents, he referred back to Bridge Court three times as "said
Court," and after specifying that the obstructions w ere being placed in the
passage-way of Bridge Court, he referred once again to the "said passage-w ay
of said Court." Though typical of official legal docum ents, this letter w as not
a product of a formal court proceeding; it w as handwritten and probably
directed to the selectmen, the police department, or sim ply a draft of a notice
to be posted. Robinson obviously thought this kind of legalistic w ording
carried weight. By appropriating the authority that legal language carried, he
attem pted to inscribe legality on the m undane. W hether Robinson's letter
had the desired effect is uncertain, although the lack of further com plaints
m ay be an indication that the obstructions ceased to im pede the com ings and
goings of the Bridge Court residents.
187 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account
o f Legal Consciousness," New England Law Review 26 (Spring 1992), 734; Michael Grossberg, A
Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in Antebellum America
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
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African Am ericans in antebellum Boston, like the m em bers o f the
African H um ane Society and the litigants in the justice of the peace court,
w ere comfortable using beliefs about the h o w law worked to exert som e kind
of control over their daily lives. In m any respects, the manner in w h ich they
did so likely d id not differ substantially from that of their w hite neighbors,
particularly w h en it came to using the courts to manage conflicts. Black
urbanites in B oston and other northern cities found, however, that u sin g the
courts provided fodder for the perpetuation of racist ideologies, as
newspapers began to regularly lam poon black litigants. Court reporters'
published accounts of the legal travails of black litigants fit w ithin a larger
context of increased public derision of northern African Am ericans in
broadsides, new spapers, and minstrel sh o w s.188 Employing legal
consciousness b y using the courts became som ething of a double-edged sword:
as African A m ericans exerdsed their right to use the law, w hite observers
used their efforts to help fashion a radst caricature, making that public space
m ore perilous.
N evertheless, black Bostonians like John Robinson d ev elo p ed and
w ielded a legal consdousness that outlined w ays in which they b elieved the
law should and could work. Frequently these beliefs were m ade m anifest
through formal legal interactions, such as in the courts. On other occasions,
these beliefs w ere put into action in informal w ays invested w ith the
188 On the deteriorating atmosphere of race relations and increased public denigration of
northern African Am ericans, see Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of
Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1988);
Lamont D. T hom as, Rise to be a People: A Biography of Paul Cuffe (Chicago: U n iversity of
Illinois Press, 1986); Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America (Chicago: U niversity of
Chicago Press, 1981); D avid Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the M aking o f the
American Working Class (N ew York: Verso, 1991); Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface
Minstrelsy and the American Working Class (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Shane
White, " 'It W as a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 17411834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1994), 13-50.
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authority of the law , which, could work in the interest of both African
Americans and legal authorities.
Richard Crafus, a legendary figure in Boston, epitomized the manner
in which the law could w ork for both groups b y occupying a position betw een
the white legal system 's formal mechanisms for maintaining social order and
the black com m unity's informal means of m anaging conflict. Crafus, one of
many African Am ericans w h o had served in the United States N avy in the
War of 1812, w as captured and sent to Dartmoor prison in England, w here he
soon became the leader of nearly one thousand imprisoned black mariners.
Popularly called K ing Dick, Crafus was a m an of such size and strength that
he reportedly fough t off an attempted coup b y som e other black prisoners
w ho sprung an am bush w hile he was sleeping by seizing "the smallest of
them by his feet, and thum ped another w ith him," successfully quashing the
rebellion. The anecdote m ay have been more m yth than fact — though at w ell
over six feet, perhaps w eighing as much as three hundred pounds, and by all
reports of great strength, he surely could have sw un g a small man around by
his feet. As W. Jeffrey Bolster points out, though, Crafus' size and strength
were not the only assets that propelled him to dominance among Dartmoor's
black prisoners; along w ith physical ability, African custom required other
character traits for leaders to attract and retain support. His 1831 obituary
eulogized him as "this king Richard IV" w ho w as "a man of good
understanding, and he exercises it to a good purpose. If any one of his color
cheats, defrauds, or steals from his comrades, he is sure to be punished for it."
Another w hite Bostonian remembered him as a "generous, m agnanim ous
man" w ho always advocated the "cause of right, preventing the strong from
triumphing upon the weak." African Am ericans in Dartmoor and Boston
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recognized Crafus' unique combination of personal and physical traits and
bestow ed upon him a position o f high status.189
Sometime after being repatriated at war's end, Crafus m oved into a
similar position of leadership am ong the black community on what was then
called 'Nigger Hill.' The Hill, straddling Wards Five and Six, and bounded on
the south by the Commons, on the w est by the Charles River, and on the east
by court and government buildings, held the heaviest concentration of
African Americans in Boston. Black Bostonians quickly became familiar w ith
those traits that set him apart at Dartmoor. So, too, did many white
Bostonians, and recognizing the respect he received from African Americans,
Boston's law enforcement establishm ent approached Crafus and offered him
"a special position," apparently as a sort of unofficial constable, which he
accepted and "filled with distinction." Crafus reportedly kept his "muscles in
full play... quelling riots and settling disputes. He did the work of ten men o f
the Constabulary force." Another chronicler of Boston described Crafus w ith
a bit more complexity, calling him the "bully of the hill" but also "a
peacemaker by practice." By reputation and action, King Dick was a potent
force in helping to maintain som e semblance of order on the Hill throughout
the 1820s.190
189 For more on Crafus' experiences at Dartmoor Prison, see W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks:
African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 102113; the story of the attempted coup is taken from Crafus' obituary, printed in The Liberator,
February 26, 1831; George H ugh Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces: sketches of
some odd characters who have flourished in Boston during the past fifty years, 1881, an
unpublished manuscript located at the Boston Athenaeum. See chapter entided "Big Dick."
Crafus became a figure of such interest that, according to Crichton, he "sold his body to the
Medical College, where his skeleton hangs to this day." Edward Savage's history of the
Boston Watch also mentions that in 1865 Crafus' "stately figure may still be seen not a mile
from his former residence."
190 Crichton, Old Boston; Edward H. Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch
and Police, from 1631 to 1865; Together with the Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or
Boston by Daylight and Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 69.
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Crafus acted as a de facto constable at a transitional time in northern
urban policing. In Boston, city leaders like Josiah Quincy were bent on
establishing a m oral and social order in the m idst of a growth in population
and in econom ic potential. City officials focu sed in particular on using the
courts and the police force to im plem ent reform .191 In his m ediatory role,
Crafus aided the police and city governm ent in their efforts towards social
reform, and so furthered the law's function of social control. But he also
provided a buffer o f sorts between black citizens and a white police force that
often perceived African Americans as a threat to the goal of an orderly society.
As a prisoner-of-war, Crafus gained valuable experience working as an
intermediate b etw een African Americans and w hite authorities. H e did
likew ise in Boston.
To som e extent, Crafus' ability to m aintain the law's function of control
and enforcem ent w ithin the black com m unity w as no doubt strengthened by
acting w ith the m andate of the 'special position' bequeathed upon him by the
police. In fact, during a time when the black festivals were waning, and the
traditional judicial function of black kings and their subordinates was
underm ined by com peting alternatives su ch as the justice of the peace court,
the backing of the police may have briefly reinvested this particular black king
with a kind of paralegal authority w ithin the black community. Black
offenders knew the alternative to the justice of King Dick was the justice of

191 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts; Lane, Policing the City; Paul Boyer, Urban
Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978);
see also W illiam J. N ovak , The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), particularly 149-190.
Novak argues for greater continuity in the policing and governance of public morality from the
colonial era through the early republic era instead o f seeing the efforts of Quincy and others as
an era of new reforms.
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the w hite legal system, and many probably w illin gly abided by his rules and
submitted to his penalties rather than risk other consequences.192
Black Bostonians had long recognized and acted within tw o
overlapping legal systems: the formal w h ite legal system and the system of
enforcem ent and punishm ent that existed w ith in the black community.
Even the internal judicial system s of the black community, however, had
been influenced by the w hite legal system; Joseph Reidy noted the white
influence in the festivals' judicial functions. A ny self-enforcement
continuing w ithin the nineteenth-century black comm unity, particularly
after the end of King Dick's reign, remains largely hidden. But in an era of
increased regulation and reform, and w ith the strengthening of the police's
purpose and function, it seem s unlikely that African Americans enjoyed
much of the occasional legal autonom y once provided by the festivals. And it
is important to keep in m ind that occasional nature; African Americans,
including Crafus, interacted with the law and courts on nearly a daily basis,
while the festivals were a once-a-year affair. The legal consciousness of
Crafus and his subordinates, heavily inform ed by the white legal system,
likely facilitated the acceptance of his role as a sort of ancillary constable.
As a black king in Boston, and as the leader of the black prisoners in
Dartmoor, Crafus had operated within an African American tradition of the
"quasi-legal system" of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century festivals.
Whites had supported the festivals in part because of the self-policing that

192 See Shane White, "It Was a Proud D ay/'; W illiam D. Piersen,Black Yankees: The
Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England (Amherst:
University of M assachusetts Press, 1988); and Joseph P. Reidy, " 'Negro Election Day' and
Black Com m unity Life in N ew England, 1750-1860," M arxist Perspectives 1 (Fall 1978), 102-117.
Black kings and governors continued to exist in N ew England into the 1850s, but the festivals
became more sporadic and and som e places, such as M assachusetts, stopped altogether by about
1830.
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slaves and free blacks undertook during the festivals. For Crafus, operating in
conjunction w ith the white legal system w as a natural transition, as it
apparently w as for m ost black Bostonians w ho readily used the lower courts.
But it was n ot a case of more of the same. White support of the festivals w as
more than perm itting blacks to deal w ith lesser crimes internally; it was also
manifested in providing food, drink, and clothes for black participants. For a
few days of each year, African Americans expected and received largess from
whites, a m aterial manifestation of the role reversals performed during the
festival. But in the nineteenth century, free black Bostonians received
nothing of the sort — in fact, even during Crafus' reign as king and his tenure
as an unofficial constable, d ty officials bypassed Crafus at w ill by making
forays into black neighborhoods to shut dow n brothels, unruly taverns, or
other immoral activities, such as M ayor Quincy's 1823 crack dow n on girls
"shaking dow n" on the H ill.193 There were certain responsibilities that fell
within Crafus' 'jurisdiction', but those responsibilities w ere defined by the
white law enforcem ent officials and reform-minded politicians. Ultimately,
his jurisdiction existed only so long as w hites in positions of pow er deemed
the arrangement advantageous. Furthermore, the 'jurisdiction' and
mediating influence of Crafus and subsequent governors had boundaries:
although the H ill supported the heaviest concentration of Boston's black
population, anyw here from 45% to 70% of African Americans lived
elsewhere in Boston.194 African Americans' self-rule, though it persisted to

193 Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, 63.
194 George Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in Urban America, 17501860 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), Tables 1-14 and 1-15. The reason for the wide
statistical spread (45%-70%) is because the 1820 census records about 55% of black Bostonians
living on the H ill, or Ward 6, but only 32% in 1830. The d ty census of 1825 puts the figure at
27%. The d ed in e between 1820 and 1825 m ay have been due to a significant relocation, of
which there is presently no evidence; it is possible that the dty census of 1825 undercounted the
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some degree, becam e m ore circumscribed. N onetheless, Crafus' role in acting
on behalf of both th e black community and the w hite legal system provided a
transitional phase as black Bostonians' legal consciousness became less
connected to the older traditions and more tied to the law that w as grow ing in
its reach into the d a ily lives of all Bostonians.

The grow ing encroachment of the law did not necessarily m ean black
Bostonians sim ply subjected themselves to it, how ever; like John Robinson's
use of legal language, other blacks figured out h ow to sometimes bend even
the reformist im p u lses of the legal establishment to their own devices. One
of Crafus' successors, 'Governor' Riggins, dem onstrated this when he turned
one his subordinates, W ilham Patterson, over to the court for violating a
standing order. O ne of Patterson's responsibilities w as procuring unlicensed
liquor, but he m ade th e mistake of doing this on a Sunday and supplying it to
a party of fellow black Bostonians. Riggins adm onished Patterson, rem inding
him that Patterson an d his friends could "drink in m y house, as comfortably
as in the parlor of a n y gentlem an of Boston" on a Saturday night. But doing
this on a Sunday w a s just plain foolish. Riggin's chagrin may have been
partly because he k n ew that during a time of heightened attention to
temperance and m orality, a party of drinking blacks w ould attract unw anted
attention from d ty authorities. By leaving Patterson to the mercy of a w h ite
judge, Riggins used th e law to remind Patterson of his proper place, and
forestall a stronger resp onse from legal authorities. Riggins, telling Patterson
"I hope the law w ill m ake you smart," in effect used the law to reinforce his
black population, but this seem s unlikely since the total number of African Americans counted
increased by 187. The m o st likely explanation is that the ward boundaries were either redrawn
or the census takers, as the 1825 census records a substantial decrease inWard 6, while recording
substantial increases for adjacent Wards 5 and 7.
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ow n quasi-legal authority w ithin the black com m unity, and used the law to
prevent law enforcem ent.195
Black Bostonians som etim es put legal consciousness to use in
m ediating relationships w ithout ever going to court. The inadvertent
remark of one w hite Bostonian revealed black Bostonians" ability to use their
know ledge of how to use the threat of the law to gain retribution. This w hite
man, brought to court for not shoveling the sn ow off his walkway, had
attacked an elderly black m an earlier in the w eek, and n ow assumed his
victim had pressed an assault charge. Before discovering the actual charge, he
blurted out that after the beating he "went and p aid him seven and sixpence,
and he acknowledged sastisfaction."196 It is possible the w hite assailant
m erely felt guilty; it is m ore likely that his black victim put to use his "legal
beliefs' and threatened to take his attacker to court. By paying this elderly
black man directly, the assailant avoided paying a fine and the possibility of
spending time in jail.
African Americans also understood h ow to u se more formal and direct
m ethods to take advantage of the protection the la w afforded for everyday
life. Remember Ransom, an elderly black w om an livin g in Salem, worked
w ith her brother, Cato Freeman, to arrange for her care. They had a
handwritten contract drawn up in 1838 directing Freeman to pay another
black woman, Flora Brooks, fifty dollars after Ransom 's death in return for
Brook's caregiving. The contract also stipulated that Brooks could live w ith
Ransom rent free, have u se of the house for three m onths after her death,
and make use of the produce from Ransom's garden. If Brooks left Ransom
195 Selections from the Court Reports orginally published in the Boston Morning Post, from 1834
to 1837, (Boston: Otis, Broaders, & Co. 1837), 173-174.
196 Ball Fenner, Raising the Veil; or Scenes in the Courts (Boston:1856), 55.
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at any tim e, the contract was null and void. Brooks pu t her mark to the
contract, w itnessed by two other men. Cato Freeman sign ed another brief
handw ritten note agreeing to p ay Brooks so long as she m et the terms of the
contract.197
This relatively unremarkable agreement, articulating legal ties betw een
its black participants, evinces a conscious choice by Ransom and Freeman to
u se a form al legal process to ensure that Ransom w ou ld receive aid in her
later years. Ransom and Freeman could have m aintained an informal verbal
agreem ent w ith Brooks, or sim ply paid her on a regular basis. Instead, they
pu t to u se their understanding o f the law to construct a legally defined
relationship w ith Brooks. Brooks, too, experienced the benefits of the legal
nature of the agreement, as it guaranteed housing for herself and her child,
som e food, and wages at the end of her service.
Ransom knew the ability of legal documents to safeguard one's
property and well-being. Her husband, a laborer nam ed Cato Ransom, and
one of the property owners m entioned in the previous chapter, not only
designated her as the heir of m ost of his personal and real estate, but he also
appointed Remember as "the sole executrix of this m y last will". The fees for
inventorying an estate could add up to over fifty dollars; if a public official
perform ed these duties, the fees could exceed one hundred dollars. When the
Ransom s decided to have Remember operate in these capacities, they
protected years of work and investm ent by keeping as m uch m oney as
possible in the family. The judge of probate in Salem verified Remember
Ransom as the executrix after Cato's death one year later in 1820.198 As a
197 Contract w ith Flora Brooks is in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
198 Carol Bulchalter Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston: An Analysis of Probate
Records (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 4-5; Cato Ransom's w ill and the probate
certificate is in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
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property ow n er and executrix of her husband's estate, Remember Ransom
had sufficient experience with the legal system to appreciate the importance
and usefulness of using the law to secure an arrangement w ith Flora Brooks.
A variety o f legal experiences schooled Africans Americans in making
the best u se of the law. In 1837 Am y Jackson had a will drawn up to dispose
of her estate, w hich consisted of tw o sm all houses on a com er lot and another
house and lo t a block away on May Street. Three years later, her estate w ould
be assessed at over $2600 w hen she died in 1840. Her 1837 w ill designated
Mary Clark, the adopted daughter of her dead husband, as the sole heir. A
year later, how ever, Jackson had a change of heart, and made out a n ew will
naming V enus Senex, a nurse, as the on ly heir and the executrix. After
Jackson's death, the will was contested first by Phineas Blair, Public
Administrator, w h o argued that Jackson had left no heirs or kin w ithin the
C om m onw ealth of Massachusetts, since Clark lived w ith her husband in
Portland, and therefore legally had died intestate. Mary Clark contested the
w ill after notices had been published in newspapers. Finally, Senex contested
Clark's claim , and the judge of probate ruled in her favor.199
Senex eventually asked the court to appoint one of the w itnesses to the
second w ill, Sam uel E. Sewall, as the executor, for reasons unknow n. Sewall,
a prom inent law yer and one of the founders of the N ew England AntiSlavery Society, m ust have put this lo w on his list of priorities, for a year
w ent by w ith no progress on settling Jackson's estate. Senex did not sit idly by.
Eventually she told the judge of probate, in a note apparently written in her
ow n hand, that she wanted "the property of Am y Jackson sold by the SE
Sewall b y the sixteenth of March w hich w ill be a year and one day since her

199 Ibid., 122.
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death." A year after her death, Jackson's debts had yet to be settled. Senex also
informed the court that she had "another gentlem an" ready to take over the
process im mediately if Sewall continued to be slo w about settling the matter.
She demonstrated her determination to get the entire affair behind her w h en
she wrote the judge and asked him "please not to publish it in the Liberator
for it is not so public a paper as some others this paper is very limited indeed"
and requested that notices for the sale of Jackson's property be placed in the
Boston M orning Post and the Daily A dvertiser . Senex succeeded, and the

estate was sold and the accounts settled within a few m o n th s.200
Jackson and Senex both had a history of taking initiative w ith the la w
in an effort to exert som e control over their daily lives. Am y Jackson w as one
of the circle of black w om en w ho learned to effectively use the justice of the
peace court. As a m iddle-aged woman, Jackson m ade eleven appearances in
Stephen Gorham's court between 1812 and 1820; four as a witness, three as a
plaintiff, and four as a defendant. Brought to court in 1819 twice on charges of
theft and once on an assault charge, the justice o f the peace exonerated her on
each occasion. A n assault charge in 1814 proved to be the only time Jackson
suffered a defeat in court, for which she paid a sm all fine.201
200 Ibid. Sewall is described as a leader of the white abolition m ovem ent and co-founder o f the
NAAS in William M. W iecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America,
1760-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1977), 160; and in Horton and Horton, Black
Bostonians, 83.
201 Am y Jackson appeared as a plaintiff in the record books o f justice of the peace Stephen
Gorham: Jackson v. Armstrong, June 27 1812, Criminal Actions from August 11 1810 to July 18
1812; Jackson v. Pricklow, June 7 1814, Criminal Actions from November 24 1813 to June 28 1815;
and Jackson v. Francis, A u gu st 15 1819, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820.
Jackson appeared as a defendant in Gould v. Jackson, Decem ber 12 1814, Criminal Actions from
November 2 4 1813 to June 28 1815; Garry v. Jackson and Case v. Jackson, October 19 1819, and
Gibbs v. Jackson, N ovem ber 11, 1819, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820.
Jackson appeared as a w itness in Pem aby v. Olcott and Pem aby v. Hopkins, December 29 1812,
Criminal Actions from July 19 1812 to November 24 1813; Renouf v. Cousins, November 26 1818,
Criminal Actions from February 2 1818 to June 2 1819; and Freeman v. DeCosta, July 3 1819,
Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820.
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V enus Senex was undoubtedly the same w om an w ho appeared as the
plaintiff Venus Synnex in Gorham 's court in A u gu st o f 1819 against John
Bowers for operating a house of gam bling and prostitution in her
neighborhood. Synnex had the confidence to see the case through to the
M unicipal Court, resulting in a hefty fine for Bowers and the end of his
business for the time being. T w enty years later, she apparently displayed little
com punction in contesting the claims of the Public Administrator and Mary
Clark; nor did she have any qualm s in pushing Sam uel E. Sewall by appealing
to the judge of probate to m ove matters along w hen Sewall's timetable
proved unsatisfactory. It is likely both of these w om en continued to appear in
other courts whose records that have been lost or have yet to be uncovered.202

For African Americans, the ability to use the la w and employ legal
beliefs m ost likely held greater significance than it d id for whites. When
black m en and wom en like John Robinson or Rem em ber Ransom employed
legal term inology and concepts, they used a form o f pow er to maintain some
m easure of control amid life's vagaries. In those struggles African Americans
frequently employed beliefs about h ow they thought the law should work, no
doubt more often in w ays left unrecorded, but at tim es that legal
consciousness expressed itself in sources like John Robinson's letter. Black
m en and w om en had m ultiple sources for the evolu tion of a legal
consciousness through regular involvem ent w ith the legal system. Robinson
posted a surety in 1840 for the administration of W illiam S. Jinnings' estate, a
black trader w ho owned a business just a few doors d ow n the street from

202 Gorham, Synnix v. Bowers, A u gu st 31 1819,Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6
1820; Com m onwealth v. Bowers, Septem ber 9 1819, Boston Municipal Court Record Books, p. 129,
located at the Massachusetts State A rchives.
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Robinson's clothing business.203 A s a business and home ow ner, Robinson
w ould have dealt with various ordinances regulating life in a growing
metropolis. H e and his wife w ere probably aware of the arraignment of David
Walker and tw o other black clothes dealers on theft and conspiracy charges in
1828, and the subsequent acquittal of all three due to Walker's heady
defense.204
John Robinson's use of legal language in 1842 to clear his street fit
w ithin a pattern of bending the la w to accomplish certain goals. The most
dramatic manifestation of this pattern occurred in 1837, w h en Robinson and
his wife, Sophia, were brought before the Municipal Court on charges of
kidnapping Elizabeth, a five-year old African American, from her white
guardians. During the course of this dispute, the legal consciousness of the
Robinsons and other black Bostonians revealed itself as they attem pted to
apply their interpretation of h ow they believed the law should work.
The Robinsons suspected H enry Bright, Elizabeth's guardian, of being
nothing m ore than a slaveowner m asquerading as a benevolent caretaker
w ho had brought his chattel north. Fueling their suspicion of the Brights
m ay have been information im parted by Bright's former slave, Stephen Burt.
W hen the case came to court, Burt testified that on the day of her mother's
death, Elizabeth had been given to another slave named Eleanor. Other
members o f the African American com m unity claimed Elizabeth bore
suspicious bruises, and that her hair had not been combed for a long time.

203 Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston, 77-78.
204 Boston Municipal Court Record Books, February 1828. The other two defendants were John
Eli and John Scarlett; Peter Hinks notes that a Boston newspaper mentioned Walker's defense.
Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate any written record o f his defense; the file papers,
which may or m ay not have contained such a document, for Municipal Court cases in 1828
appear to be m issing the month of February.
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Above all, they feared Elizabeth's return to slavery in the south. It is n ot clear
if black Bostonians, once they discovered Elizabeth had been a slave, had bona
fide information pointing to plans by the Brights to sell or transport Elizabeth
south, or if they m ad e assumptions based o n Burt's knowledge. H enry Bright
did, however, acknow ledge his plan to travel south for the winter m onths,
but testified that he had "no design of taking her back." Some free people of
color presumably fou n d this daim rather dubious. Later they w ou ld tell one
of Boston's leading abolitionists that slaveholders like Bright "with their
smooth tongues, cou ld deceive" even prom inent whites, but slaveholders
"could not deceive the colored people."205
Bright, the form er owner of Elizabeth's deceased mother,
acknowledged Elizabeth's previous slave status w hen they lived in Alabam a,
but insisted he and his w ife now considered her virtually a part of their ow n
family. In fact, said Bright, his wife was an "immediate abolitionist." After
Elizabeth disappeared, Bright contacted "som e leading abolitionists in
Boston," since he correctly assumed the child had been taken either by
abolition activists or their sympathizers. Bright insisted the child w as not
n ow a slave and that he and his w ife had no intention of selling her into
slavery. After advisin g Bright to put their intentions in writing, Sam uel E.
Sewall, an attorney w h o was one of those 'leading abolitionists,' spoke to
Samuel Snowden, on e of Boston's prom inent black ministers. Snow den,
w ho said he "could probably find the child," relayed a message requesting a
bond to guarantee that Elizabeth w ould not be sold into southern slavery.
This request w as another example of black Bostonians using their

pe ter O xenbridge Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, Tried in the Municipal Court o f the
C ity of Boston, before Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, Judge of the Court from 1823 to 1842, ed.
Horatio W oodman (Boston: 1845), 492-493, 495. Located at the Social Law Library.
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understanding of the law for leverage; the Suprem e Judicial Court had earlier
ruled that in the case o f children about to be carried out of the state and into
slavery, a writ o f habeas corpus could be obtained and a surety required o f the
child's guardians. Even though no writ had b een obtained, and therefore the
request had no genuine legal weight, Bright consented, and Sewall m ade o u t
a bond for five hundred dollars.206
Another attorney and abolitionist, Ellis G ray Loring, having been in
contact with m em bers of the African American com m unity w ho kn ew about
the kidnapping, told Bright he w ould continue negotiating while
recommending that the child be given back to the Brights. Eventually, four
or five days after w h at the Brights called an abduction and black Bostonians
called a rescue, H enry Bright managed to arrange a m eeting with the
Robinsons. The im pression from his account is that Sophia operated as the
leader; Bright said "I called on Mrs. Robinson w ith m y wife....Her husband
was present a part of the time."207
According to Bright, Sophia Robinson g a v e them the runaround.
After im m ediately acknow ledging that, accom panied by her husband and her
ow n children, she had indeed taken the child w h ile Elizabeth w as playing in
the street in Cambridge, Robinson revealed she had only been acting at the
behest of two unnam ed w hite ladies, to w hom sh e had delivered the girl
im mediately. She instructed the Brights to com e back the next m orning, and
in the meantime she w o u ld speak to the w om en and get their perm ission to
return the child. The next day, Robinson told the Brights to go see "the tw o
M isses Parker." The Parker w om en informed the Brights that Robinson had

206 Ibid., 489-491, 497.
207 Ibid., 489-490.
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com e to them the previous even in g, after she had spoken w ith the Brights,
and explained the situation to them . The Parkers claim ed this was the first
they had heard of the abduction, and that Robinson had come back in the
morning, before the Brights arrived, and asked if sh e could bring the girl to
the Parkers' house. A pparently, either Sophia Robinson had a change of
heart or the Brights arrived at the Parkers before she did w ith the girl. At any
rate, the Parker w om en agreed that the child should be returned, and one
w en t w ith the Brights back to the Robinsons.
Returning to the R obinsons, the Brights and M iss Parker found the
Reverend Snowden aw aiting their arrival along w ith John and Sophia
Robinson. Snowden, again servin g as the spokesm an for those members of
the black community in volved w ith w hat they labeled as assisting an attempt
to escape, told the Brights that "some of the colored people thought the bond
w as not sufficient" and recom m ended increasing the amount. The Brights
agreed. Sophia still balked. She said "some other persons had taken an
interest in the child and she d id not like to give it u p w ithout consulting
them," and once again m anaged to pu t the Brights off until the next m orning
w ith the promise of a final resolution, one that w o u ld probably see the child
returned to the Brights. W hen the Brights arrived at Ellis Gray Loring's office
bright and early the next m orning, however, they found several free people of
color and no child.
Sophia Robinson's explanation is telling: she told that Brights that
"notwithstanding the w h ite p eo p le w ish ed to them to give up the child, the
colored people thought differently and were determ ined not to give her up
unless there was some law to compel them." [em phasis added]

Here a

portion of the black com m unity expressed their interpretation of the law as it
applied to this situation — th ey h op ed the law w ou ld be on their side, and
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thought it should be, and despite the exhortations of the w h ite abolitionists,
refused to give up the child. There w as, however, a recognition that there
might be conflicting laws: the law m ade slavery illegal, but it also made
kidnapping illegal. Ultimately a court w ou ld decide if their interpretation —
that this w as a case of slavery and therefore the law against enslavem ent took
precedence — w as a correct interpretation.208
In fact, in the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, statues 20 and 21
comm ingled both situations: it w as illegal to "forcibly or secretly confine, or
imprison any other person...against his will...or kidnap any other person...or
to cause such person to be sent ou t of this state against his w ill or to be sold as
a slave" as w ell as hold anyone "to service against his will."209 Black
Bostonians essentially argued that the Brights held Elizabeth in 'service
against her w ill/ while the Brights argued that it w as the Robinsons holding
Elizabeth against her will — to w h ich the Robinsons and others responded
that they w ere acting lawfully by preventing the Brights from violating the
state law that not only prohibited sending or selling anyone out of the state,
but also declared that any slave brought into the state was considered a free
person.
It is important to understand that w hen Sophia Robinson took
Elizabeth from the Brights, it w as no rash act. By the mid-1840s, a wellestablished network of black and w h ite abolitionists in Boston effectively hid
and relocated fugitives, and the testim ony from this case indicates that the
roots of this network were already in place in the 1830s. Robinson clearly
acted as a part of this network. The ability to hide the child at hom es other

208 Ibid., 490-491.
209 Ibid., 496.

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

than their o w n indicates that the Robinsons knew w ho to g o to. The decision
to abduct Elizabeth may have been m ade quickly, but it w as n ot m ade
im p u lsiv e ly .210
Before Elizabeth was taken, a m em ber of Boston's black com m unity
other than the Robinsons initially approached the attorney Loring and
informed him that "there was a child at Cambridge, w ho w as h eld by a
slaveowner, and w ho would soon be carried into slavery." A ccording to
Loring, w h ose testim ony cast black Bostonians in a favorable light, this
person explored w ays of protecting Elizabeth without breaking the law. He or
she asked Loring if a writ of habeas corpus m ight free the child from the
Brights. N o doubt the basis of this request w as an earlier ruling by the
Supreme Judicial Court that in the case o f a child about to be carried ou t of the
state and into servitude, the court w o u ld grant such a writ, require a surety,
and possibly even place the child w ith a n ew guardian. In fact, tw o years
earlier, the Court had granted a writ o f habeas corpus and recom m ended a
new guardian for a six year-old black girl nam ed Med w ho w as about to be
taken from Boston back to Louisiana; and in 1841 the Supreme Judicial Court
ruled likew ise in the case of seven year-old boy whose ow ner reportedly
210 On the organization of the Boston's black com m unity in cases of fugitives, see Irving H.
Bartlett, "Abolitionists, Fugitives, and Imposters in Boston, 1846-1847," The New England
Quarterly 55 (March 1982), 97-110; and James O liver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black
Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North (N e w York: Holm es
and Meier Publishers, 1979), 97-114. Bartlett7s article reprints documents from the Committee
o f Vigilance, the short-lived predecessor to the Boston Vigilance Committee, and notes that in
the 1840s, "helping fugitives was a m uch more businesslike procedure" than romantic
conceptions of the underground railroad. The Hortons state that the Robinsons "were part of no
organized antislavery group," but appear to base this on the fact that their nam es m ay not
appear on lists o f antislavery groups. While this m ay have been the case, it is highly unlikely
that the Robinsons were not connected to individuals w ho were formal members o f such groups.
Just by virtue o f being a clothing dealer and know ing William Jinnings, John Robinson probably
had regular contact with John Hilton, a prom inent black activist in Boston from the 1830s
through the 1850s. The other man w ho posted a surety, along with Robinson, for the
adminstration of Jinnings' estate —for which H ilton w as the executor —w as John Scarlett, an
African American clothes dealer w ho had also been an associate of D avid Walker.
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intended to take him back to Arkansas.211 But Loring replied that since the
girl w as allow ed to g o outside on her ow n, sh e w as apparently "not restrained
of her liberty" and doubted that such a w rit could be obtained. The child
w ould have to "take its ow n liberty." A t this point, more free people o f color,
probably including the Robinsons, entered into this discussion. A sking
Loring "what rem edy there was" and "if they assisted the child to escape,
whether they w ou ld be liable," they learned that "they might law fu lly receive
the child, but had best return its clothing." Presumably Loring advised they
not keep the clothing to avoid any possibility of being charged w ith theft.
Loring operated under the assum ption that Elizabeth was seven or eig h t years
old and therefore old enough to make som e kind of conscious choice about
leaving the Brights; he testified that had he know n she was only five, he
w ould have "hesitated at giving the advice I did give."212
Taking Elizabeth, then, was not an act o f militant civil disobedience.
The Robinsons and others had the option of sim ply taking Elizabeth
im m ediately upon learning of the Brights' plans to return to Alabam a for the
winter, and spiriting her away. They clearly had the ability to hide Elizabeth.
The day after taking Elizabeth, in fact, "some five or six colored p eop le came
to Robinson's house.... one of the m en asked if there was a slave child in the
house .... then put on its bonnet, and took her off." Sophia Robinson's sister,
w ho gave this testim ony, also comm ented that "all the colored peop le w ere
entire strangers" to her, and suggested the child m ight be in Salem.
O bviously, an effective netw ork of com m unication and action existed in the

211 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 497. For the 1836 and 1841 cases, see Judicial Cases
Concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. H elen Tunnicliff Catterall (W ashington,
D.C.: The Carnegie Institution, 1936), vol. 4, 506-510.
212 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 493.
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black com m unity. The Brights discovered who had taken Elizabeth only
because her abductors came forward. Boston's police force w ou ld not have
been very helpful. It had been established primarily for squelching public
disturbances, and, still in its early stages of organization, lacked a detective
branch. The Robinsons and the unnam ed accomplices thus stood a good
chance of elu ding prosecution. Instead, black Bostonians explored h ow they
m ight accom plish their goal of rescuing Elizabeth while staying w ithin the
bounds of the law , and they acted only after receiving som e indication from
Loring that this w as possible.213
But to stay within the law, African Americans interpreted the law. The
consultation w ith Loring indicates not ignorance of the law , but awareness —
awareness o f h ow the statute freeing slaves brought into the state applied,
awareness of h ow the statute outlaw ing transporting or selling anyone out of
the state applied, and awareness of h ow the statute against kidnapping might
also apply. Because these three illegal acts were all bound up together in the
Revised Statutes, African Americans interpreted the act o f taking Elizabeth as
not only law ful, but as an act preventing the commission of an unlawful act —
the selling or transporting of Elizabeth south.
This process of interpreting and applying the law w as a further
m anifestation of black Bostonians' legal consciousness. They fully believed
that the law should and did apply to this situation, that the law should and
did entitle Elizabeth to protection from the Brights, and that the law should
and did entitle them to rescue Elizabeth. This was not a case of kidnapping,
but a case of upholding the law by protecting the rights of a freed African
American girl. The decision not to hide their involvem ent and give up
213 Ibid., 495; Lane, Policing the City, 26-58. The m ove to create a detective branch o f Boston's
police force did not begin until 1845.
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Elizabeth only if a law compelled them indicates both their belief in the
validity of this interpretation, but also a recognition that the court might
decide otherwise.
In the eyes of the court, this interpretation turned o n whether the
Brights held Elizabeth 'against her w ill/ and if they intended to return her to
slave status. The Robinsons and som e other black Bostonians, based on their
own assum ptions or on more concrete evidence that did n o t come out in
court, remained convinced that Elizabeth did not w illingly stay w ith the
Brights. They w ere convinced there w as little chance Elizabeth ever would
experience freedom again once the Brights returned to Alabam a for the
winter. The judge, however, used a strict legal logic that circumvented
African Americans' interpretation of the law.
Judge Thacher of the Municipal Court instructed the jury "that the
moment the master carries his slave into a country where dom estic slavery is
not permitted, he becom es free." Furthermore, no person could "restrain
such slave of his liberty during his continuance here...against his consent."
Since Elizabeth w as legally free, then, she was entitled to the full protection of
the law. Nor could Elizabeth, as a free being, be held against her will or
carried out of the state, either by the Brights or the Robinsons. Therefore,
argued Thacher, the law entitled Elizabeth to protection against being taken
against her w ill, and he inferred that her 'will' was to rem ain w ith the
Brights, stating "it is in evidence, that the child was happy and contented with
its natural protectors." He apparently based this conclusion on the Brights'
testimony and the rationale that "if the child had been treated with
inhumanity, any citizen m ight have complained in its behalf," and since no
citizen had done so — apparently ignoring the testimony by Loring that som e
African Americans said the child had been ill-treated — the Brights were
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humane caretakers. In fairness to Thacher, there had been testim ony by
Sewall, Loring, the Reverend Snowden, and the Parker sisters that cast Bright
in a favorable light. B ut Thacher7s jury instructions entirely avoided the
issu e of whether or not the Brights m ight take Elizabeth back into slavery.
H is definition of Elizabeth as a free legal being implied that even if she did go
back to Alabama, she w o u ld have d on e so voluntarily; therefore, the
Robinsons had no legal grounds for 'protecting' Elizabeth from re
en slavem en t.214
Thacher's jury instructions gave the jury virtually no room to do
anything but find the Robinsons guilty. H e described Henry Bright as acting
"with humanity" and declared Bright7s statements as "confirmed by every
material fact." The Robinsons, on the other hand, "inveigled the child into
their possession" and had "set their o w n w ill above the law." Thacher told
the jury that Loring's advice — suggesting it might be lawful for som eone to
assist the child in an escape, which w as h ow the Robinsons attem pted to
define their actions — w as immaterial. If the jury believed the Robinsons
committed this act "innocently and w ith ou t an unlawful intent" an acquittal
should result, but Thacher follow ed that adm onishm ent by n otin g that "from
the time the child w as taken...it has been kept in secret confinem ent, away
from its natural friends and protectors, and without their know ledge, and
that the defendants n ow refuse to put it under the protection of the law, [and]
you must judge of the act done."215
The jury found the Robinsons gu ilty of kidnapping and confining
Elizabeth against her w ill, and not guilty of intending to convey her out of the

214 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 497.
215 Ibid., 498-500.
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state. Thacher handed d o w n a sentence of four m onth's im prisonm ent and a
tw o hundred dollar fine. The Robinsons prom ptly appealed, and bon ds of
one thousand dollars w ere posted for John and Sophia. It is likely other free
people of color and som e o f the wealthier w h ite abolitionists aided the
Robinsons in coming u p w ith the bond m oney. The appeal seem s to have
been drawn out for nearly a year; on October 22 of 1838, Henry Bright asked
the commonwealth's attorney to drop the prosecution because Elizabeth had
been returned and the fine paid.216 W hy the Robinsons and their accom plices
decided to finally return Elizabeth is, unfortunately, unknown. Perhaps the
specter of four m onths in jail proved too much; perhaps the Robinsons and
others became convinced that the Brights w o u ld keep Elizabeth in
M assachusetts.
Running throughout the entire episode w as a struggle for pow er. This
struggle had two inseparable focal points: Elizabeth, the object of the struggle
and over whom each party w ished to gain control; and the law, the tool by
w hich Elizabeth, the object, w ou ld be gained. First by requesting a surety of
the Brights, and then by trying to interpret the conflict as a case of
slaveholding, those African Americans w ho participated in this struggle
attempted to access the law 's power to negate the Bright7s power over
Elizabeth. The Brights, initially w illing to com ply w ith the requests for
sureties and negotiate through abolitionists w h o w ere also attorneys,
ultimately resorted to u sin g the law's pow er to get Elizabeth back.
Though it may be understandable w h y Judge Thacher saw the
Robinsons as setting "their ow n will above the law," his characterization,
from the Robinsons' p oin t of view , was inaccurate. The Robinsons and their

216 Ibid., 500. See Thacher's footnote.
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supporters believed they could locate their w ill w ith in the law. They
explored how they m ight rescue Elizabeth w ithout violating the law: they
began b y asking an attorney if a writ of habeas corpus w ou ld force the court to
rem ove Elizabeth; they asked for sureties from the Brights, m odeling legal
procedure; and, believing that the law was at least potentially amenable to
their goals, they chose to use the law instead of defy it.
They made this choice primarily because they believed the law applied
and that using legal m eans w as the best way to guarantee Elizabeth's
perm anent freedom. This belief was encouraged by the comm ingling of
kidnapping and slavery in the statutes, the earlier ruling in the Supreme
Judicial Court preventing Med, the African American girl, from being taken
back to N ew Orleans, and because the law had often been useful to black
Bostonians. Ewick and Silbey have noted that "the m ultiple and
contradictory character of law's meanings, rather than a weakness, is a crucial
com ponent of its pow er."217 Ewick and Silbey are concerned less w ith the
m ultiple and contradictory meanings of formal statutes and focus instead on
h ow people interpret the law and infuse the comm onplace w ith legality, as,
for instance, John Robinson did in his Bridge Court letter. But the concept
applies here as well: because the formal law could be interpreted in m ultiple
and contradictory w ays, in this case by the Robinsons and other African
Americans on the one hand, and the Brights and Judge Thacher on the other
hand, and because African Americans often were accustom ed to being able to
successfully and usefully apply the law, the law w as an attractive and sensible
forum for trying to secure Elizabeth's freedom.

217 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place o f Lazo: Stories from Everyday Life
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1998), 17.
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Black Bostonians had other options to ensure her freedom. The
network of peop le w ho hid Elizabeth for a year, and then only gave her up
voluntarily, demonstrated their pow er to resist the legal system . But
relocating Elizabeth permanently had the disadvantage of placing her and
those involved at som e degree of ongoing risk, w hile usin g legal means to
separate her from the Brights had the advantage of a m ore secure freedom.
Nevertheless, those African Americans involved w ith this endeavor had two
choices: deny involvem ent and find another place for Elizabeth, or use the
law. They chose the law.

N ot all African Americans in antebellum Boston becam e involved
with the law and the courts for such noble principles as the Robinsons and
their allies. For the most part, black Bostonians continued to come to the
lower court for m uch the sam e reasons that black litigants appeared in the
justice of the peace court during the first two decades of the nineteenth
century: personal animosity, vengeance, or simply a fear for personal safety.
But the court that now adjudicated m any similar conflicts to those that Senex
and other ordinary black Bostonians used so frequently during the 1810s,
underwent a transformation w hen the town of Boston incorporated itself as a
city in 1822. There had been num erous changes in the Suffolk County legal
system betw een the end of the American Revolution and incorporation, and
after 1822 a revised court system supposedly regulated the type of cases each
court heard, and im posed som e sense of order on the legal system . Contrary
to the spasm odic changes of the first tw o decades of the nineteenth century,
these changes w ou ld endure throughout the antebellum period. A new
court, the Police Court, was created to deal w ith m inor crime that individual
justices of the peace and the General Court of sessions had formerly handled.
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Composed of three justices of the peace, w ho rotated periodically, and w h o
were paid a regular salary, the Police Court en d ed the practice whereby
justices of the peace w ere paid by fines and court fees.218
The M unicipal Court, established at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, conducted litigation in a professional, formal manner, and retained
that character into the antebellum years. This court handled appeals of
decisions made b y justices of the peace, along w ith more serious crimes.
Litigants were typically represented by law yers, som e of whom, along w ith the
judges, were highly educated members of the political elite. In the early 1820s,
for instance, D aniel W ebster represented defendants in criminal cases, and
Josiah Quincy, w h o w o u ld go on to serve several terms as mayor of Boston,
and eventually as president of Harvard, sat as the judge of the M unicipal
Court. By contrast, the justices w ho sat on the Police Court were frequently
either aspiring office holders or drawn from the m iddle class.219
Initially, the Police Court handled a half dozen or so cases a day, w hich
was only slightly m ore than Gorham typically adjudicated. The case load
gradually increased, and by the 1850s one observer put the average num ber of
daily cases at thirty-five and described days of fifty to sixty cases being nothing
out of the ordinary.220 Since individual justices, w h o continued to carry out
other functions, took turns sitting on the Police Court, many black Bostonians

218 A Volume of Records relating to the Early History of Boston containing Boston Town Records,
1814-1822 (Boston: M unicipal Printing Office, 1906), 40-41. The selectmen proposed a police
court for this reason in 1815. A lso see Chapter Two of this dissertation, p. 99.
219 Theodore Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 (Newark: U niversity of
Delaware Press, 1992), 9-17; A Volume of Records Relating to the Early History of Boston
Containing Boston Toaon Records, 1784-1796 (Boston: M unicipal Printing Office, 1903). See tow n
meetings for May 18 1790, May 111795, March 211796, and April 25 1796.
220 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 9-17; Fenner, Raising the Veil; or Scenes in the
Courts, 26-28.
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w ou ld have been familiar w ith som e of the Police Court justices. The
constable system also rem ained in place —George Reed, the constable referred
to in the previous chapter as a regular figure in black residential areas,
remained at his post at least into the mid-1830s. As they had done before,
plaintiffs typically lodged a complaint with a justice of the peace or a
constable. Courtroom procedure remained som ew hat sim ilar to what
African Americans had k n ow n in justice of the peace courts, and cases were
frequently argued by the litigants themselves.
Yet changes did occur. The criminal justice system did become more
codified, and the courts m ore streamlined. The attorney general gained
authority at the expense o f individual justices of the peace, and the courts
became a more useful tool for m en like Josiah Quincy, w h o w ished to secure
an orderly society during a period of economic and urban growth. Michael
Hindus notes that "the sam e values that the legal system endorsed for the
sake of economic growth- certainty, predictability, and rationality- can be
found in the criminal justice system of Massachusetts." But change was
layered. Even though legislators and court officials w ere in the m idst of
attempting to reorganize the criminal justice system, and make it more
professional and predictable through centralization, the substance of the
Police Court day-to-day activities w as not altered dramatically in the
antebellum era. The system of private prosecution rem ained largely intact.
The personal, face-to-face nature of adjudication, where litigants appeared
before neighborhood justices of the peace, began to erode, but since those
sam e justices sat on the Police Court, some elem ent of fam iliarity lingered.
Probably because of these similarities, the creation of the Police Court appears
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to have had little effect on African Americans' efforts at managing conflicts
through litigation.221
W hether or not black Bostonians appeared in court as
disproportionately as they had in justice of the peace Stephen Gorham's court
is difficult to ascertain. Unlike Gorham, m ost Boston court dockets and
records only occasionaly noted if a litigant was African American, and when
they did, it w as generally only if the black litigant w as the defendant. In 1821,
a state congressional committee, concerned about the "increase of a species of
population, which threatens to be both injurious and burthensome," reported
a ratio o f one black convict out of every 146 African Americans in
M assachusetts, w hile for w hites the ratio was one to 2140. George Levesque
has docum ented the significant fluctuations in these ratios up to the Civil
War, w ith black Bostonians being eight times more likely to be incarcerated
than w hites in 1833, to a low of less than twice as likely in 1837. Overall,
betw een 1823 and 1843, the average proportion of black convicts was five
times greater than w hite convicts.222
Breaking those numbers dow n a bit further for one year reveals a
gendered pattern of incarceration. In 1835 the M unicipal Court record book
placed the total number of incarcerations made by the Municipal and Police
Courts by the end of Novem ber at 253 men and 151 w om en. Twenty-four of
the m en and 34 of the wom en were black. Of the m ale convicts, then, black

221 M ichael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill: U niversity of North Carolina
Press, 1980), xxii; on Quincy and others who viewed Boston's courts as a useful tool for social
reform, see Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 15-17, 24-30, and 38-66.
222 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, "Free Negroes and Mulattoes," House No.
46. Located at the Massachusetts Statehouse Library, Special Collections; Levesque, Black
Boston, 384.
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m en com posed 9.5% of m ale convicts, or about twice their proportion of the
population; w hile black w om en m ade up 22.5% of female convicts. If the
pattern demonstrated in the previous chapter of black w om en bein g
aggressive in using the court to prosecute other African A m ericans,
particularly other black w om en, persisted into the 1830s, this w o u ld partly
explain the higher proportion o f black female convicts.223
A high proportion of black prisoners means, of course, that there was a
high proportion of black defendants. Because m ost court records in Boston
inconsistently identified litigants w ith racial categories, it is virtually
im possible to determine w hether or not there continued to be a high
proportion of black plaintiffs, or to determine how many black defendants
succeeded in avoiding guilty verdicts.
Savvy defendants knew h o w to avoid the pitfalls of the court, while
those unfamiliar with the courts risked being hurried along to jail,
particularly as the dockets of the Police Court grew more burdensom e. One
court observer recalled som e "poor bewildered devil," arrested for being
drunk and disorderly, entering the courtroom in the m orning, and stumbling
out a not guilty plea. Two or three police officers quickly sprang up to attest
to the defendant's guilt, and w h ile the accused protested his innocence, the
judge wrote out the sentence. Other witless defendants fell prey to lawyers.
The "'pettifoggers" and "blood-suckers" waited outside the jail cell inside the
courthouse and told the hapless defendants, as they came out o f the cell on
their w ay to a hearing that he, the lawyer, could get them "out o f this scrape"
for $15 in advance "to pay court expense." A novice defendant w o u ld
probably have been unaware that there would be no court expense to pay if he

223 Boston Municipal Court Record Books, N ovem ber 1835.
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or she w as acquitted. Without an "able attorney/' the lawyer told the
defendant, a six-m onth sentence in the H ouse of Corrections loom ed. M ost
defendants w ere brought to the Police Court for minor charges; sm all fines or
sentences of a few days to a few w eek s w ere common. Some law yers m ay
have been helpful; m any were certainly unscrupulous.224
The jails in w hich these convicted black defendants served o u t their
sentences m ade the dangers of being taken to court a serious matter. In 1808 a
visitor to Boston's state prison in Charlestown, just across the river from the
dty, was struck by "the high ramparts, the m assy walls, the com fortless cells,
scarcely adm itting the light of heaven." This visitor did observe "a num ber
of ameliorating circumstances" such as clean cells, opportunities to learn a
trade, and that the "beer is the m ost palatable I have ever tasted." But m ost
convicted defendants of less serious crim es w ou nd up in the m unicipal
prisons that lik ely had few, if any, such amenities. An antebellum poem
described the Leverett Street jail as
Here's the place which m en (for being poor)
are sent to starve in,
Rude rem edy, "I trow, for sore disease,"
Within these w alls stuffed by dam p
and stench doth hopes fair torch expire.
This particular jail sat about twenty feet below street level, and passersby
could view the jail through the iron railings on the sidewalk. The prisoners
within could be heard cutting stone in the prison yard, and their only glim pse
of freedom cam e by "the aid of a sm all mirror" w ith which they m igh t steal
"a glance of the free denizens as they passed along Leverett Street."
Defendants convicted in the Police Court typically wound up in the H ou se of
Corrections, w here female convicts sp en t their days making m en's clothing,
224 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 18-19, 28.
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and male convicts crushed stone to be used for street repairs, often working
while shackled to ball and chain. While an early traveler's guide to Boston
characterized the jailers and administrators as hum ane and remarked on the
availability of good medical care, the guide also called the prison a "gloomy
place."225
While som e African American litigants surely fell victim to harried
judges and unscrupulous lawyers, others k n ew h o w to function effectively
within the legal system , often from past experience or by learning from their
neighbors' courtroom escapades. William W eevis, a light-skinned black
mariner, w ho celebrated "the termination of each successive voyage in a
flowing can of grog," came to court accused by his m uch darker-skinned w ife
of beating her w ith his belt. Weevis painted a picture of himself enduring
bitter storms at sea, motivated by the thought of returning home to his w ife.
When he arrived, she w as at the theater, in the gallery, with another man,
and apparently had been doing this regularly. As they walked home, she w as
swearing at W eevis m ightily. He tried to p u t his arm around her; she slapped
him. He kissed her; she threw a plate at him . She told him she had another
man in town that she preferred. "By gum" he said, "You've worn the
breeches long enough, and may I be tetotally d— if you wear 'em any longer"
and took off his belt and beat her over the shoulders. The judge adm onished
him, especially since he w as "a stout man," for losing control with such a
small wom an and found him guilty. But the judge only fined him one dollar
with no jail time since he had been "provoked". During an era of threatened

225 Judith Sargent Murray to Anna Parsons Sargent, A u gust 31,1808. Judith Sargent Murray
Papers, M ississippi Department of Archives; Leverett St. jail described in Crichton, Old
Boston; the House o f Corrections described in Abel Bow en, Picture of Boston, or the Citizen's
and Stranger's Guide to the Metropolis of Massachusetts, and its Environs (Boston: 1829), 80-81.
Located at the Bostonian Society Library.
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patriarchy, W eevis effectively used gender roles to transcend race by depicting
him self as a hard-working m an asserting control over his unfaithful and
unruly wife.226
African Americans b y no means came solely or even typically as
defendants; as in the justice o f the peace court, m any black defendants were
brought to court by black plaintiffs. Their familiarity w ith the courts
prompted many black Bostonians to resort to the courts for settling private
matters even w hen other m eth ods of managing conflict w ere available.
Perhaps the m ost notable exam ple occurred w h en delicate fractures within
the black community surfaced in the African Baptist Church, founded in 1805
as the first black church in Boston. The African Baptist Church had a history
of abolitionist activism; Thom as Paul, the pastor until 1829, w as an active
supporter of the m ovem ent, and William Lloyd Garrison and others began
organizing the N ew England Anti-Slavery Society in the church's basement
classroom in 1832.227 But in part due to that activism and divergent view s on
colonization, the church also began to build a history of dissension. In the
1830s, as the following list indicates, the leadership w as wracked with
upheaval.

226 Selections from the Court Reports, 205-210; on 'threatened patriarchy,' see Paul E. Johnson
and Sean Wilentz, The Kingdom o f Matthias; A Story of Sex and Salvation in 19th-Century
America (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1994).
227 Edward D. Smith, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The Rise of Black Churches in Eastern American
Cities, 1740-1877 (Washington: Sm ithsonian Institution Press, 1988), 47-51.
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Table 4

African M eeting House Pastors . 1832-1841

Thom as Ritchie
Sam uel G ooch
John G iven
A rm strong Archer 2 / 37
G eorge Black

A rrived
10/32
11/33
5/35
? /3 7
11/38

Left
11/33
5/35
?/36
7/41

In the span of nine years the Joy Street congregation saw five pastors come
and go, and endured lenghty periods w ith no pastor. In 1840, George Black
led forty m em bers out to form Twelfth St. Baptist, effectively ending a decade
of conflict.

This division w as undoubtedly due in large part to disagreements

over h ow m uch tim e and energy should to devoted to abolitionism , as the
Twelfth St. church became deeply in volved in the abolition m ovem ent.228
But in the m id st of that decade of conflict, members w en t ou tsid e the church
in an attem pt to resolve som e of their problems.
The conflict ostensibly grew ou t of a sharp disagreem ent over the
political leanings of the African Baptist Church. The R everend John Given,
who had taken over the pastorate in M ay of 1835, reportedly had "fallen
under the suspicion of his colored brethren" as a supporter of colonization.
Rumors of visits to Liberia fueled suspicions. Never a popular cause among
northern African Americans, colonization nevertheless did find support
among a m inority of free blacks. Som e members of the African Baptist
church, perhaps in part motivated by a desire to ensure that G iven had no
228 The New England Historical Genealogical Register (Boston: Samuel G. Drake, 1847) vol. 1.
The Register lists all the ministers, black and w hite, in the Boston area from 1620-1847;
Mechal Sobel, Trabelin' On (Westport: G reenw ood Press, 1979), 258; Sm ith, Climbing Jacob's
Ladder, 51.
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opportunity to w in any converts over to colonization, decided to starve him
out by refusing to pay p ew rents. But they still show ed up for Sunday
services. The church leadership responded by sending home the p ew cushion
of at least one m em ber, George Putnam, in effect notifying that him that he
was no longer w elcom e.
Putnam did not let the issue die that easily. Putnam used a legal
argument, arguing that the church w as not an incorporated body, and
therefore could n ot dem and p ew rent or sue him for nonpayment. H e
marched into church w ith a young boy carrying his p ew cushion. Cyrus
Foster, a m em ber o f the committee that sen t Putnam's cushion hom e, told
Putnam that he w o u ld by no means be allow ed to set his cushion in its
customary place. Foster m ay have then tried to grab the cushion. Thomas
Dalton, another church member, "stripped off his coat and flew to Putnam's
assistance." W ith tensions escalating, Putnam seized Foster by the throat, and
Charles Virgin Caples, formerly a minister and another ally of Putnam's,
managed to get h old of the controversial cushion and place it in the pew .
Due to the "uproar and confusion created by this contest," Sunday services
were suspended for the day.229
Later that evening, members of the church m et and voted to instruct
the church com m ittee to take the matter to the Police Court. Putnam, Dalton,
and Caples w ere charged with "disturbing a religious meeting" and
subsequently ordered to put up a surety of $60 each to ensure their appearance
at a M unicipal Court trial. N ot to be outdone, the trio, along w ith tw o other
members, lod ged a counter-charge of "disturbing a religious meeting" against
Foster and three o f his allies. Perhaps by the time the case came to the

229 Selections from the Court Reports, 50-51.
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Municipal Court, tem pers had cooled. After one day the case was postponed,
and did not appear in this court's record books again. The case was not
dismissed, how ever, w h ich at least ostensibly gave the court continuing
authority to intervene should the dispute flare up again.230
The Sunday scuffle involved som e of Boston's m ost prominent black
citizens. As m inisters, Caples and Given occupied positions of leadership.
Thomas Dalton, a former confidante of David Walker, had long been a leader
in agitating against racist policies and slavery. Cyrus Foster, a deacon at the
church, was also a Revolutionary war veteran.231 All of these men were no
doubt aware of biblical warnings against using secular courts to settle disputes
between believers. Churches had internal m eans of dealing .with disputes
between members. But in this charged dispute, they believed the court's
authority was a more effective means of disciplining one another than
traditional church procedures. In a manner very different than Richard
Crafus, but w ith a sim ilar result, the leaders of the African Baptist church
furthered the law 's function of social control by opening the doors of the
church to the authority of the court. In this incident black Bostonians used
the court as an arbitrator to reinforce acceptable behavior, even in the sacred
world.
Most black litigants did not occupy such positions of prominence, and
m ost of the conflicts bringing African Americans to court did not stem from
political divisions over the place of abolitionist politics in the church. Far
more common were dom estic and neighborhood disputes like those of
230 Selections from the Court Reports, 51; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, A ugust 1835,
cases 333 and 334.
231 Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of
Antebellum Slave Resistance (U niversity Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997), 77.
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W illiam W eevis and his w ife. W hen Rosanna T um ey charged Samuel
W allace w ith assault, Wallace g o t w ind of her intentions and quickly
obtained a writ of slander against Tum ey. Wallace m anaged to have his
slander charge prosecuted first, probably in the Court of Common Pleas,
resulting in Tumey being in jail w h en her case against W allace came to the
Police Court. The court issu ed a writ of habeas corpus to enable Tumey to
testify, foiling Wallace's plan. T um ey produced tw o black w om en as
w itnesses, but, like William W eevis, Wallace argued that T um ey provoked
him w ith a torrent of abusive language and by refusing to get out of his w ay.
Even at that, claimed Wallace, he had only given her a shove. The justices
found him guilty, but fined him a mere fifty cents.232
N ot all black m en w h o assaulted wom en escaped so easily. In 1834
Richard King appeared in the Police Court after he attacked his wife Sarah
and then jumped dow n a cistern in an attempt to kill him self. The water w as
too shallow , though, and even tu ally Reverend Taylor, a well-know n
minister of seamen, black and w hite, succeeded in getting King to come out.
King also told a story of his o w n long-suffering w ith an unfaithful wife. But
this w as no simple assault. K ing reportedly struck Sarah several times on the
neck w ith a hatchet, prom pting a charge of attempted murder. The
seriousness of the charge required the Police Court to bind him over for trial
at the Municipal Court, which, noting King had "grieviously beat bruise
w ound, & cut to the great hazard of [Sarah's] life," sentenced King to four
years hard labor at the state prison in Charlestown.233

232 Selections from the Court Reports, 135-137.
233 Ibid., 144-145; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, 1834. A brief biography of Rev. Taylor
appears in Crichton, Old Boston, "Father Taylor."
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African Americans' in volvem en t w ith the courts in the antebellum
era, had at least one significant n ew developm ent. M edia scrutiny of court
proceedings had become increasingly common, and it rarely worked to the
advantage of free people of color. The combination of the presence o f court
reporters and an intensifying racism m ade black litigants into public fodder
for evolvin g racist ideologies.
The persistent presence o f African Americans in the Police and
M unicipal Courts garnered considerable attention from court reporters. Ball
Fenner, w h o wrote what he considered an expose on the low er courts in 1856,
described the om nipresent court reporters as "fellows of infinite jest."
African Americans in particular attracted their attention. Fenner reported
that "w hen a colored individual is arraigned for som e m inor offence, they
alw ays seem ed determined to have a little sport am ong them selves."
O ne young biradal w om an w ith dark blue eyes, arrested during a raid
on a brothel, had been seen earlier by a reporter w hen she sang at "a negro
concert."

The reporter knew she had " sw eet and m elodious voice" and he

knew the clerk of the court had a fondness for music. Taking the young lady
aside before her arraignment, the reporter told her to enter her plea in song.
She com plied, singing a line from "a w ell-know n German song, 'Thou, thou,
know 'st that I love thee.'" The judge, clerk, and officers sat in stunned
silence. Recom posing them selves and asking again for her plea, she
answ ered not guilty and then sang 'Let m e go where fate m ay lead me. Let me
cross y o n troubled deep; Where no strange ear shall greet m e, Where no eye
for m e shall w eep.' The officers gave minimal testimony, the clerk declared
"That w om an can't be guilty of any crimel", and the judge discharged her.234

234 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 121-122.
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During the 1830s and throughout the antebellum era, newspapers in
Boston and other northern cities ran court reports as regular features for their
readers. The courts became, in som e respects, a kind of free public theater.
Centralizing the low est rung of the criminal justice system , w hich had been
the individual neighborhood justice o f the peace courts, into the Police Court
no doubt spurred on the theatrical aspect by giving spectators and reporters a
predictable performance. Complainants could show up at the office of a
justice of the peace with no warning and at all hours, but the Police Court
provided a forum w ith regular hours, and the courtroom in the recently
com pleted Suffolk County Courthouse w as more accessible and room y for
reporters and spectators. Some of the spectators w ould have been litigants
w aiting their turn on the docket. Boston's lower courts likely mirrored
Philadelphia's courts, described by A llen Steinberg as a "free popular theater,
w ith friends and neighbors as the performers."235
African Americans appearing as 'performers' in court, unw ittingly or
not, fit w ithin a broader antebellum context of public 'black' performance for
w hite entertainment. African Americans attracted attention in Boston,
som etim es in unusual ways. In the mid-1830s, when the W ashington Hotel
served as "the Rubicon for all notables w ho visited Boston" from Chief
Osceola to A ndrew Jackson, a N ew York military escort by the nam e of the
Lafayette Guards camped out on the hotel grounds for a week, feasting and
drinking. One of the highlights of the w eek was entertainment provided by
som e o f the regim ent7s black servants, in particular one "round, bullet
headed little fellow." The officers w agered on his butting ability, and one

235 A llen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 18. Ball Fenner m entions spectators in Boston's
courtroom s in Raising the Veil.
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w itness remembered seein g him "dive through the panel of a stout door,
disappearing bodily into the room...without displaying the slightest sign of
mental or bodily perturbation." This so im pressed local boys that they
attempted to imitate him, only to acquire many sore heads. The black
servant's feat actually had deep African cultural roots, and similar scenes
whereby African Am ericans entertained w hites in this manner persisted at
least through the Civil War.236
There had been a lo n g history of public performance by Africans and
African Americans w h en eighteenth century slaves in the Boston area and
other northern towns adapted w hite election holidays into distinctly African
American celebrations. T hough some w hites in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries disapproved of the noise, drinking, and general revelry,
others enjoyed and participated in the w eek long festivals. After electing or
appointing a black king or governor, the inaugural parade's "music and flying
colors made the black election parades som ething special to white and black
N ew Englanders alike." Other activities during the festivals included
different forms of combat, foot races, and dancing. In Boston, the tradition
continued at least sporadically into the nineteenth century. Historians have
noted the cultural significance of these festivals, but have perhaps overlooked
the significance of the activities as public performances before white
observers. Even though Election Day festivities seem to have become
sporadic before ceasing altogether in 1831, in Boston the black parades, lead by
the legendary Richard 'K ing Dick' Crafus and com posed of a "squad of colored
236 Crichton, Old Boston, chapter one. W. Jeffrey Bolster describes head-butting am ong black
sailors from N ew England to Brazil in Black Jacks, 119-120; also, David A. Cecere has
documented white Union soldiers from N ew England being entertained by head-butting black
soldiers during the Civil War. See Cecere, "Carrying the Homefront to War: Race and N e w
England Culture during the C ivil War," in Looking Homeward, ed. Paul Cimbala (N ew York:
Fordham University Press, 2000).
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brethren of all sizes an costum es, m arched around and through Boston
Com m on "amid the shouts and laughter of the assembled crow d w h o came
to witness." That w hites gained som ething from watching is apparent; it was
the only time of public gathering or celebration that w hite m en did not chase
black Bostonians off the C om m ons.237
Though the laughter m ay have had moments of genuine innocence,
much of it w as no doubt a part of the heightening public denigration of
African Americans throughout the North. Black Balls and parades also
elicited derision from w hite observers; in 1828 Freedom's Journal reprinted a
story from the Pennsylvania G azette on an alleged disturbance at w hat the
Gazette claimed was a "fancy ball." Supposedly a group of w hite boys

attempted to break up the ball by scaring carriage horses and insulting the
w om en. Freedom's Journal claim ed the ball had been a "plain" one, and that
no disturbance had taken place, and that actually a white ball on the sam e
night had degenerated into an unruly affair. Regardless of w h ich report was
correct, the Gazette's portrayal of the black celebrants as pretentious buffoons
epitom ized m any public renderings of African Americans.238
Court reports did likew ise. W hen Rosanna Tum ey prosecuted Samuel
Wallace, she w as labeled a "dandizette." The Boston M orning P ost described
one of her witnesses as "a real grandee—of m iddling stature, but magnificent
breadth of beam, and w ou ld come to a good round penny if bought by weight.
She w as a first-chop pattern for an em press of Morocco....the expanding skirt
of her figured calico gow n, diverging equi-distant from her sable and stable

237 Piersen,Black Yankees, 122-123; Reidy, " 'N egro Election Day'
Crichton, Old Boston, "Big
Dick, King o f darkies"; Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness, 101; White, " 'It W as a Proud
Day'," 17.
238 Freedom's Journal, March 14, 1828; Gary Nash, Forging Freedom, 253-259.
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ankles, in branching out in picturesque fold s of ligh t and shade, covered an
immense area, like a field-marshal's marquee." The depiction concluded by
comparing her to "the cloud-capped dom e o f the State House."239
In the nineteenth century, what w h ite observers gained beyond sim ple
entertainment w as probably similar to w h at D avid Roediger argues w hite
audiences of blackface minstrel shows gained: defining whiteness against the
outlandish behavior o f blacks. Eric Lott has also pointed out that an
important aspect o f the popular support for m instrel shows w as the
sim ultaneous attraction and repulsion m any w h ites experienced. Black
parades and celebrations likely stimulated sim ilar reactions am ong gaw king
w hite Bostonians. A t the sam e time these celebrations were disappearing
from Boston, m instrel show s took the stage. Robert C. Toll places the
beginning of the touring minstrel shows around 1830, and they appeared in
Boston at about the sam e time. Shortly after the dem ise of Negro Election
D ay on the C om m ons in 1831, a w ell-know n nineteenth-century chronicler of
Boston's police force m ade a note of "Jim C row Rice jum ping at Tremont
Theatre" in 1833. D uring the 1840s, O rdway's A eolian Vocalists, a "company
of Negro Serenaders," performed regularly at H arm ony Hall in Boston on
Friday and Saturday evenings. Though the A eolian Vocalists were described
as "negro minstrels," the performances w ere a classic example of a blackface
minstrel show, one so popular that it did n ot have to tour, enjoying a tenyear run in Boston. It soon out grew the capacity of the Province H ouse, an
old Boston m ansion, prom pting its conversion into a theater w ith the
Aeolian Vocalists as the headline act in 1851, prom pting a public "howl of
righteous indignation... givin g to the citizens farce in the place of tragedy."

239 Selections from the Court Reports, 135-137.
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A n 1847 program listed a three-part performance of "Whites and Ethiopians":
part one "As Citizens," traditionally performed w ithout blackface, partly to
ensure the audience knew the performers were actually white; part two "As
Northern Darkies"; and part three "As Southern Darkies."240
The north-south division of the blackface performances is intriguing,
especially since one of the songs, "A Darkie's life is always gay," sung in the
northern part of the show, w as no doubt a take off of "A Nigger's Life Is
A lw ays Gay." The latter song, a favorite on the minstrel circuit, focused on
depicting slave life as a day of hard work. But minstrel show s typically
depicted northern African Americans as "lazy, pretentious, frivolous,
im provident, irresponsible, and im m ature — they very antithesis of what
w hite m en like to believe about them selves." The m ost common
characterization was the black m an as "completely self-centered dandies...who
thought only of courting, flashy clothes, new dances, and their looks."
Furthermore, on stage these pretentious upstarts w ho "tried to live like
'gem men'.... [were] jailed for violating laws they did not understand." The
"Northern Darkies" part of the sh ow mocked and ridiculed northern African
Americans, in part by communicating that a free black m an or woman in the
N orth was really no different than an enslaved black m an or woman in the
South. Several of the song titles in the northern part of the show had a
southern flavor, including "Sugar Cane Green" and "I'm O ff for Charleston."
O rdway's Aeolian Vocalists w as one example of a comprehensive and

240 Robert C. Toll, Blacking Up: The M instrel Show in Nineteenth-Century America (N ew
York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 27-32, 68; Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy
and the American Working Class (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 20-21; Savage, A
Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, 73; Crichton, Old Boston, "Old Province
House." The 'Jim Crow Rice' that Savage m entioned w as undoubtedly Thomas D. Rice, who
Toll credits with creating and popularizing 'jump Jim Crow'.
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efficient m instrel show constructing w hiteness by denigrating blackness,
whether it appeared in conditions o f freedom or bondage.241
Minstrel show s and court reports both served to crystallize ideas about
race that w ere still forming in antebellum America. African Am ericans had
no control over whites' appropriation and uses of black culture in the
minstrel show s. The tragic irony of the court reports was that the propensity
of African Americans to use the courts, a propensity fostered in part b y the
courts' intentional accessibility and attem pted impartiality, provided material
for the court reporters. The Police Court rem ained accessible after the
incorporation o f Boston, and as the previous chapter indicated, even though
adjudication in the lower courts m ay have been affected by racism, the
differences in conviction rates were not great enough to drive black litigants
away. W hen African Americans used the law to gain control over
circumstances important in their ow n lives, they often did so because they
believed the law could provided useful rem edies. The court reports,
however, transformed these attempts into public performances. W hen one
black man nam ed White brought an action o f trover to recover w hat he
believed w as his parrot from a w hite man, he judged the matter im portant
enough to bring w itnesses and a lawyer. W hite's case may have been solid.
But under the hand of the court reporter, W hite became a dim -w itted and
petty fool pursuing a trivial matter. The report mocked White for bringing
the case to court, and then appealing the Police Court's acquittal of the w hite
defendant, w h en at m ost "the value of the parrot w as estimated at fiv e
dollars."242
241 Crichton, Old Boston, "Old Province House"; Toll, Blacking Up, 68-71; Roediger, The Wages
of Whiteness, 120.
242 Selections from the Court Reports, 25; on racial formation in the north, see George M.
Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and
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Other court reports closely mimicked the kind of depictions the
minstrel show s perfected. In contrast to the story in chapter one of the
eighteenth-century black m an w h ose extremely literal interpretation of the
law enabled him to successfully dodge being persecuted for not carrying a
lantern in the darkened streets, one court report m ocked a nineteenthcentury black man's attem pt to elude prosecution by his ow n 'cleverness/
Robert Gardner came to court charged by the city marshal for smoking a cigar
in a fire-conscious tinderbox part of the city. Gardner, however, pointed out
that he had actually been sm oking a pipe, and since he w as specifically
charged w ith sm oking a cigar, he should be acquitted. The court prom ptly
dispatched a m essenger to get the city marshal to am end the charge. The
newspaper described Gardner as greatly am used b y the all the trouble the
court was going through — for a moment, it appeared that this poor bootblack
held the upper hand. But the court report quickly restored the proper
hierarchy by turning Gardner into a smug fool, concentrating in particular on
prominent physical racial markers. Gardner, "w hose face shone like his
customers' polished boots" had been "licking his purple lips with his poppyred tongue" w hen he believed he had trumped the court, "didst look blue...as
blue as a black-a-moor could look" when the court fined him five dollars,
while his "twine eyeballs glistened, and shot their quick gleams crosswise
over [his] unpretending nose" as he pressed "the broad heel" into the carpet —
im plying that Gardner had com e to court barefoot. The court report painted a
blackface performer for the newspaper's readers, m any of w hom had no doubt
been to a minstrel show .243
Destiny, 1817-1914: (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1971), 97-129; on the role of minstrel show s in
racial formation, see Lott, Love and Theft, and Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness.
243 Selections from the Court Reports, 92-93.
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Court reports in the new spapers rendered another kind of black public
performance, even though it w as n o t intended as a performance by black
participants. Nevertheless, court reports transformed black litigants into
spectacles for w hite readers. Ironically, the young African American
chanteuse w h o actually did perform in the courtroom w as one of few black
litigants to come close to being favorably portrayed by court reporters. In
general, court reports depicted black litigants as pretentious, deceptive,
violent, or bum bling, and at best naive. The church dispute, William
W eevis, Richard King, the dispute betw een Rosanna T um ey and Samuel
Wallace w ere all reported in m ocking tones, sometimes subtle and
som etim es obvious. Weevis' hair w as described as "mongrel," and his w ife
as having a com plexion "one shade darker than a lump of coal in a cloudy
day." W allace w as a "mulatto exquisite," and Turney's skin w as "some
shades darker—say the color of a dun cow." Thomas Gill, perhaps the dean of
court reporters, m ade plain his racism w hen he criticized a jury for freeing a
white w om an w ho, in his opinion, w as an unsavory character. His evidence
for her deviancy: "she is now the house-keeper of a colored man...[and] two
years ago, she became the mother of a colored child." Another column he
wrote described a formerly married w om an lured into prostitution, and "as if
her cup o f sham e w as not already full enough, Watchee [a watchman] here
added that he 'had been called to take her out of a colored house, in Page's
court, w here she w as hugging a nigger round the neck, and that the nigger
could only get rid of her by chucking her out of doors.'" For Gill, such
familiarity w ith African Americans represented the depths of depravity.244

244 Ibid., 158, 181.
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But, like the minstrel shows, hum or and ridicule, not indignation, was
the usual m ethod of making black litigants into public spectacles. One black
man, w ho successfully prosecuted tw o sailors for assault in the Police Court,
became a different kind of victim in the newspaper report. The paper
reported that sailors "licked a nigger in A nn street. It m ight have been
supposed that such an abolition taste carried its ow n penalty w ith it; but our
courts w ill not allow any such public indulgence of the licking propensity.
Therefore they had to pay for their peculiar gratification." The black victim,
w h o became the protagonist in court, w as slapped down again as the public
recounting m ade him an object of ridicule and identified the w hite assailants
as objects of favorable humor.245
Southern immigrants, particularly "a genuine African, or one of
African descent, w ho knows nothing of our courts of law" provided especially
rich material. Characterized as polite but ignorant, they supposedly called the
judge 'General' and the clerk 'Yer Honor.' One recently freed slave w as cast as
a "comical negro witness" who, w hen asked of his past, said he w as a slave in
Virginia, but "I'se m y ow n nigger now! The free darkey shook his sides with
laughter...many of the court officers and spectators involuntarily joined
him ."246 What the court officials, spectators, and court official m issed,
however, w as the im port of this former slave's public declaration in court of
his transformation from a person with no rights to a free legal being w hose
testimony, im perm issible in the south, n o w had legal weight.
Court reports and minstrel show s w en t hand-in-hand so far as the
lam pooning of aspects of black life that w ere of some importance to African

245 Ibid., 87.
246 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 238.
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Americans. They differed, however, in com plexity. Minstrel show s engaged
in a complex pattern of cultural borrowing w hereby w hites ridiculed African
Americans by mirroring black culture — and som etim es mirrored blacks
imitating whites. Court reports did not possess the degree of intricacies.
White reporters did not mirroring black behavior; they sim ply and blatantly
mocked it. Eric Lott argues that minstrel sh ow s functioned to repress
genunine interest in black life by ridiculing black life, and while this dynam ic
m ay have been present in the court reports, the primary function w as
underm ining any notions of black citizenship. The reaction of the court
officials and spectators to the Virginian freedm an's assertion that he w as n o w
his ow n man spoke to the uneasiness m any w h ites felt about free people o f
color asserting rights and citizenship. Because w hites w ere not w illing to
undermine the law by denying this man the right to testify, laughing at the
"free darkey" served to assuage, but not erase, discom fort with African
American participation in such an important social institution as the law .247
In the antebellum era, using the law to m anage daily life som etim es
became som ething of a tw o-edged sword. The black man attacked on Ann
Street benefited from being able to punish his assailants, but he and other
African Americans w h o came to court — w hich w as intended to be accessible - attracted unwanted attention that contributed to the construction of
w hiteness through the continuing stereotyping of black m en and w om en.
Even informal m anifestations of legal consciousness could attract unw anted
attention. When a North End black m an disappeared and his body surfaced
tw o days later at Charlestown, a group of black m en apparently gathered
together for an informal inquest. The new spaper report noted that this w as

247 Lott, Love and Theft, 6.
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com m on practice. African Americans probably did this to determ ine if foul
play h ad been involved, especially g iv en the North End's reputation for
baw dy taverns and violence. The Boston Evening Transcript, a paper never
sym pathetic to free people of color, exploited the occasion to pillory the efforts
of the black 'jury' in minstrel sh ow fashion, reporting that they "brought in a
verdict som ething as follows: 'Dat goin g hom e one berry dark night, he fell
from the w harf, and was killed; and the tide coming in strong, it floated him
over to Charlestown, and he w as drowned; dat the w edder being berry cold,
he froze to deathV " N ot content w ith depticting these black m en as such great

fools that they believed the m an could drow n and then die again from
hypotherm ia, the paper recorded the possibly apocryphal w itticism of the
coroner, "w ho w as very w aggish, nothwithstanding the solem nity of the
occasion, [and] said, 'You m ay as w ell add died in the wool!"248
N evertheless, in the face of public ridicule, African Americans
continued to em ploy legal beliefs in a variety of ways, and, as the next chapter
docum ents, African American leadership in particular becam e m ore vocal
and active in pushing their interpretation of how the law should benefit the
black com m unity. Whereas m ost black Bostonians w ielded a legal
consciousness in more mundane or personal matters, as John Robinson had
in dealing w ith the obstruction of Bridge Court, other activist members of the
black com m unity also em ployed legal beliefs in the public arena of ideas to
argue for their rights as citizens. The antebellum articulation of an African
American identity based on the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution w as in som e w ays a natural evolution stem m ing from the long
history o f legal consciousness am ong free people of color, and served as a
248 Boston Evening Transcript, March 24, 1840; on the reputation of the North End, see Horton
and Horton, Black Bostonians 34-35; Levesque, Black Boston, 377-378.
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counterpoint o f sorts to the ways in which minstrel shows, court reports, and
other cultural and social forces attempted to exclude African Am ericans from
any claim to an Am erican identity.
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Chapter Four

From "No Country!" to Our Country: African Americans D efining
Themselves and the Boundaries of Rights and Citizenship, 1773-1855

During the early republic era, African Am ericans in Massachusetts and
throughout the North faced an array of challenges. Minstrel shows cast blacks
as exotic 'Others." Pressure on black laborers m ounted from job com petition
with lower class w hites. Antagonistic and paternalistic whites in the
colonization m ovem ent attempted to rem ove African Americans from the
nation, and proslavery forces challenged the right of African Americans to be
called citizens. A m id the strain of surviving in this environment, ordinary
free people of color used the law as one tool to retain som e kind of control
over daily life. A t the same time, black leaders used a legal rights ideology to
challenge exclusion and racial subordination.
Black writers and orators, who at best had expressed a hesitant and
qualified connection to notions of American nationality in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, began to respond with determ ined
definitions of them selves as American in the second decade of the nineteenth
century. During the Revolutionary War and the first decades of the Early
Republic, black leaders expressed virtually no allegiance to the ongoing
construction of an American identity. But nineteenth-century black leaders
articulated a vision of Africans as Americans, sparked particularly by the
abolition of the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization m ovem ent
in the next decade. A s slaves and free blacks had done during the
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Revolutionary era, they validated this African Am erican identity in part by
appealing to a biblical view of hum an rights and a natural rights philosophy.
Increasingly, however, they buttressed black identity formation by making a
rights discourse the central part o f the argument for full inclusion in the
polity. Coinciding w ith the rise of black parades as a public and
confrontational means of asserting African Am erican citizenship, black
leaders constructed an African Am erican identity intim ately connected to
legal notions of citizenship and rights stem ming from the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, thereby finding another means of
publicly reinforcing to both w hite and black Am ericans an African American
identity.249

Massachusetts slaves sensed, in the 1770s, that the time w as ripe to
push for freedom. Cognizant of revolutionary rhetoric and hopeful that it
m ight provide the im petus for freedom , slaves petition ed the legislature four
tim es for freedom. Each petition, delivering a qualified challenge within the
respectful and deferential language that characterized m ost eighteenthcentury petitions, attacked slavery w ith different strategies. The first,
subm itted in January of 1773 by slaves in Boston, pointed out that slaves
w ou ld make good subjects, "able as w ell as w illin g to bear a Part in the Public
Charges," and that despite the bitter circumstances m ost found them selves in,

249 On African Americans' use of biblical and natural rights ideologies in Revolutionary era
discourse, see Gary Nash, Race and Revolution (Madison: M adison H ouse Publishers, 1990), 5787; and Thomas J. Davis, "Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, and Revolutionary N ew
England: A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777," New England Quarterly
62 (March 1989), 248-263; on black parades and their connection to citizenship and identity, see
Shane White, " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North,
1741-1834," fourtial of American History, 81 (June 1994), 13-50; and David Waldstreicher, In the
M idst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill:
U niversity of North Carolina Press, 1997), 294-348.
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slaves had already demonstrated, their virtue and faith, and w ou ld continue
to do so. In one of the more striking statem ents, the petitioners cried out
"We have no Property! We have no w ives! N o children! We have no City!
N o Country!"250
Slaves cou ld and did own property; they could and did have w iv es and
children. The petitioners' plaintive cry w a s intended to make clear the
desperate circum stances engulfing m ost black m en and wom en. All slaves,
regardless of w hether or not they ow ned property or had family, shared a lack
of control over their future. The loss of fam ily and property w as always a
genuine risk sh ou ld an owner decide to sell a slave south or to the W est
Indies, a point the third petition, offered in 1774, m ade clear w hen the
petitioners protested that "we are no longer m an and wife than our masters
or m istresses thinkes proper" and grieved the loss of children "taken from us
by force and sen t m aney miles from us." The legal status of slaves as spouse
or parent w as alw ays in peril. The rights o f the master to sell his chattel
trumped any rights of the slave. And for virtually all black m en and wom en,
slave or free, the poignant cry of "No Country!" rang especially true.251
In the m id st of the revolutionary change in America, the black peoples
of M assachusetts found themselves in the m id st of revolutionary changes in
identity. W hile w hite Americans, busy constructing and validating an
American id en tity distinct from English nationalism , "imagined them selves
as a separate people," free and enslaved blacks were, in many w ays, already a
separate peop le.252 There was no country w ith w hich they identified. M ost
250 The four petition s are reprinted A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United
States, ed. Herbert A ptheker (N ew York: The Citadel Press, 1951), vol. 1, 5-10.
251 Ibid., 9.
252 T. H. Breen, "Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve o f the American Revolution: Revisions
Once More in N eed o f Revising," Journal of American History 84 (June 1997), 34.
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slaves and free blacks, the majority of w hom w ere at this point second or
third generation, had been in N ew England long enough that identification
with African roots w a s through a generalized and idealized Africa. The
petitions of 1774 and 1777, likely made by the sam e authors, and probably
relying on a com bination of personal m em ories w ith w hat they had heard
from other African-born slaves, nostalgically recalled Africa as "a Populous
Pleasant and plentiful country." Though Africa rem ained a powerful source
of identification and culture, there was no specific reference to ethnic or
geographic origin.
Through a blend of a biblical w orldview and natural rights ideology,
black petitioners did place slaves within a broader hum an family. In a
Massachusetts new spaper, Cesar Sarter, a N ew buryport freedman, called on
white colonials to extend "the natural rights and privileges o f freeborn men"
to slaves. Since he and many other slaves had been b om free in Africa, those
rights applied to them as well. The implication o f his argument was that
even those w ho had b een bom into slavery should be able to expect "the same
natural rights of mankind."

Sarter stretched the revolutionary rhetoric across

the Atlantic, in essence arguing that natural rights knew no geographic or
color boundaries. H e drove hom e his point by describing the physical and
emotional horrors of captivity, and asking if w hites could truly claim to be
living out "that excellent rule given by our Saviour, to do to others, as you
would, that they should do to you .',253

The first of the four freedom petitions to the M assachusetts legislature
used similar strategies b y pointing to both public opinion and God w ho "hath

253 Cesar Sarter, "Essay on Slavery," reprinted in Nash, Race and Revolution, 167-170; on the
natural rights ideology in the four freedom petitions, see D avis, "Emancipation Rhetoric,
Natural Rights, and Revolutionary N ew England."
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lately put it into the Hearts of Multitudes o n both Sides of the Water," along
with "Men of great N o te and Influence," to pu sh for black emancipation. The
second petition, subm itted just four m onths later, demonstrated that the
black petitioners w ere w ell aware of the argum ents white colonials w ere
making in response to Parliament's attem pts to reassert its authority over the
colonies in the early 1770s. The petitioners expected "great things from m en
w ho have made such a noble stand against the designs of their fellozv-m en to
enslave them," nam ely, for them to take the sensible next step and "give us
that ample relief w hich, as men, we have a natural right to." This petition
also exhibited the lack o f attachment these slaves had to the colony.
Expressing a desire to "leave the province, w h ich w e determine to do as soon
as w e can," the petitioners planned a return to Africa once they had earned
sufficient funds. The follow in g year, the third petition claimed "a naturel
right" to freedom "within the bowels of a free and Christian country," and
issued a biblical rebuke, asking "How can the master be said to Beare m y
Borden when he Beares m e dow n whith the H ave chanes [heavy chains] of
slavery an operson." Furthermore, this petition shrewdly pointed out the
lack of any law ever declaring their children slaves —children w ho had been
bom in a free country — but custom had locked their children into slavery just
as surely as if there had been such a law. O ne of the two petitions offered in
1777 borrowed from the Declaration of Independence, arguing that slaves had
"in Common w ith all other m en a Natural and Unaliable Right" to the
freedom God had "Bestowed equally on all menkind."254

254 A Documentary History of the Negro People, 6-10; the biblical basis of the third petition's
rebuke was Galatians 6:2, "Bear one another's burdens, and thus fulfill the law o f Christ."
George H. Moore refers to a second petition by M assachusetts slaves, including Prince Hall, in
March of 1777; see Moore, Notes on the History o f Slavery in Massachusetts (N ew York: D.
Appleton & Co., 1865), 180-181. On public opinion as a factor in abolition in M assachusetts, see
T.H. Breen, "Making History: The Force of Public O pinion and the Last Years of Slavery in
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Toward the close of the Revolutionary War, after hundreds of black
m en had fought against the British to earn freedom , black petitioners still
exhibited little indication of identifying them selves w ith the new nation. In
1780, seven M assachusetts black men subm itted a request to be relieved from
tax assessments, arguing that decades of "Long B ondag and hard slavery" had
left them in an abject state of having no inheritances or foundation upon
w hich to build an estate. O nly a few recently freed blacks had managed to
gain even a "small Pittance of Estate... through m u ch hard Labour &
Industry," and their situation remained so precarious that taxes threatened
even this shadow of security. Reminding the legislators of their ow n
revolutionary rhetoric, the petitioners pointed o u t that no blacks, even those
w ith small estates, shared the "Privilage of freem en of the State having no
vote or Influence in the election of those that Tax us," and this despite the
record of many black m en w h o "cheerfully Entered the field of Battle in the
defence of the C om m on Cause...against a similar Exertion of Power (in
Regard to Taxation)." But the overriding them e o f this petition is not a call to
an active part in the polity, and there is no claim to the right to vote based on
any notion of citizenship or identification w ith the state or country. The
thrust of the petition w as sim ply to be excused from taxation, and the
argument was predicated upon the notion that the legislators and w hite
society in general o w ed som ething to those of "African extract." In contrast to
later arguments m ade b y African Americans, the petitioners did not argue for
suffrage because free people of color were citizens and had a certain body of
rights; in fact, they d id n o t argue for suffrage at all. The debt arose out o f tw o

Revolutionary M assachusetts" in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in
Early America, ed. Ronald H offm an, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 67-95.
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causes: first, because w hites has historically denied slaves economic
opportunity and therefore caused the present debilitating state of many freed
people; and second, because m any slaves and free blacks had aided whites in
their cause against unfair taxation.255

There continued to be an absence of identification w ith the new
country in m ost of the w ritings and speeches by free p eop le of color for the
next tw o decades. In June o f 1789, the members of Boston's African Lodge of
M asons listened to the black m inister John Marrant d eliver a sermon on the
biblical roots of masonry. Marrant, bom in N ew York in 1755, was converted
after hearing George W hitefield and worked as an itinerant evangelist until
an early death at age thirty-five. His experiences w ere truly transatlantic: bom
in N e w York, he spent his you th in Georgia and C harlestow n before being
captured by and living for several months with Cherokees, and then pressed
into service by the British N a v y for seven years. After a salvation experience,
he began preaching in England before being called to preach in the Americas.
Marrant eventually w ent to N o v a Scotia and N ew England, preaching to
w hites, blacks, and Indians.256
His m essage to the M asonic Lodge set out to prove "the andency of
Masonry," and fixed his black listeners within a biblical and Masonic lineage
that stretched back to creation. H e more than tweaked the O ld Testament in
order to read it as a record o f the Mason's divine lineage and ordination.

255 A Documentary History of the Negro People, 14-16.
256 Sidney Kaplan and Emma N ograd y Kaplan, The Black Presence in the Era of the American
Revolution (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1989), 111-116; John Marrant, A
Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings With John Marrant, A Black, reprinted in Early
Negro Writing, 1760-1837, ed. D orothy Porter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 427-447; John
Marrant, "You Stand on the Level w ith the Greatest Kings on Earth," in Lift Every Voice:
African American Oratory, 1787-1900, ed. Philip S. Foner and Robert James Branham
(Tuscaloosa: University o f Alabama Press, 1998), 27-38.
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When "great Architect" gave N o a h a plan for the ark, Noah's sons become
"like deputy and tw o grand wardens." In Marrant's sagacious rendering,
Masonry becom es a historical redem ptive force: not only w as G od's grace and
salvation m anifested through N oah, but God gifted the M asons w ith skill
and knowledge in order to use them to settle and rebuild the w orld after the
post-flood disaster at the tower o f Babel. God also inspired Solom on with
wisdom "as grand master and undertaker" in order for the tem ple to be built,
which points to "one grand end and design of Masonry," rebuilding "the
temple that Adam destroyed in Paradise."257
Placing his audience of black Masons and African Americans in general
within this grand context that transcended time and space, Marrant attempted
to create a transatlantic and trans-historical bond. He connected African
Americans w ith Africans of the biblical (and therefore also M asonic) past and
present, and, w ithou t m entioning whites or race, excoriated those w ho
"despise those they w ould make, if they could, a species below them, and as
not make of the sam e clay w ith themselves." Marrant rem inded his audience
that God had Africans to "stand on the level not only with them , but with the
greatest kings on the earth." Marrant then placed his listeners w ithin a
network of obligation to all people, especially the weak and needy. They were
"under a double obligation to the brethren of the craft of all nations on the
face of the earth, for there is no party spirit in Masonry." A blend of
Christianity, Masonry, and Africa provided the touchstones of identity and
the bonds of com m unity in Marrant's exhortations.258

257 Marrant, Lift Every Voice, 32-35.
258 Ibid., 36.
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The lodge's founder, Prince Hall, offered the same kind of form ula in
his addresses during annual St. John's festivals. H e held up Tertullian,
Cyprian, Augustine, and Fulgentius — all leaders of the early church, som e
rendered as Africans — as examples for em ulation. In 1797 Hall rem inded the
lodge brethren "we shall call ourselves a charter'd lodge of just and law ful
Masons... give the right hand of affection and fellowship to w hom it justly
belongs; let their colour and complexion be w h at it will, let their nation be
what it may, for they are your brethren, and it is your indispensable d u ty so to
do; let them as M asons d en y this, and w e & the world know w hat to think of
them be they ever so grand."259 A few years previous, Hall had taken a
leading role in subm itting a petition to the M assachusetts legislature
requesting the state's financial aid for an em igration plan of black Bostonians
to settle on the w est coast of Africa. The petition, signed by seventy-three
black men, described Africa as a land "for w h ich the God of nature has form ed
us; and where w e shall liv e among our equals, and... may have a prospect of
usefulness to our brethren there."260
Themes of identification with Africa and the near-absence of
identification w ith A m erica persisted. In the 1808 pam phlet The Sons o f
Africa, an unnam ed m em ber of Boston's African Society repeatedly

juxtaposed Africa in opposition to other nations, thereby creating and
reinforcing a quasi-nationalism for African Americans. Asserting G od's
creation of all the nations from one blood, the writer noted that "All the
Africans, at the present day, seem to be the butt of the nations over w h ich

259 Prince Hall, "Pray God G ive U s the Strength to Bear Up Under All Our Troubles" in Lift
Every Voice, 52.
260 Kaplan and Kaplan, Hie Black Presence in the Era o f the American Revolution, 207-208.
The 1787 petition is reprinted here.
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m en choose to tyrannise, enslave, and oppress." H e later prodded his readers
to come up w ith any legitim ate rationale for slavery b y asking if "Africans
ought to be subject to the British or Americans, because they are of a dark
complexion?" If Turkey, Spain, or Portugal enslaved Am ericans, America
w ould rightfully consider those nations as "divested o f all humanity," and
therefore "what m ust be said of America... w hich treats the African in ways
similar?" Furthermore, in all references to anything American, the writer
uses not the first but the third person possessive pronoun: 'their" and not
"our/261

The writer of The Sons o f Africa participated in a process described by
historians as the creation o f a creolized 'Africa' in the m inds of African
Americans that absorbed original ethnic and cultural distinctives. David
Waldstreicher notes that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the "redefinition of Africa as one nation can be seen in virtually all
contemporary black writing."262 This redefinition w o u ld have been more
pronounced in the North, w here public orations and print culture provided
forums for black northerners to articulate and dissem inate view s on slavery,
freedom, and the inequities of northern society. W hen they did so, black
speakers and writers alm ost invariably invoked a representation of Africa in
which regions encom passed the entire continent. The freedom petitioners

261 The Sons of Africans: An Essay on Freedom. With Observations on the Origin of Slavery.
a Member of the African Society in Boston (Boston: 1808), 20-21, 10. Located at the Boston
Athenaeum; also reprinted in Early Negro Writing, 13-27.

By

262 See Waldstreicher, In the M id st of Perpetual Fetes, 320-322; W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks:
African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1997), 3839; Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America
(N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1987). For an argument that does not refute but does
complicate Stuckey's view , see M ichael A. Gomez, Exchanging Our Country Marks: The
Transformation o f African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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represented Africa through remembrance of the central or w estern African
homeland as "a Populous Pleasant and plentiful country"; John Marrant and
Prince Hall em ployed the names of early church fathers, som e of w hom were
supposedly from northern Africa, in representing African heritage; the Sons
o f Africa author and others rooted the im age of Africa as a nation from days

following the biblical flood w hen God sent Noah's sons out to populate the
earth.
Other black writers and orators in the North sounded similar themes
and used similar terms in identifying black m en and w om en in America as
part of a generalized African nation. Jupiter Hammon, the N e w York slave
whose 1786 serm on m ixing rebuke w ith encouragem ent m ust have blistered
the ears of som e of his black audience, sanctioned his m essage by identifying
himself as a m an of "your ow n nation and colour." H am m on did not mean
the United States. The next year, one of the first formal black societies left out
any connection to the United States and labeled them selves "the Free
Africans and their descendants of the city of Philadelphia and the State of
Pennsylvania or elsewhere." In 1794, w riting from Philadelphia, Richard
Allen and Absalom Jones typified a strategy of using Pharaoh's Egypt as a type
for the United States: Egypt had been "destroyed by the protector and avenger
of slaves," and so, too, could America be destroyed. And, as the w hite and
black readers of this pamphlet knew, ou t of the destruction of Egypt a new
nation was formed. Though Allen and Jones and other black writers usually
did not go so far as explicitly stating that God would form a n ew African
nation out of a destroyed America, there remained an im plication of
im pending judgm ent for an unrepentant America and redem ption for the
oppressed African. Someday, they wrote, "princes shall come forth from
Egypt." In a 1799 Absalom Jones led 73 black Philadelphians in a petition to
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the President and Congress protesting slavery and the slave trade, and linked
themselves to those of "like colour and national descent." Again, the 'nation'
here was Africa.263
Concurrently, the public discourse of African Americans betrayed little
identification w ith the American nation during the first tw o decades of the
new republic. Because Africa was a som ew hat m ythologized hom eland and
even those w ho d id desire to return to Africa found it difficult to do so, the
cry of "No country!" continued to ring true for m ost free people o f color.
There were, h ow ever, som e hints of articulating connection to an American
polity. James O liver Horton has noted that m ost free people of color
"identified w ith the w ords and the spirit of the Declaration of Independence
and the Revolution." But this did not equate to defining them selves as
Americans or as a perm anent part of the America polity. The law s of the
African Society d id identify its members in 1796 as "We, the African
Members...true an d faithful citizens of the Com m onwealth in w h ich w e
live," and in a qualified but complimentary attitude towards that
com m onwealth in The Sons o f Africa, the author noted that "M assachusetts
is greatly to be valu ed for the peculiar advantage which w e enjoy, as it
respects our freedom." The town of Salem in particular received praise "for
their particular benevolence to the Africans." But for the m ost part the
author credited an y benefits of living in M assachusetts to God, not to the
benevolence of w h ites, and even here he continued to juxtapose him self and

263 Jupiter Hammon, "An Address to the Negroes in the State of N ew York," reprinted in AfroAmerican Religious H istory: A Documentary Witness, ed. Milton C. Sem ett (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1985), 34; Aptheker, A Documentary History of the Negro People, 18; Richard
Allen and Absalom Jones, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People, during the Late
Awful Calamity in Philadelphia, in the Year 1793: and a Refutation of some Censures Thrown
upon Them in some late Publications (Philadelphia, 1794), 24, 28; 1799 petition reprinted in
Early Negro Writing, 330.
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other free people of color against other Am ericans by calling blacks "Africans,
w ho inhabit M assachusetts."264
Even thou gh the rhetoric of black leaders in the late eighteenth
century, and the first years of the nineteenth century, did occasionally define
Africans as citizens and members of Am ericans society, the contrast w ith later
years remains striking: in 1829 even the m ilitant David Walker called
America his "native land" and em phatically stated "This country is as m uch
ours as it is the whites." In 1832 Maria W. Stewart, labeled by one biographer
as the first Am erican w om an to deliver political lectures before m ixed-gender
audiences, spoke before her Boston audience concerning the "American free
people of color," w h ile calling herself "a true b om American." Later that
same year, Peter O sbom e painted a picture for his N ew H aven church of
African Am ericans holding "the Declaration of Independence in one hand
and the H oly Bible in the other," fighting for "our native country," thereby
fulfilling the m antle laid upon them by their forefathers w ho had "fought,
bled and died to achieve the independence of the United States."265
Surveying just the first year of The Liberator reveals pointed
sentiments by African Americans claim ing an American identity. A
Philadelphia m an w h o wrote to The Liberator asserted his identity as an
American by p oin tin g to his ancestors w h o had lived in Pennsylvania since
264 James O liver H orton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American Community
(Washington: Sm ithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 150; The Sons of Africa, 14, 17; Laws of the
African Society, instituted at Boston, 1796. Located at the Boston Athenaeum; also reprinted in
Early Negro W riting.
265 David Walker, D avid Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the
Coloured Citizens o f the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those of the United
States of America (Boston:1829), 55. I am using the 1995 edition of the Hill and Wang 1965
reprint, with an introduction by Sean Wilentz; Maria W. Stewart: America's First Black
Woman Political W riter, Marilyn Richardson, ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1987), 46. This volu m e reprints several of Stewart's speeches and essays; Peter O sbom e, "It Is
Time for Us to be U p and Doing," Lift Every Voice, 124-125.
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W illiam Penn came to the colonies, and that during his time spent fighting
in the American R evolution he had endured "the tim es that tried m en's
souls." "Am I n ow to be told," he argued, "that Africa is my country, by som e
of those w hose birth-place is unknown.?"

A nother "Colored Philadelphian"

wrote "we are told A frica is our native country; consequently the climate w ill
be more congenial to our health. We readily d en y the assertion. H ow can a
m an be bom in tw o countries at the same time? Is not the position
superficial to su p p ose that American bom citizens are Africans?" Brooklyn
African Americans referred to the "United States of America, our native soil"
and called them selves "countrym en and fellow -citizen s" who dem anded "an
equal share of protection from our federal governm ent."266
Another colu m n ist in The Liberator, w h o d id not identify him or
herself as w hite or black, suggested in July of 1831 that the term 'negro' w as
considered insulting and offensive by free peop le of color, and that 'colored'
"recalls to m ind the offen sive distinction of color" due to prejudice in the
United States. Nor w a s 'African' suitable, for it w as "no more correct than
that of Englishman w o u ld be to a native b om citizen of the United States."
This writer offered a "change of appellation," w ith the term Afric-American
being most appropriate, since it "asserts...that the colored citizen is as truly a
citizen of the United States of America as the white." William Lloyd
Garrison, the paper's publisher, asked his 'colored' readers for a response, and
the only direct response, from a letter writer w h o did not identify them selves
by color, rejected the 'change of appellation.' M ore telling is the indirect
response of African Am ericans: in the next issu e, Robert Wood and John T.
H ilton, two prom inent and activist members o f Boston's black community,

266 The Liberator, January 22, March 12, July 2, 1831.
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published a brief notice for a m eeting of free people of color about establishing
a black vocational college, and used the term 'Afric-American.' Another
notice of a meeting in Hartford used the same term, and in the fall a group of
female black Bostonians organized a literary association under the name "The
Afric-American Female Intelligence Society Of Boston." In December, Peter
O sbom e exhorted his N ew H aven church to "take courage, ye AfricAm ericans! "267
Though the individual and corporate identification w ith the United
States became an integral part of northern African American identity, black
Bostonians and other free people of color in the north by no means
repudiated their African identity. The transatlantic perception combining
African heritage and American them es came through clearly in a testimonial
dinner in 1828, when David Walker and several other members of black
Boston's leadership cadre w elcom ed the West African Prince Abduhl
Rahaman, an escaped slave w h o had come to Boston in an effort to raise
support for gaining his fam ily's freedom from southern slavery. The
language of some of the toasts were infused w ith American notions of
"Independence and Liberty" and hopes that "the Spirit of Liberty which
pervades our Northern Hemisphere" would spread south and worldwide.
Cato Freeman praised Haiti for being "founded on the basis of true republican
principles," and Coffin Pitts anticipated the day w hen "Christianity, industry,
prudence, and economy" w ou ld "characterize every descendant of Africa."
James G. Barbadoes expressed a similar desire that the "sons and daughters of
Africa soon become a civilized and christian-like people." Within these

267 The Liberator, July 16, July 23, A ugust 13,1831. The lone writer w ho rejected the suggested
term appeared in the September 24,1831 issue. Marilyn Richardson notes the 1831 founding of
Boston's fem ale literary association in Maria W. Stezuart, 127; O sbom e in Lift Every Voice, 125.
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testimonials, g iven for an African prince they called brother, Boston's black
leaders affirmed both their African heritage by labeling themselves 'sons and
daughters' of Africa, and their American character by defining their hopes for
the future w ith ideological terms that had becom e central to American
identity —republicanism, 'Independence,' 'Equality,' and 'Liberty.'268
Another less obvious example of the evolu tion from a virtual absence
of affiliation to a strong identification w ith America w as the formal
expression of various societies' charters.

In Boston, the African Society

specified the law s of the society 1796 w ith the labels "1st," "2cd," and so on.
But tw enty-tw o years later, the African H um ane Society, formed in 1818 w ith
Sdpio Dalton — w h o had been the vice-president of the African Society — as a
founding member, wrote their by-laws and regulations in a manner distinctly
different from the 1796 Society. The constitutions that black organizations
wrote began to take on a decidedly constitutional character. The H um ane
Society gave each member a small book containing its Act of Incorporation
and Constitution, w hich began w ith a paragraph stating "the constitution of
the United States declares, 'ALL MEN ARE BORN FREE AND EQUAL;' and
our laws protect all classes of men in all their rights." The Society's preamble
also borrowed from the Constitutions's preamble in describing its purpose as
"promoting the general welfare of all the people of colour." A list o f tw enty-

268 Freedom's Journal, October 24, 1828; The Black Abolitionist Papers, ed. C. Peter Ripley
(Chapel Hill: U niversity of North Carolina Press, 1991 ), vol. 3, 78. According to the editorial
note here, the Prince, w hose full name was Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima, had originally
embarked on this tour to promote the American Colonization Society in return for their help in
raising funds to free the rest of family. Freedom's Journal and other African Americans,
however, typically portrayed the Prince's cause as the emancipation of his family (w hich w as
undoubtedly the Prince's sole motivation), and neglected to mention the colonization aspect to
his northern tour.
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four 'Articles' follow ed the preamble. In 1831, the Afric-American Female
Intelligence Society o f Boston spelled out their by-law s in a similar manner.269
The sam e pattern played out in other northern cities. The 1787 society
that preceded the form ing of the Bethel church in Philadelphia laid out their
financial rules in a sim ple unlabeled paragraph. In 1797 St. Thomas, an
African Episcopal church in Philadelphia, d ivid ed their constitution into tw o
sections, "Regulations" and "Rules." And in 1808 the Rhode Island African
Benevolent Society o f N ew port, who included them selves as part of "the
African Nations," separated their constitution into several sections, labeled as
the rules "Of Members," "Of the School," and so forth.270 But the 1810
constitution for N e w York's African Marine Fund had a preamble follow ed by
laws labeled "Article I," and likewise to the final "Article Vffl." The
Augustine Education Society of Pennsylvania listed its tw elve Articles after a
preamble in 1818.271
Other organizations throughout the north in the 1820s and 1830s
follow ed suit. Philadelphia's Brotherly U nion Society, formed in 1823,
identified them selves in a similar fashion to the 1787 society that Richard
Allen and Absalom Jones founded. But w hile the 1787 group had identified
their members as "the Free Africans and their descendants of the d ty of
Philadelphia and the State of Pennsylvania or elsewhere," forty years later the
Brotherly Union Society identified them selves as "coloured men, of the

269 The Lazos of the African Society; The By-Laws, rules and regulations, of the African
Humane Society, (Boston: 1820). The by-laws of the African H um ane Society are in a small
booklet, w hich had belonged to Cato Freeman, and is contained in the Robert Morris Box at the
Boston Athenaeum; G eorge A . Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in
Urban America, 1750-1860 (N ew York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 324-325.
270 A Documentary H istory of the Negro People, 17-19; Early Negro Writing, 28-32 and 84-86.
271 Early Negro W riting, 42, 92-93.
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county of Philadelphia, citizens of the C om m onwealth of Pennsylvania and
of the United States of America."272
Black Bostonians, then, were a part of this trend of northern black
identity formation. Leaders of the community actively solicited copies of
speeches delivered in other northern cities, and several, including D avid
Walker, were the Boston agents for Freedom's Journal.773 James Oliver
Horton has described northern black northerners' penchant for retaining
institutional nam es that spoke clearly of their African heritage w hile
incorporating American political structures and language, thus blending "the
two aspects of their heritage to their advantage."274 But Horton places the
1796 African Society in Boston and the later groups in N ew York and
Philadelphia w ithin the sam e category of blended heritage, while the
argument here parses the language these groups choose to em ploy in w riting
their charters more closely. While free people of color in the late eighteenth
century and the first years of the nineteenth did, as Horton argues, begin to
incorporate aspects of Am erican principles into their organizational activities
and identity, the change over time was and is significant. Claims of an
American heritage or identity by free people of color in the late eighteenth
and the first years of the nineteenth century w ere m uted or non-existent, but

272 Ibid., 51. Constitutions w ith similar wording, also in this volume: the N ew York African
Clarkson Association, 1825; the American Society of Free Persons of Colour, 1831; the Pittsburgh
African Education Society,1832; and the Phoenix Society o f N ew York, 1833. Also see the
constitution of the Colored Anti-Slavery Society of Newark, 1834, in The Black Abolitionist
Papers, 132-134.
273 For instance, a public m eeting of black Bostonians in the African School published a few
resolves, one of which recom m ended that free people of color get copies of speeches Garrison
delivered to the black com m unities in Philadelphia and N e w York. See The Liberator, July 16,
1831.
274 Horton, Free People of Color, 154.
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as the nineteenth century progressed, northern African Am ericans
consciously and stridently laid claim to the American aspects of their heritage.
Signal events helped catalyze this evolution of identification, especially
the abolition of the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization
m ovem ent in the next decade. W hen Congress made the im portation of
slaves illegal as of January 1, 1808, African Americans finally had som e cause
to celebrate the nation for som ething specifically related to an essential part o f
their identity and heritage — w hat seem ed to be the ostensible end of the rape
of their hom eland. While the end o f the slave trade furthered a connection
to the U nited States, it did not cause an articulation of American identity to
spring forth ex nihilo ; but the abolition did provide opportunity for its
expression. Public gatherings keynoted by orators extolling the virtues and
sins of the United States marked w h at w as essentially African Americans'
first national day of celebration. The orations "fought American racial
injustice w hile inventing and establishing black nationality." On a first
anniversary celebration in N ew York, William Hamilton's praise of the act
"which for its justice and hum anity, outstrips any that have ever been passed
by that honorable body" of the U nited States Congress typified expressions of
gratitude that many African Am ericans could now direct towards the
national governm ent.275
Other speeches made a more explicit identification w ith America: at
the opening of his speech in 1808, Peter Williams defined him self and his
audience as "Africans, and the descendants of Africans," and near the end
told his audience that "As an Am erican, I glory in informing you that
Columbia boasts the first m en w h o distinguished them selves em inently in

275 Early Negro Writing, 35; W aldstreicher, In the M idst of Perpetual Fetes, 344.

199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the vindication of our rights." A year later, Joseph Sidney boasted that "in
these U nited States, reason, truth, hum anity, and freedom have finally
obtained a glorious triumph over sophistry, falsehood, cruelty, and tyranny."
Sidney, w h o had no trouble using the first possessive pronoun 'our' w hen
referring to America, w ent further b y not only identifying w ith America, but
by also placing him self and African Am ericans in general as guardians of
America's future through support o f the Federalists and opposing "our
enemies," the Jeffersonians, and "the great idol of democracy," Thomas
Jefferson. O n the sixth anniversary of the abolition of the slave trade, Russell
Parrott poin ted to the War of 1812 as proof that "we are faithful to our
country... w h ere her Hull, her Decatur, and her Bainbridge, fought and
conquered, the black bore his part, stim ulated by pure love of coimtry."
Parrott likely had in mind black sailors w h o fought in the war, m any of
whom m ade clear declarations of w h at W. Jeffery Bolster called "a radical
African A m erican patriotism" w h en im pressed by the Royal N avy. Several
months later, black N ew Yorkers w o u ld express their allegiance and stake
their claim as a part of the nation b y turning out unbidden to build
fortifications in case of a British attack.275
W hereas the abolition of the slave trade provided a positive release for
aligning w ith the American polity, the rise of the colonization m ovem ent
proved to be a negative force triggering a vigorous assertion of American
identity am ong African Americans throughout the antebellum era.277 W hile
275 Early Negro W riting, 350, 357, 361, 390; Bolster, Black Jacks, 117; Shane W hite, Somezuhat
More Independent: The End of Slavery in Nezo York C ity, 1770-1810 (Athens: U niversity of
Georgia Press, 1991), 150.
277 On African Americans involved in furthering emigration to Africa, see Lamont D. Thomas,
Rise to Be a People: A Biography of Paul Cuffe (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); and
Floyd J. M iller, The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration atid Colonization 17871863 (Urbana: U niversity of Illinois Press, 1975).
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African Am ericans continued w ithout reservation to avow an African
heritage, the characterization of Africa changed. The orations on the abolition
of the slave trade had typically recalled an alm ost idyllic Africa, but in one of
the first responses against colonization, James Forten and Russell Parrott
referred in 1817 to "the burning plains o f Guinea." Subsequent emigrants
confirmed those opinions; in 1833 Joseph D ailey wrote back to Philadelphia,
describing high death rates among em igrants to Liberia, crowded hospitals,
poor agriculture, and corrupt politics. M eanw hile, Dailey referred to America
as his "native coimtry." This varies from Floyd J. Miller's argum ent in The
Search for Black N ationality , in w hich h e asserts that colonization efforts

provoked som e free blacks to seek a n e w nationality in Africa. That m ay
indeed characterize the minority that supported emigration. But the vast
majority of free blacks in Massachusetts and throughout the North did not
have to search for their nationality. C olonization aroused a fierce black
patriotism.278
Much of the im petus for sending African Americans to colonies on the
w est coast of Africa did come from black m en such as Paul Cuffe, but the twin
forces of general disapproval from ordinary black folks and the seizure of the
m ovement7s leadership by prominent w h ites prom pted m ost black leaders to
repudiate all colonization schemes. A significant part of the reason for
rejecting em igration w as a refusal to abandon enslaved black m en and
wom en and leave their hopes for em ancipation solely to the few principled
whites w ho m ight carry on the fight for abolition. James Forten told Paul
Cuffe in 1817 that the three thousand black Philadelphians w ho rejected
emigration suspected "the slaveholders w an ts to get rid of them so as to make

278 Early Negro W riting, 267; The Black Abolitionist Papers, 74-77.
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their property more secure." But another pow erful motivation crystallized in
the unequivocal claim that African Americans already had a country, a
country to which they belonged, and, perhaps more significantly, a coimtry
that belonged to them. W hen David Walker and the other black writers in
the Liberator called America their own country, they did so in the context of
rejecting colonization.279
David Walker provided one of the m ore com plex articulations o f the
American aspects of free black identity. W hen rebuking whites for prejudice,
hypocrisy, willful ignorance, and all their other sins against enslaved and free
blacks, Walker persistently refers to "the Americans."

Using the term in a

denigrating and bitterly sarcastic manner generated a distance between
African Americans and 'the Americans' w ho perpetuated oppression. He
does likewise w ith the term "the Christians." But just as Walker saw him self
as a true Christian, so h e saw himself and those w h o supported the cause of
oppressed black m en and wom en, whether they be black or white, as true
Americans. Walker drew distinctions betw een blacks and their "white
friends" who sought to refute claims of black inferiority that m en like
Thomas Jefferson had made; those charges needed to also be "refuted by
blacks themselves." Furthermore, when black m en and wom en gained
enough education and opportunity to make full use o f all their talents,
Walker speculated that a freed people m ight w an t "perhaps more, to govern
ourselves." This articulation of a potential black nationalism did not,
how ever, exclude or even hint at a different nationality than an American
one: for all his warnings of judgment and castigating the nation as a w hole,
Walker did not disassociate him self from America but claimed it as his
279 W ilson Jeremiah M oses, Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to
Marcus Garvey (N ew York: N e w York University Press, 1996), 51.
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nation. Walker included a letter Richard A llen w rote to Freedom's Journal to
make his point: "This land w h ich w e have w atered w ith our tears and our
blood, is n ow our mother c o u n try Z'280

African Americans' assertion of America as a hom eland and their
claim to a stake in America rested on two intertwined arguments. First, the
labor of generations of slaves entitled them to far m ore than they presently
had. Second, they had a right to stay in their hom eland and realize a better
future—a right conferred by God, by nature, and by legal rights based upon the
Constitution. Relying on the law and the Constitution m ay have signaled an
acceptance of how legitim ate change would be accom plished w hile
weakening more radical challenges. Radical challenges, how ever, such as a
separatist m ovem ent to establish a black nation w ithin the nation, were not
realistic — the threat to w hite hegem ony w ould have been to great to be
ignored. Moreover, if their w ords are to be believed, m ost African Americans
saw themselves as part of the coimtry and not as a separate nation that
happened to exist w ithin a nation. But African Americans' vision and
interpretation of the law in general and the Constitution in particular did
provide black leaders an effective tool for challenging w h ite hegem ony by
calling for w hite Americans to live up to the prom ises of the revolutionary
heritage they so loudly proclaim ed.

The appropriation of the the form and language of the Declaration of
Independence and of the Constitution by black leadership in the nineteenth
century w as a double-edged rhetorical thrust at racial oppression in
280 David Walker's Appeal, 58. For a thorough treatment of the D avid Walker's Appeal, see
Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted. Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of
Antebellum Slave Resistance (U niversity Park, Pennsylvania: U niversity o f Pennsylvania
Press, 1997).
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antebellum. America. It provided a cutting reminder of prom ises denied, but
it w as also a pow erful expression of African Americans' belief — or at least
their hope — in the pow er and prom ise o f that document and the ideology
they b elieved it represented.
Black leaders' constitutional argum ent for freedom u sed the
Constitution against itself. Free p eop le o f color used sections of the
Constitution to negate any right to o w n slaves that other sections permitted
and constructed arguments based on the principles of individual liberty and
equality that they read in the C onstitution. One tactic privileged the Preamble
over the b o d y of the Constitution. V incent Harding describes the concern of
the A fro-A m erican freedom m ovem en t for over two centuries as trying "to
liberate the essential spirit of the docum ent, espedally as that spirit is
represented in the Preamble." In 1851, W illiam Howard D ay, arguing for an
interpretation of the Constitution as an anti-slavery docum ent, quoted from
the Preamble to point out that "if it says it w as framed to 'establish justice,' it,
of course, is opp osed to injustice." H e supported his position further by using
a portion o f the Fifth Amendment: "if it says plainly 'no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, w ith o u t due process of law ,' — I suppose it
means it, and I shall avail m yself of the benefit of it." African Americans,
taking notice of the contradiction b etw een the Preamble and the som e of the
more conservative parts of the m ain b o d y of the document, u sed that
contradiction as "a w edge by w hich they m ight engage the struggle for the
transform ation of the Constitution, th e nation — and them selves."281

281 Vincent H arding, "Wrestling Toward the D aw n: The Afro-American Freedom M ovement
and the Changing Constitution, " Journal o f American History, 74 (December, 1987), 720-721;
Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, ed. Philip S. Foner and G eorge E.
Walker (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), vol 1, 262.
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Black writers and orators interpreted and applied the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, just as John and Sophia Robinson
interpreted and applied the law in their attem pt to ensure Elizabeth's
freedom. W hen they used the Constitution to pu sh for equality and
opportunity, they com m only referred to the Constitution in general and not
specific terms. A t tim es the two docum ents becam e fused in black rhetoric, as
in the case of a black Philadelphian w ho argued that racist practices w ere "in
direct opposition to the Constitution; w hich positively declares, that all men
are bom equal, and endow ed with certain inalienable rights — am ong which
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Their arguments, at times
constructed not from specific articles or am endm ents but from principles they
believed the docum ent intended to profess, mirrored the broader process of
Americans w h o "com m only spoke in constitutional terms w hen debating
political and social issues."282 For free black leaders this habit began early on;
in a 1797 petition to Congress, four southern black m en who had fled to the
north referred to "the unconstitutional bondage" they had left behind, and
called the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 a "direct violation of the declared
fundamental principles of the Constitution" w ith ou t delineating exactly what
those principles w ere or w hat they were based upon. By the m iddle of the
nineteenth century, African Americans had grow n quite astute in dissecting
and applying specific parts of the Constitution to negate other sections that
could be interpreted as proslavery. Nearly sixty years after the 1797 petition,
John Mercer Langston invoked the "true spirit of the American Declaration
of Independence [and] the Constitution" in his condemnation of the 1850

282 The Liberator, February 12, 1831; Donald G. N iem an, Promises to Keep: African Americans
and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present, (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
31.
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Fugitive Slave Law before the Convention of Colored Citizens of O hio. But
Langston w ent further and spelled out the specific legal grounds for the
unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, in particular "the
constitutional guarantee of the writ of Habeas Corpus."283
Interpreting the Constitution as an anti-slavery document put m any
black leaders at ideological odds with white and black abolitionists like
Garrison and Martin Delany, who saw the Constitution as an endorsem ent of
slavery and w as thus a "covenant from hell." In 1844, Massachusetts black
and white attendees of the N ew England Anti-Slavery Convention heard
Charles Lenox Rem ond criticize the Constitution as an instrument of
oppression upon "the few w hom it entirely overlooks, or sees but to tram ple
upon." Remond and other Garrisonian abolitionists w ho advocated
disunion view ed the Constitution as a tool for protecting slavery and as the
glue binding the free states to the slave states. Their view s were shared by
other African Americans in the North. A t an O hio convention, H. Ford
Douglass offered a fervent dentmdation of the pro-Constitutional position s
held by William H oward Day and John Mercer Langston, dedaring that "the
gentleman m ay wrap the stars and stripes of his country around him forty
times, if possible, and with the Dedaration of Independence in one hand, and
the Constitution o f our common country in the other, m ay seat him self
under the shadow of the frowning m onum ent of Bunker Hill." Langston
replied that he hoped black men would do anything "under the Constitution,
that will aid in effecting our liberties." But D ouglass' repudiation
demonstrates h ow deeply other African Americans had drunk of the
Constitutional well; he castigated the thorough identification of other black
283 Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, vol. 1, 260; A Documentary History of the Negro
Peoples, 43.
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leaders w ith Am erican ideals and heritage. That identification fostered a
support for the Constitution and lead the convention to side w ith D ay and
Langston. They v o ted d ow n Douglass' m otion to reject the Constitution
twenty-eight to tw o .284
The anti-constitutional position of Rem ond and successors of his
stance like Henry M cNeal Turner has been characterized by Mary Frances
Berry as a negative v iew of the Constitution. Berry labels this group as the
"blacks-do-not-need-whites-to-succeed" school.

O n the other hand,

antebellum black abolitionists w ho supported the Constitution em phasized
"Americans' ow n stated ideals" and often "attempted to identify w ith those
ideals and to insist that the nation should live u p to them." Berry notes that
the civil rights m ovem ent, beginning in the nineteenth century and
continuing into the tw entieth, "was a distinctly Am erican m ovem ent,
making appeals to traditional American culture and values." And though, as
Peter Hinks points out, Americans, black or w hite, did not have a m onopoly
on many of these values, the context within w hich black leaders w orked and
the culture and valu e system they drew from w as nonetheless an Am erican
one. When Charles Lenox Remond, speaking before the M assachusetts
legislature in 1842, called Boston the "Athens o f America," he invoked a
republican vision o f independence and equality that Americans, black and
white, intuitively understood.285
284 Charles Lenox Rem ond, Black Abolitionist Papers, vol. 3, 442; Proceedings of the Black
State Conventions, vol. 1, 262-263; Donald G. Nieman, "The Language of Liberation: African
Americans and Equalitarian Constitutionalism, 1830-1950" in The Constitution, Law, and
American Life: Critical Aspects of the Nineteenth-Century Experience, ed. Donald G. N iem an,
(Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1992), 67-90, 68.
285 Mary Frances Berry, "Vindicating Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Road to a Color-Blind
Society" Journal of Negro H istory 81 (1996), 141; Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren, 110;
see also W illiam M. W iecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America, 17601848 (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1977); Charles Lenox Remond, Black Abolitionist
Papers, vol. 3, 368.

207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

African Americans saw them selves as part of that republican visio n of
America. They called upon federal and state governm ents to u p h old the
spirit of the Constitution's pream ble to "promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our prosperity." A ccording to
their interpretation of the Constitution, the governm ent ought to serve their
interests since they were a part of the sovereign people. In this African
Americans differed little from other Americans; Americans had un dergon e a
significant change in their v ie w o f the law and governm ent in the nineteenth
century, w hen the traditional v ie w of rights was largely displaced. The
traditional view had "em phasized what governm ent could not do," but
w ithin that older view , w h ich had been essential w h en an absolute
sovereign had the potential to take away established practices, "rights defined
as restraint made less sense w here the people them selves were sovereign.... if
the people ow ned the governm ent, it should serve their interests. So argued
those energetic Yankees w h o called on law to help them m odernize the
econom y, conquer the continent, and exploit its riches." While historian R.
Kent Newm yer and the Yankees he describes were concerned w ith the
expansive change in how the la w could help free up capital, free p eop le of
color argued for a governm ent and law that served their particular interests.
In Boston, Hosea Easton drove this point home. African Americans, he said,
"being constitutionally Americans," were depending on "American
government, and American m anners...a w itholding of the enjoym ent of any
American principle from an Am erican man... is in effect taking aw ay his
m eans of subsistence; and consequently, taking aw ay his life." Black
Bostonians, like other free p eop le of color, sought freedom from racial
oppression and equal civil rights, upon which the ability to take com plete
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advantage o f the nation's burgeoning econom ic opportunities was
predicated.286
Though Walker and other black leaders unflinchingly concentrated
attention on the sins and inconsistencies of the United States, they shared the
moral, econom ic, and political aspirations of m ost Americans. Many of those
aspirations had never been anathema to an African w orldview , thus
facilitating African Americans' support. A s early as the 1790s, Venture Smith
placed frugality, financial stability, and material success as high priorities.
The African-born Smith, who grew up in Connecticut, expressed a value
system that m any w est African cultures as w ell as N ew England Yankees
would have appreciated. Black entrepeneurs in Boston like David Walker
and John H ilton, w ho joined in toasts for prudence and economy at the
testimonial dinner for Prince Abduhl Rahaman, no doubt shared those
sentim ents.287
The poin t here is not to enter into the well-worn argument of
assimilation versus resistance. Certain aspects of African and American
value system s could and did co-exist; nevertheless, nineteenth-century
African Americans expressed these ideals and aspirations in an American
context and in American terms. Walker persisted in defining himself as
286 R. Kent N ew m yer, "Harvard Law School, N ew England Culture, and the Antebellum
Origins o f Am erican Jurisprudence," Journal of American History 74 (December 1987), 814-835,
821; also see James Willard Hurst, 77ie Lazo and Conditions of Freedom in the NineteenthCentury United States (Madison: The University o f W isconsin Press, 1956); and Morton J.
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Laxo 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977); H osea Easton, A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and Civil and Political
Condition of the Colored People of the United States (Boston: 1837), 49. Reprinted in Negro
Protest Pamphlets: A Compendium (N ew York: A m o Press and the N ew York Times, 1969).
287 See Robert E. Desrochers, Jr., " 'N ot Fade Away': The Narrative of Venture Smith, an
African American in the Early Republic," Journal of American History 84 Qune 1997), 40-66; and
A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture A Native of Africa, But Resident above
Sixty Years in the United States of America (N ew London, 1798), reprinted in Five Black Lives
(Middletown, CT: W esleyan University Press, 1971).
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African or of the "African race," and though opposed to emigration, held up
Haiti for emulation. Like many other African Americans, Walker expressed
corporate ties reaching beyond the shores of the United States. But these
transatlantic connections did not subsum e an American identity or Walker's
commitment to a system of morals and values accepted by many white and
black Americans. Walker "wanted only the opportunity for his people to
participate fully w ithout obstacle in the expanding free labor economy and the
culture of Protestant moral improvement." Celebrating the end of slavery in
N ew York on July 4th of 1827, the escaped slave and entrepreneur Austin
Steward exhorted African Americans to inscribe "in letters of gold upon every
door-post — 'industry, prudence, economy.'" Samuel Cornish, co-founder of
the nation's first black newspaper, articulated a Jeffersonian-like vision of
getting black fam ilies to establish a literal stake in this country w hen he ran
an ad for the sale of a 2000-acre parcel of land along the Delaware river in
N ew York. Cornish's stated aim w as to sell it at half its value (by his
estimate), so as to avoid the appearance o f attem pting to make a "good
bargain". For buyers, he was looking for som e of his "brethren w ho are
capitalists", w h o he hoped would in turn sell it for a small profit to black
families w ho w o u ld build an African Am erican farming community.
Walker, Steward, Cornish, and others connected pursuit of financial stability
to sound morals, education, hard work, and prudence — qualities inseparable
from the overall goal of full equality.288 But black leaders knew virtue,
frugality, and education would be insufficient to elevate ordinary free people

288 Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren, 108-110; A ustin Steward, "Termination of
Slavery," in Lift Every Voice, 108; Cornish's ads in Freedom's Journal, July 13, 1827 and several
other issues.
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of color to full social, economic, and political equality w ithout procuring all
the rights that God, nature, and the Constitution imparted.
M ost African Americans, far from proposing radical change or
abandoning the country, were intimately tied to m any of the goals articulated
by American society. A s Kimberle Crenshaw has pointed out for the
twentieth-century civil rights m ovem ent, antebellum black activists called on
social and political institutions to act in the w a y they were supposed to act
according to the Constitution so that African Americans, like w hite
Americans, could realize those goals. Black N e w Yorkers gathering in 1840
for a state convention aimed at gaining black suffrage, professed them selves
"to be American and republican," and described the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution as em bodying "the primary ideas of
American republicanism." In their estim ation, the framers of those
docum ents had intended federal and state governm ents to live up to those
ideals by granting and protecting the "republican birth-right" every
individual, black or w hite.289
W hen African Americans spoke of a /birth-right/ they infused it w ith
m ultiple m eanings. Birth-right connoted a stake in America because their
forefathers fought for freedom, and im plied that an inheritance w as due
them because slaves had worked the land. But it also grounded a rights
discourse by focusing on constitutionally defined citizenship by right of birth.
During the plenary address at the 1840 N ew York convention, published in
the Colored American and likely read by Boston's black leaders, Austin
Stewart neatly sum m arized this by asserting "We do regard the right of our

289 Kimberle W illiams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrim ination Law," Harvard Law Reviezv 101 (May, 1988) 1331-1387,
1367; Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, v. 1, 21.
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birthdom, our service in behalf of the country, contributing to its importance,
an developing its resources" as sufficient reason to consider African
Americans as worthy of suffrage. But Stewart predicated the right to vote on
"still higher ground" — the "certain peculiar rights" belonging to any being
"found endow ed w ith the ligh t of reason." H um an nature provided the
foundation and legitim ation for rights, and the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution represented the ultimate expression of "natural and
indestructible principles o f man," designed to secure "the purest liberty G od
ever conferred" upon a p eop le.290
Making rights rhetoric the heart of the argum ent for full equality and
opportunity was "a w ay o f saying that a society... ought to live up to its
deepest commitments." The complicating factor becom es the limits of using
rights to achieve the desired goals. Crenshaw notes that "demands for change
that do not reflect the institutional logic — that is, dem ands that do not engage
and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology — w ill probably be
ineffective." Because African Americans shared m any of the same goals and
ideals of other Americans, m ost had little desire to effect radical change that
threatened established institutions (other than slavery) or to challenge an
ideology that placed the Constitution and the law as a primary agent of
change.291

290 Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, v. 1, 21-22.
291 Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment," 1365-66; Proceedings of the Black State
Conventions, vol. 1, 21-22. For argum ents similar to Crenshaw's regarding the how the need to
legitim ate law and legal id eology works both to maintain hegem ony w hile also exposing it to
challenges, see Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law" in Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (N ew York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 364; E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black A ct (N ew York, Pantheon
Books, 1975).
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Kimberle Crenshaw's insights on the possibilities and limitations of
twentieth-century civil rights protesters' use of rights rhetoric are directly
relevant in discussing antebellum black activists. Like their twentiethcentury successors, black leaders made claims framed in language of rights
rhetoric that Americans of all ranks w ould recognize. Their claims "reflected
American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology." By talking about
legal rights, African Americans in both centuries "exposed a series of
contradictions," primarily the contradiction between Constitutional promises
of citizenship and its attendant privileges, and the systematic denial of those
privileges through the practice of racial subordination. But African
Americans, beginning in the antebellum era, advanced arguments "as if
American citizenship w ere real, and demanded to exercise the 'rights' that
citizenship entailed." This represented an attempt "to restructure reality to
reflect American m ythology," a m ythology that presum ed rights undergirded
all social and political equality, and would also open the doors to economic
opportunity. Obtaining full exercise of rights w ould supposedly make reality
fit the m ythology.292
Crenshaw points ou t that it is the need of the dom inant order "to
maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups w ith the opportunity to
wrest concessions" from that order, but at the same time, "it is the very
accomplishment of legitim acy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, the
potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation." Though the
kind of change Crenshaw speaks of is primarily legal and political in nature,
her conclusions can be applied to the construction of identity. The
'institutional logic' of legal rights ideology shaped African American identity.

292 Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment," 1367-1368.
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By using the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to legitim ate
their citizenship, African Americans m ad e that legal rights id eo lo g y an
integral part of their identity.293
Incorporating a legal rights id eo lo g y into a free black identity m ay have
foreclosed more radical alternatives, su ch as a 'classical' black nationalism .
W ilson Jeremiah M oses defines classical black nationalism as "the effort of
African Americans to create a sovereign nation-state and form ulate an
ideological basis for a concept of a national culture." African Am ericans w ho
supported establishing a black republic through colonization, w hether in w est
Africa, Canada, or other parts of the Am ericas, were classical black
nationalists. The m ovem ent to create a black republic revived shortly before
the Civil War, but never received broad support in black com m unities.
Undercutting classical black nationalism in the antebellum era w as an
African American identity that articulated a vigorous claim to Am erican
citizenship based o n the birth-right and the Constitution. Part o f living out
that identity w as fighting for full citizenship rights.294
Writing from Boston in 1855, W illiam C. Nell called African
Americans the "Patriots of the Second Revolution." H is label neatly
encapsulated African Americans' revolutionary heritage, as w e ll as their
continuing duty to pursue change. T hough the committment to seeing the
fulfillment of the prom ises of the C onstitution weakened the potential of a
classical black nationalism , fighting for individual and group rights did create
potential for change. In the decades before the Civil War, African Americans
and their w hite allies managed to strike d ow n racist practices in

293 Ibid.
294 Moses, Classical Black Nationalism, 2.
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Massachusetts that segregated rail cars and schools. Fighting for rights also
became part of w hat it m eant to be African Am erican.295
While free blacks' u se of a legal rights id eology may have lim ited som e
potential for change, the historical context is crucial: few alternatives existed
for African Americans. The law and rights rhetoric offered one of the few
possibilities for change, as w ell as some ability to exercise control over their
ow n lives in an era of steadily deteriorating conditions. For m ost free people
o f color, em igration or the establishment of a classical black nationalism w as
beyond their means, and, m ore importantly, b eyon d their desire. T hough the
choices free people o f color had available to them w ere limited, the elem ents
of choice and agency rem ain important. African Americans were not
ignorant of other possibilities such as emigration. But they consciously
conceived of them selves as Americans w ith a legitim ate claim to citizenship,
and they asserted that claim during a time w h en proslavery forces and w hite
colonization advocates challenged their right to even be considered citizens.
Protecting that basic right w as crucial in the daily lives of many ordinary
African Americans. Black Bostonians w ho exercised their rights to u se the
law and the courts in a variety of ways w ould have suffered had they, unlike
their enslaved southern brethren, not experienced the guarantees of the fifth
through the eighth am endm ents or been unable to execute writs of habaes
corpus. A letter written by a black man to The Liberator pointed to the

consequence of slaves b ein g unprotected by the Constitution:
295 W illiam C. Nell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with Sketches of
several Distinguished Colored Persons: to which is added a Brief Survey of the Condition and
Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: 1855), 380. Reprinted by A m o Press and the N e w York
Times, 1968; on the efforts to end segregation in Boston, see Levesque, Black Boston, 149-152 and
165-229; James Oliver H orton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and
Community Struggle in the Antebellum North (N ew York: H olm es and Meier, 1979), 67-76; Jim
Crow in Boston: The Origin o f the Separate but Equal Doctrine, ed. Leonard W. Levy and
Douglas L. Jones (N ew York: D a Capo Press, 1974.)
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"they are not permitted to testify against a white criminal, in courts of justice;
consequently, their persons, property, and lives are at the m ercy of every
w hite ruffian, thief or murderer. The question, therefore, should be quickly
settled, whether free colored persons, bom or naturalized in this country, are
not American citizens, and justly entitled to all the rights, privileges and
im m unities of citizens of the several states; and w hether the Constitution of
the United States makes or authorises any invidious distinction with regard
to the color or condition of free inhabitants."
A few years ealier, a report in Freedom's Journal pointed out injustice in the
W est Indies when a slave m anaged to publicly identify his assailant shortly
before he died from the injuries. The slave's testim ony, how ever, had no
legal standing and his murderer w as allowed to go free. The living testim ony
of the denial of citizenship and legal recognition to m illions of slaves
remained continually before free people of color.296

African Americans had m oved from bleakly acute cries of "No
Country!" to compellingly resolute declarations of "Our Country!" Vincent
H arding notes that one of the "essential questions" — perhaps the first and
forem ost one for African Americans in the early republic — raised by the
black freedom m ovem ent w as focused on the Preamble: "Who were 'w e the
People of the United States'?" Like Maria Stewart, w h o proclaimed herself a
"true b o m American," m ost black w om en and m en had no doubt in their
o w n m inds that they did indeed belong in that equation. The challenge was
296 The Liberator, January 15, 1831; Freedom's Journal, September 14, 1827. On the antebellum
environm ent for African Americans, see Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of
Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1988);
Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1981);
Shane White, " 'We Dw ell in Safety and Pursue Our Honest Callings': Free Blacks in N ew
York City, 1783-1810," Journal of American History 75 (September, 1988), 445.
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making American social and legal institutions recognize what African
Americans already knew .297
But because rights and fighting for rights became an integral part of
African American identity, many black m en and wom en could brook no
lassitude on the part of other free blacks regarding any issue concerning
rights. Those w h o appeared to shirk from the battle became the target of
withering criticism, as they were perceived as betraying what it m eant to be
African American. During the 1840s and 1850s, black Bostonians becam e
embroiled in an acrimonious dispute over whether to support the closure of
Boston's black schools in favor of integration w ith the white schools.
Differing interpretations developed over w h at it meant to be black and a
citizen, and to so m e extent, the depth of feeling that surfaced in this debate
resulted directly from the incorporation of legal rights ideology w ithin free
black identity.

297 Harding, "Wrestling Toward the Dawn," 721.
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Chapter Five

The Elusive Boundaries of Blackness: Identity Formation in Antebellum Boston

African Americans'’ vigorous defence of free people of color as Am erican
citizens in the first half of the nineteenth century left little room for calm
disagreem ent within the black community w h en issu es concerning the exercise
of rights w ere at hand. The stakes were high. In the estimation of m any black
leaders, the present welfare and future prosperity of all blacks hinged on their
ability to protect the rights they had and to gain the rights they did not have.
Though there was broad agreem ent among black Bostonians that rights w ere
crucial, there was not alw ays consensus on the best strategies for accom plishing
those goals. Dissent felt like betrayal.
D uring the 1840s the question of whether or not to push Boston's School
Com m ittee to allow African American students into the public schools and close
the tax-supported black schools brought dissension to the forefront. Black leaders
pushed hard for integration, because they believed their childrens' education
w ou ld im prove, and because it w as their responsibility as African Am ericans to
fight for equal rights. They ran headlong into a divisive dispute. The conflict
exposed deep personal sentim ents that reflected different perspectives am ong
black Bostonians concerning the future of the black community, w hat citizenship
in the republic meant, and h o w citizenship ought to be w ielded in protecting and
prom oting black interests. The dispute, at times quite acrimonious,
dem onstrated the extent to w h ich black identity w as contested ground in the
urban antebellum north. A n im age of black identity emerged with a relatively
stable core but uncertain boundaries. Stability existed in a consensus that African
218
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Am ericans were citizens and had little desire to be defined as anything other
than American. But the rancorous discussion betw een the tw o groups blurred
the boundaries of identity. The integrationists attem pted to include
com m itm ent to making equal rights a reality as quickly as possible as a part of
w hat it m eant to be black and American. The separatist-m inded blacks argued
that there were limits to w hat could be realistically expected, and that part of
being a citizen was the right to w ithdraw from interacting w ith whites on certain
issues and pursue their ow n course. For them, being African American w as
sim ply that: an African heritage, and an American citizenship. What each black
w om an or man made of their citizenship did not detract from w hat it m eant to
be black and American.
U sing a tactic at times still em ployed in public disputes today, the
integrationists, who counted m ost of Boston's prom inent African Americans
am ong their ranks, attempted to define their black opponents as standing outside
the black community. M eanwhile, their opponents, w h o com posed a substantial
m inority of the black com m unity that wanted to m aintain the city's black
schools, exercised a broader conception of black identity. They appealed to
com m on experience and to the prejudice every African Am erican faced. Led by
Thomas Paul Smith, John H. Roberts, and Alexander Taylor, the minority
faction prom pted the more prom inent integrationists to am plify the importance
of the school issue by placing it in the context o f a national struggle for rights and
the future of black Americans.

In the m inds of the integrationists, racial barriers

had to fall before African Americans could truly be full citizens. Reaching that
goal dem anded that black citizens challenge those barriers at every turn; to do
less constituted a betrayal of present and future generations. The minority
'separatist' faction, however, conceived of citizenship as the right to be left alone
by w hites and thus avoid an im placable racism w h en possible.
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D uring the night of September 17th, 1849, Boston's sixth w ard w itnessed a
palpable expression of how deep feelings ran. Earlier in the day the Smith
School, Boston's public school m aintained exclusively for blacks, h ad reopened
after being briefly closed by the integrationist faction.298 John T. H ilton, William
C. Nell and other integrationist leaders called a meeting of colored citizens at the
Belknap Street church, adjacent to the Smith School, in order to "deepen
impressions already made, and animate [the audience] w ith increased zeal and
determination" in their opposition to the opening of the school.299 The
integrationists had already decided that until the School Com m ittee relented and
permitted integrated public schools, they w ou ld close the Smith School and
establish a fund to pay private school tuition. A substantial number of black
Bostonians, how ever, not only w anted the school to remain open for the time
being, but opp osed integrated schools altogether. Many of them attended the
m eeting that night.
The integrationists' leaders took center stage, seeking to harden the
resolve of their supporters. They characterized Thomas Paul Smith, a leader of
those opposed to integration, as "unworthy [of] their confidence or respect".
Smith's supporters refused to stay quiet. The abolitionist newspaper, The
Liberator, reported that some separatists "stationed them selves near the door,

and, observing the cue of their leaders, persevered in disturbing the m eeting by
hisses, and various other demonstrations." The integrationists attem pted to

298 The Smith School gained its name from a w hite benefactor, Abel Smith, w ho established a
trust as part of his w ill that provided for continued maintenance of the school. The school for
black children had originally been established in 1808 by the black community because they
feared not only lack of equal treatment for their children in the white schools, but also outright
hostility. This w as used during the 1840s and 50s by the white pro-segregation majority of the
school committee as a rationale for continuing the maintenance of an exclusively black school.
299 The Liberator, Sept. 21, 1849. The Boston Daily Journal of Sept. 18, 1849 also reported that
the meeting w as held by the integrationist faction w ho wanted the Smith School shut dow n.
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retain control of the m eeting by instructing the audience to ignore the
disturbances, but, having already been spurred on by John T. Hilton, W illiam
Cooper Nell, Henry W eeden, and other leaders of the integration faction,
em otions were running high. Individual m em bers of the audience "attem pted
to secure order"— likely a euphem ism for attem pting to shove the opposition out
of the building— "and on the rioters retreating from the building, were
immediately assailed by a volley of stones and other missiles, w hich [were]
preserved as trophies o f the prowess of those w h o resort to such m ethods".300
The Boston D aily Journal reported that after the m eeting had begun, the
integrationists "were disturbed by the appearance of a number of the friends of
[the school]. A large crow d collected, and m issiles of all sorts were used, breaking
the w indow s of the church and bruising several persons." The m elee cam e to an
end only w hen the police arrived on the scene.301 By this account, w hich seem s
consistent w ith the pattern of other meetings both before and after the riot, the
black integrationist leadership intended the m eeting to be for colored citizens
w ho shared their view point. A year earlier, Thomas Paul Smith had protested
this very tactic. A m eeting supposedly called to discuss pushing Boston's school
committee for a n ew teacher, better physical conditions, and a cessation o f the
"strange management, the very peculiar system s and policy" of the School's
w hite principal turned into a call for the abolition of the school. Smith
complained that a com m ittee, w ith B. F. Roberts as chairman, w as appointed,
"was out from three to five minutes, w hen Mr. Roberts re-entered, and the

300 Ibid.
301 See the Boston Daily Journal, Boston Traveler, and the Boston Evening Transcript o f
September 18,1849. N one o f the papers I surveyed gave prominent notice of the incident, giving
it on average about ten lines of one column. The Evening Transcript cast it in a derogatory light
by commenting that the question at the end of the riot becam e "Who throw'd de last brickbat?"

221

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

audience w as thunderstruck b y the announcem ent of a string of resolutions he
had som etim e previously written, referring exclusively to the abolition of the
school. N o debate had been intended. Nevertheless, a "protracted and warm
discussion" ensued, after w hich the resolutions passed b y a small majority. In
the published account, Roberts described the support for the resolution as
unanim ous. Both m en had an agenda, making it difficult to ascertain the truth;
but the black integrationists d id on other occasions publicly claim unaminity on
the issue am ong black Bostonians w h en that clearly w as n ot the case.302
The threat of violence had apparently been running throughout the day;
som e black youths sprung an im prom ptu boycott intended to keep black children
from entering the school on the m orning it opened for the fall term. Police
broke up the boycott, but the num ber of students registering fell from the
previous spring's 67 to only 23, though the number of students eventually
increased to som ewhere betw een 40 and 53 later in the fall and to 60 the
follow in g winter.303 Though no violence followed, the w ou n d s did not fade

303 Attendance figures contained in the loose papers of the Boston School Committee records,
folders #1, 6, and 26 of the box covering 1849 (BPL); and from the Postscript o f the Report of a
Special Committee of the Grammar School Board, Presented August 29, 1849, on the Petition of
Sundry Colored Persons, Praying for the Abolition of the Smith School: xuith an Appendix
(Boston: J.H. Eastburn, City Printer, 1849), 70. This report, along with the minority report of
those that favored granting the petition to desegregate the schools, and the majority and
minority reports from 1846, are reprinted in fim Crow in Boston: The Origin of the Separate but
Equal Doctrine, edited by Leonard W. Levy and Douglas L. Jones (N ew York: Da Capo Press,
1974). The Committee's report, w hich added the postscript after the school opened, depicted
the youths' boycott negatively. A m ore positive account is given in John Daniels, In Freedom's
Birthplace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), 448. James O. Horton notes that the
boycotters "were well organized, holding frequent meetings which provided mutual support and
communication." Though the integrationists d o appear to have been organized as far as support
and communication, their political and legal strategy did not have the sam e degree of
organization; the boycott, for instance, apparently was not planned o u t w ell ahead of time.
Horton's source for his conclusion is Carleton Mabee's Black Freedom (N e w York: The
MacMillan Company, 1970). Mabee, aside from not consistently docum enting his sources, does
not give a picture of a well-thought o u t strategy of boycotts combined w ith legal action. I
suspect the integrationists' strategy, like that o f their twentieth-century successors, was
frequently borne out of the needs o f the m om ent. For Horton's description, see James Oliver
Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the
Antebellum North (N ew York: H olm es and Meier, 1979), 74. For an exam ination of how
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away; a year later black Bostonians opposed to keeping an all-black public school
open declared that "our motto has been, n o w is, and ever shall be, 'N o
fellowship w ith the exclusive school system , its teachers or supporters."304
This riotous confrontation and sim m ering resentment betw een the
colored citizens o f Boston sounds a discordant note in the relatively harm onious
symphony of like-m indedness generally attributed to antebellum African
Americans. H istorians of black America su ch as Herbert Gutman, Eugene
Genovese, Gary N ash, and Sterling Stuckey, have described a com m on
experience and culture and a similarity in w orld view for both slave and free
blacks that indicates the existence of a shared identity, forged in the crucible of
slavery and hardening racial ideologies. Stuckey has shown, for example, that
the experience of slavery and racism w as central in eradicating cultural, social,
religious, and political differences am ong Airican slaves and that it stim ulated a
resilient African Am erican culture. Gary N a sh describes how steadily
intensifying racism further solidified Philadelphia's black comm unity in the
early republic era. W hile these seminal w orks have been invaluable
contributions in revealing a complex process, there is a danger in assum ing that
this is the end of the story for African Am erican identity formation and m issing
the significance o f difference and division am ong African Americans.305

twentieth-century strategies against discrimination evolved , see Stephen L. Wasby, Race
Relations Litigation in an Age of Complexity, (C harlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1995) and Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 19251950, (Chapel Hill: U niversity of North Carolina Press, 1987).
304 The Liberator, A u gu st 15, 1850.
305 Eugene G enovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage
Books, 1972); Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom 1750-1925 (N ew
York: Vintage Books, 1976); Gary B. Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's
Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity Press, 1988); Sterling Stuckey,
Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America (N ew York: Oxford
University Press, 1987).
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Their arguments and others fit into Kenneth Kusmer's delineation of
three primary forces shaping the black urban experience. Along with the
"fundamentally nonradal" structural forces such as econom ic trends, Kusmer
explains the other tw o as external forces— the attitude and behavior of whites
towards blacks— and internal forces, or "how black urban dwellers have
responded to their circumstances, either through the retention or creation of
cultural values or institutions.... [and] the attitude of blacks towards whites, and
the behavior that results from such attitudes."306
Yet attitudes and behaviors of free blacks to each other is a central but
often overlooked fourth elem ent that shaped black identity as well as black urban
experience. Other historians have taken note of the Sm ith School dispute; non e,
however, have examined what it says about the ongoing construction of black
identity and the attendant tensions.307 While the responses of black urbanites to
each other did not act independently of the three forces Kusmer describes, this
neglected fourth element frequently manifested itself m ore overtly than any
other in the daily experience of black urbanites. Structural forces were often not
im m ediately tangible and the retention of cultural values and institutions could
at times also be a long-term and abstract process; black urbanites' responses
towards one another were typically concrete and im m ediate, especially when
priorities clashed.
Emancipation presented black Americans w ith different sets of choices.
Several im portant studies have demonstrated that free blacks in the early

306 Kenneth Kusmer, "The Black Urban Experience in American History," in The State of AfroAmerican History: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Darlene Clark H ine (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1986), 105.
307 For a thorough narrative see George A. Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and
Culture in Urban America, 1750-1860 (N ew York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 165-230; for
another brief commentary see Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians (N ew York: Holmes and
Meier, 1979), 70-76.
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republic responded to freedom by establishing comm unities, creating
institutions, and m aintaining a significant degree of cultural continuity.308 But
little has been done to explore either h o w freedom complicated m atters of
identity, or the potential conflicts freedom presented as black m en and w om en
attempted to gain control of their im m ediate and future circum stances in
different w ays, form ed different priorities, and pursued a variety o f goals. With
freedom came the incorporation of a legal rights ideology, but n o t necessarily a
consensus on strategies to protect and pursue equal rights.
In Thirteen W ays o f Looking at a Black M an , Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
explores, am ong other things, the abiding com plexity of w h at it m eans to be black
in m odem America. Pulling no punches, Gates lays bare som e m arkedly
different and at tim es oppositional perspectives held by a handful of notable
black men. W restling w ith black identity is nothing new for African Americans;
the men Gates profiles are dealing w ith issu es that have deep historical roots.309
Nor has the process o f defining particular individual African Am ericans as
anathema to black identity ceased— Clarence Thomas, for instance, is frequently
censured in public discourse because of his political and social stances, thereby
placing him ou tsid e the black com m unity. Precious little, how ever, in the
historiography of pre-Civil War America has bothered w ith the lo n g struggle of
black Americans for self-definition. The dispute over m aintaining a separate

308 See Gary N ash, Forging Freedom: The Formation o f Philadelphia's Black Community,
1720-1840, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Robert J. Cottrell, Afro-Yankees:
Providence's Black Community in the Antebellum Era (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982);
Horton and H orton, Black Bostonians ; James O. Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African
American Community (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Shane W hite,
Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810 (Athens:
University of G eorgia Press, 1991) and " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Am ericans, Festivals,
and Parades in the North, 1741 - 1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1984), 13-50.
309 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man (N ew York: Random
House, 1997).
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school for black children in Boston w as n ot the first manifestation. But because
it dealt with tw o issu es close to the heart o f an oppressed people — the im m ediate
well-being of their children and how to shape a better future — it crystallized
som e aspects of the diversity in thinking am ong black Bostonians concerning
w hat it meant to be black in America.

Ironically, the Smith school had been originally established because in
1787 the state governm ent, and in 1798 tow n of Boston, had turned d ow n
requests from its black citizens for a separate school. On both occasions, the
explanation given w as a lack of funds. After several years of conducting a school
based in private residences, a school for black children was held on the bottom
floor of the town's first black church in 1806. Abiel Smith w as one o f several
w hite philanthropists w h o funded the school, and in 1815 the tow n began
contributing $200 tow ards the annual budget, w ith the children's parents paying
the other $300. T w o other small primary schools for black children w ere also
eventually opened b y the city, though these schools did not becom e a focal point
during the fight over integration. A t the tim e, the city's financial support w as no
doubt a boon and taken as a hopeful sign by black parents. Ultim ately, however,
it gave the city grounds to exercise its authority in matters such as hiring and
firing of teachers and headmasters, and, m ore significantly, enabled the w hite
school committee to refuse to close the school and thereby maintain a segregated
system .310 The loss o f control over the Sm ith school, a school founded at the
request of Boston's African American com m unity, resulted in the school
becoming a m agnet for com m unity dissension.

310 George Levesque, Black Boston, 165-180; Horton, Black Bostonians, 70-72.
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The first hints of a sp lit among African Am ericans in Boston over the
importance of having an exclusively black school surfaced several years before
the issue became inflammatory. In 1843, The Liberator reported that a m eeting
of colored citizens in Boston passed a resolution disputing allegations that som e
of the "colored people, as a body, do not approve and support the efforts which
the friends of equal rights have made" regarding school integration. It w as
probably true that few black Bostonians actively opposed integrated schools. But
it was probably also true that som e members of the black community resisted any
m ove to shut dow n the Smith School. Early on in the dispute, som e of the black
community's leaders sought to marginalize m em bers of the rank-and-file w ho
held differing view points by denying the existence any differing view points. Six
years later, it was apparent they had not succeeded; nevertheless, black
integrationists proved unrelenting in their efforts to both castigate the w hite
school committee and w eaken their black opponents.311
The integrationists ratcheted up the stakes by tying the issue of integration
and their opponents' support of the Smith School to 'blackness'-- in other words,
to questions of identity. Tw o months previous to the riot, a group of
integrationists m et and unanim ously passed a series of resolutions that w ere
ostensibly directed at w hite Bostonians, particularly those in position to
influence the school com m ittee that w ould ultim ately decide the matter. The
resolutions laid dow n the gauntlet within the black community. They resolved
that the Smith School, "being a caste, an exclusive school, [is] a GREAT PUBLIC
NUISANCE, which should be im m ediately annihilated....we will not regard w ith
confidence, any contrivance to quiet our efforts in relation to its abolition....it is

311 The Liberator, Feb. 10, 1843.
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our hope, that no individual w ho is identified w ith us in complexion, w ill suffer
him self to be used as a TOOL, to prolong the existence of that school."312
The emotional and symbolic w eigh t of the terms used are telling and
proved to be the beginning of a charged and acrimonious dispute. The rhetoric
held a certain militancy- 'annihilating7 the school- and calling for its abolition
carried undertones of the larger struggle for freedom. But more importantly in
considering w hat it meant for black identity is the phrase "those w ho w ould be
identified w ith us by complexion." This loaded phrase w ou ld be used repeatedly
in the days and months to come. The subtext was an acknowledgm ent that
w hile all blacks were identified as one group by whites, for black integrationists,
to be 'identified7 with them by virtue of 'com plexion7 w as not enough. The
im plication w as that regardless of the m eans by w hich w hites arrived at a
definition of w ho was a member of the black community, being black meant
som ething more than having a sable hue. The integrationists defined 'blackness7
w ith greater sophistication and com plexity than their w hite neighbors.
This stem m ed in part from an ongoing attempt by black Bostonians to
redefine, or at least to complicate, h o w Americans conceptualized race. 'Race7
w as by n o m eans a fixed and concrete concept; historian D avid Roediger's
evidence revealing the construction of w hiteness indicates just how diverse and
fluid racial ideologies remained in m id-nineteenth century America. While for
som e w h ites racial ideologies were already well established, others expressed
uncertainty and ambivalence. Roediger notes that som e w hites grew less
tolerant and more openly hostile to African Americans7 public gatherings in
northern cities during the 1830s; yet in September of 1850 a company of black
soldiers received a warm response from N e w York City crowds during a

312 The Liberator, August 10, 1849. In this chapter all emphases in quotes from primary sources,
such as capitalization and use of italics, are original and not added unless otherwise noted.
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precision march in full dress. The effort m ounted by the Boston School
Com m ittee to m aintain segregated schools also evinces am bivalence towards
race. In 1846 the committee's report im plied that the African 'race' had som e
innate inferiority, w h ile the 1849 com m ittee, after hearing Thom as Paul Smith's
eloquent defense of the Smith School, stated that if Smith "be taken as fair type
of the African intellect, the question of organic differences in the capacities of the
tw o races could no longer be seriously entertained." The point here is not to
dispute the w eight of historical scholarship that argues for a hardening of racial
oppression in the urban north. But the response of the N e w York City crowd
and the am bivalence of Boston's school com m ittee suggests that racial
oppression and racist ideologies were n ot absolute, uniform, or universal,
especially in a society and culture that w as still groping for a firm understanding
of exactly w hat race w as and where the boundaries lay.313
Black Bostonians attempted to exploit that uncertainty. They repeatedly
argued that the issue w as not race, but com plexion. Successful several years
earlier in eradicating Jim Crow law s from public transportation in Massachusetts,
pushing for the acceptance of black m en into M assachusetts m ilitias, and fighting
to end segregated units in the national military, black integrationists consistently
referred to the difference between black Americans and w hite Am ericans as one
of com plexion, not race. In a petition o n the militia issue, they introduced
them selves as the "acknowledged citizens of this Com m onwealth,
(notw ithstanding their complexional differences)". By the m iddle o f the
nineteenth century, 'complexion' and 'colored' were com m on self-designations
w hile 'black', 'African', or 'race' became less frequent. W illiam C. N ell even

313 D avid Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working
Class (N ew York: Verso, 1991), 115-132; The Liberator, October 4, 1850; Report of a Special
Committee o f the Grammar School Board,48.
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referred to prejudice and racism as 'colorphobia'.314 This was a marked change
from earlier in the nin eteen th century.
The choice o f term s, combined w ith their efforts and rhetoric, indicates
that African A m ericans d id not accept the social construct of race as im m utable
or fixed in antebellum northern society. The School Committee's majority
report in 1846, w h ich rejected the black integrationists' petition to open u p all of
Boston's public schools to black children, recognized that the integrationists'
language and argum ent represented a threat to the existing racial hierarchy. The
stakes were higher than allow ing black children in previously w hite schools;
underlying the challenge to segregation w as a discourse about how a society
delineated and m aintained boundaries. O ccasionally, this subtext rose to the
surface. N oting that the integrationists had "so often and so confidently asserted,
that the principle, o n w h ich the separate schools for colored children are
maintained, is that o f com plexion, merely", the com m ittee took issue w ith the
public being told "over and over, that a darker or lighter colored skin, is m ade
the ground of separating children." Reacting to the persistent "taunt that it
m ight be difficult to decid e on the requisite degree of ebony which a child's
pigm ent m ust p ossess, in order to entitle him to the distinction of a colored
child", the School C om m ittee emphatically stated that color or com plexion was
"not the ground o f distinction" for determ ining whether a child was to g o to a

black or w hite school. The boundary was established and maintained o n the
grounds of "races, n o t of colors." And race w as not a categorization subject to the
caprice of men; it w a s established by God, and "founded deep in the physical,

314 William C. N ell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with sketches of
several Distinguished Colored Persons: to which is added a brief survey of the Condition and
Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: Robert F. Wallcut, 1855; reprint, A m o Press and the
N ew York Times, 1968), 107-114. N ell and other black leaders also used the term 'colorphobia'
in various issues of The Liberator.
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mental, and moral natures o f the tw o races" and "no legislation, no social
customs, can efface this distinction."315 Exhibiting strains of a romantic racialism
that view ed every race as innately endow ed w ith distinct talents, the majority
report argued that "amalgamation is degradation" for both races since it
threatened the "genuine virtues" peculiar to each race.316 The report concluded
by emphasizing the w hite com m ittee's racial conception, describing the students
as "colored children, or the descendants of the African race" w hose unique
educational needs due to their race — needs the comm ittee outlined as an
inferior ability to use "faculties of invention, comparison, and reasoning" —
m andated separate schools.317 The school committee's argum ent may have also
been an example of Kenneth Kusmer's external forces on the black urban
experience. Most w hites defined blackness as being determ ined by one variable,
race. That attitude of w hites towards blacks likely contributed to many free blacks
formulating a similar construction of their ow n identity as being primarily
determined by what passed for an antebellum understanding of race. But for
African Americans, that w as not the only determining factor in defining what
m ade one part of the black com m unity. Other variables entered into the
equation, in part because race itself w as not a fixed concept in American society.

315 Report to the Primary School Committee, June 15, 1846 on the Petition of Sundry Colored
Persons, for the Abolition of the Schools for Colored Children, With the C ity Solicitor's
Opinion, Documents of the City o f Boston for the year 1846 (Boston 1846), 7. A lso Reprinted in
Levy, Jim Crow in Boston.
316 Ibid., 13. On the increased acceptance of a romantic racialism, see George M. Fredrickson,
The Black Image in the White M ind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny,
1817-1914, (N ew York: Harper & Row, 1971), "Uncle Tom and the Anglo-Saxons: Romantic
Racialism in the North," 97-129.
317 Report to the Primary School Committee, June 15, 1846, 27-29. The report allowed that
black students were equal in som e areas: "colored children will often keep pace with the white
children" in "those parts of study and instruction in which progress depends on memory, or on
the im itative faculties."
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Even the school committee d od ged the m ore elusive question, h ow race was
determined, though they im plied that com plexion w as the primary means.
Shortly after the School Com m ittee rejected the petition for integration,
The Liberator printed a rejoinder. Though the writer m ay have been white, the

thinking w as consistent w ith the argum ents of the black integrationists. If
segregation was truly based on race and not color, asked the writer, "why not
have separate schools for the genuine Celtic Irish, w ho are as distinct a race from
the Anglo-Saxon as the native Africans?" These Irish had "physical peculiarities
alm ost as marked" along w ith a distinct language and therefore, according to the
logic of the school committee, represented a greater risk to erode the /peculiar
virtues' of the white race. Since the school authorities condoned Irish children
in any public school except the black schools, the determining factor w as
obviously complexion, not race. The resolutions the black integrationists passed
during a meeting in July of 1849 m ade a similar argument, noting that
"foreigners of all kinds... w ho are w hite, are not rejected."318
N ot only were w hite foreigners admitted into the public schools, they
were aggressively assimilated. In 1851, German immigrants — som e o f whom
lived on the same streets as Boston's black citizens — petitioned the school
committee for a separate school in w hich their children could receive
instruction in German. The com m ittee refused their request on the grounds
that "it is the English language that the Germans m ust know a n d ... they
should begin as early as possible to learn the national characteristic and the
peculiar developm ent in hum an nature of those, w ith w hom they are to be
associated in life." Being educated in schools "German in their character"
w ou ld only serve to place their children at a disadvantage. Ironically, the
committee revealed its large racial blindspot by noting that "there are many
318 The Liberator, August 21,1846; A u gust 10, 1849.
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classes in our com m unity who desire separate schools, for various reasons
which they think sufficient" and warned against setting a precedent,
apparently for other ethnic groups. African Americans were clearly in a
completely different category, so m aintaining a separate school for black
children did n o t set a precedent, since the reasons for separation were based
on innate racial differences. The com m ittee's greatest concern w as that a
separate German school, or other ethnic schools, w ould tend to "continue the
German elem ent & dispense w ith the American." This expression of
nativism, typical for the era, pushed im m igrants to forsake or at least
m inim ize their cultural heritage and m ove towards becom ing Am erican in
character as w ell as in legal standing.319
Schools, said the committee, w ere "designed by our lawgivers, to make
American citizens - to furnish the best education for this purpose & for no
other." Education benefited society as a w h ole and served "as a powerful
instrument in support of the political institutions of our governm ent."320 This
explains another facet for the school com m ittee's unwavering opposition to
permitting black children into the all-w hite public schools: African Americans
were not desirable citizens, thus negating a key purpose of education. Black
Bostonians, both the integrationists and the separatists, resisted this definition by
defining them selves as Americans and as citizens. The integrationists attacked

319 From the loose papers of the Boston School committee, box covering 1850 (BPL), contains a
list of children by ward and street. The German immigrants' petition and the comm ittee's
response is in the box covering 1851-1852. On antebellum nativism, see Eric Foner, Free Soil,
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (N ew York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), 226-260; on nativism during and after the Civil War, see John
Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (N ew Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1955).
320 From the response o f the school committee, in the loose papers of the Boston School
committee, box covering 1851-1852 (BPL).
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the committee's thinking from another vantage point by attempting to exploit
the uncertain boundaries of antebellum racial conceptions.
This tactic h ad som e moderate success. Sixteen members of the school
committee, com p osing the minority w ho supported the integrationists, adopted
the integrationists' argument. The public schools, they argued, rested upon a
constitutional principle that "all men are b o m free and equal." This principle
had been established w ith the Puritans and m ade law by the Constitution.
Therefore, any exclu sive schools m ust be m ade "upon some distinction,
recognized by the law s of God and man, stronger than the distinctions of birth
and origin, of religious or political faith, of w ealth or poverty, of social condition
and standing. It m u st be upon a distinction founded in the constitution and the
laws." But the majority of the committee had m ade "color, and color alone" the
only distinction. W hile the white minority d id go so far as to argue that races did
not exist — a position black integrationists did not subscribe to either — their
language echoed that of the black leaders.321
Other w hites sympathetic to African Am erican integrationists also
adopted the tactic o f questioning the legitim acy of race as a determining factor,
underlining the potential threat to established racial boundaries. Responding to
the school com m ittee's 1849 decision upholding segregation, a committee from
the First W esleyan Church of Boston wrote that since
the children o f all foreigners— many of w h om are rude in manners,
and corrupting to good order, are freely and w ithout question
admitted to all the schools, w e m ust feel the exclusion of the children
of native Am ericans, whose industry and love of order contribute to
the w ealth and peace of the city—w h ose forefathers bled for the
country's freedom; and who are equally taxed for the support of
schools; ... is a m ost unjustifiable and every w ay dangerous
distinction.322

321 From the m inority report contained in Levy, Jim Crcnv in Boston, 5-7.
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This protest also reflected the growing sentim ent against immigrants and
Catholics that w ould h elp catapult the K now-N othings to pow er in
Massachusetts. In Boston, w ith a growing influx of Irish Catholics, Republicans
and Know-Nothings v oiced fears that the absolutism they saw represented in
Catholic traditions w o u ld undermine liberty. The opp osition of many Irish to
anti-slavery merely fu eled Republican and K now -N othing rhetoric, which
stressed Am ericanization.323 Black integrationists exploited this tension by
arguing that African Am ericans had long inculcated American concepts of
liberty; indeed, argued the integrationists, some of their ancestors had fought in
the Revolution. Furthermore, the push for the right to be able to have black
children go to the schools in their own neighborhoods had everything to do w ith
seeking liberty; if anything, it was the school com m ittee w h o represented a threat
to liberty. By m elding claim s to an American identity w ith a critique of the
school committtee's rationale that made 'com plexional distinctions' the basis for
segregation, the integrationists questioned the validity of northern society's racial
conceptions.
Black and w hite arguments for integration that challenged the uncertain
yet dominant racial conceptions failed to make any h ead w ay with the majority of
the school committee. This did not deter Boston's black activists from
continuing their attem pt to m ove the focal point of the argument to the more
subjective and slippery ground of skin color. The resolutions passed in the July,
1849 m eeting stated again that some of Boston's children "are refused common
school privileges, solely on account on complexion."

A n 1851 broadside

322 Letter from the First W esleyan Church to the Boston School Com m ittee, December, 1849.
Contained in the loose papers o f the Boston School Committee records, folder #26 of the box
covering 1849 (BPL).
323 Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 228-231.
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addressed to the state legislature repeated the charge that "citizens of Boston,
have for a num ber of years been deprived from the enjoym ent of our rights...on
account of complexion."324
Dom inick LaCapra, describing the difficulty of w riting about race, notes
that "it is decidedly difficult to overcome the tendency to privilege whiteness as
the master-text— the valorized and often unmarked center of reference— and to
identify the nonwhite as 'other7 or 7different/ " In a sense, by trying to make Irish
immigrants an 'other7, and b y persistently talking about com plexion— which,
because of m iscegenation, varied greatly— the integrationists w ere attempting to
rewrite the 'master-text7 by m uddling the already uncertain concept of race.
George Fredrickson has n oted that in the m id-nineteenth century, Americans
were no longer "being characterized primarily by their adherence to a set of
political and social ideals alleged ly representing the universal aspirations of all
humanity, but democracy itself w as beginning to be defined as racial in origin
and thus realizable perhaps only by people with certain hereditary traits."
Thrusting a contending narrative into this rewriting of Am erican identity, black
integrationists reasserted the broader outline of American identity by stressing
those "political and social ideals allegedly representing the universal aspirations
of all humanity." M aking ideals the 7master-text7 was m ore inclusive. Anyone
could adopt the ideals, but African Americans could not adopt w hite skin.325
This attempt to confound the bounds and definitions of race by stressing
complexion and pointing to distinguishing variables of other w hite ethnic
groups had no discernible im pact on the School Com m ittee's thinking. Though

324 The Liberator, A ugust 10, 1849; "EQUAL SCHOOLS FOR ALL WITHOUT REGARD TO
COLOR OR RACE", Boston, May 21,1851.
325 The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance, ed. D om inick LaCapra
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2; Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind,
101 .
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this raises interesting questions regarding the ongoing form ation of racial
ideologies in the antebellum North, the focus here is on w h at this language and
debate m eant to African Americans and the ongoing formation of black identity
as free people of color found them selves pitted against one another.
Little of the available evidence hin ts that the parents opp osed to closing
the city's black schools were black nationalists. Some of the m en w ho led the
m ovem ent to keep the all-black Sm ith School open supported other measures
aimed at integration, such as opening u p Massachusetts' m ilitias to black men.
A t most, they w ere 'separatists' in a different sense than the term's m odem
connotations. They arrived at a separatist stance reluctantly, ou t of necessity, and
not because of a w ell-defined black nationalism , though the seed s of a moderate
form of nationalism m ay have been present. Thomas Paul Smith, the m ost
visible of the 'separatists', supported a resolution passed at a Boston anti
colonization m eeting declaring that black citizens had decided "under all
circumstances, to cling to the land sanctified by the blood of our fathers; and in
this land, upon this soil, beneath the flag of stars and stripes" to fight for slaves'
freedom so that "w hen they are free, w e w ill stay to enjoy w ith them the land
their labor and blood have enriched." The sym bolic language of the resolution
underscores how keenly American these m en and w om en conceived of
themselves-- they em ployed a potent nin eteen th century Am erican imagery,
rooted in an independence gained by lan d and the Revolution. On the same
page of this issue o f The Liberator, an account of an anti-colonization "Colored
People's Meeting" in N ew York City stressed both the transatlantic black heritage
and the American strain of antebellum African American identity. The N ew
Yorkers argued that "we do not trace our ancestors to Africa alone. We trace it to
Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen; to Frenchmen; to the German; to the Asiatic,
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as well as to Africa. 'The best blood of Virginia courses through our v e in s/ "326
These black N e w Yorkers sw ung a tw o-edged sw ord. Cutting through racist
attempts to deny rights by linking their claim for full citizenship to
m iscegenation, they affirmed their Am ericanness w hile pointedly rem inding
whites of their o w n racial infidelity. White infidelity fortified the African
American rhetorical arsenal by giving them a w eapon for challenging racial
conceptions and w eakening colonizationists' arguments that im plied black
Americans w ere som eh ow less American than w hite ethnic groups.
In addition to identifying themselves as Americans and seeing the racism
behind m any of the colonization schemes, m ost free blacks opposed colonization
based on three points: a firm belief in their right to the heritage of the
Revolution and the prom ises of the Constitution, a hope for a brighter future in
America, and a negative conception of Africa. W hile black Americans did not
deny or m inim ize their African heritage, and frequently glorified it, they did not
see Liberia or any other part of Africa as desirable. The Boston resolutions
described it as "the land of the crocodile, the burning sun, the fever, and of
death," and the N e w Yorkers referred to it an "inhospitable region" of "deep
superstition and idolatry." Even those African Americans supporting
colonization saw it as a land in need of redem ption, a land that could be civilized
and evangelized— in other words, made into a relocated America, but black and
free from racial oppression.327

326T/ze Liberator, April 4, 1851.
327 For instance, see D aniel Peterson, The Looking Glass: Being a True Report and Narrative of
the Life, Travels, and Labors of the Rev. Daniel H. Peterson, A Colored Clergyman; Embracing
a period of time from the year 1812 to 1854, And Including His Visit to Western Africa, (N ew
York: Wright, 1854); Paul Cuffe, A Brief Account of the Settlement and Present Situation of the
Colony of Sierra Leone, in Africa (N ew York: 1812).
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This is but one example of the com plex nature of northern black id e n tity m any free people o f color affirmed their African heritage w hile conceiving of
that continent in broad and frequently denigrating terms. Free black people were
able to incorporate a glorified African past into their self-conception w h ile
berating that continent's present condition. Paralleling that, m ost free people of
color affirmed them selves as truly and com pletely American, proclaim ing the
unique heritage o f this country w hile unhesitatingly condemning the
unrelenting opp ression of black Americans, slave and free. W ithin this context
o f fervent hope and identification with the prom ise of America, the
integrationist faction attacked Smith and his supporters for their opposition to
closing Boston's black school.
The quandary for the integrationists in their two-front battle against the
separatists and the School Committee was that their rhetoric condem ning the
latter strengthened the case of the former. The integrationists, quite sensibly,
called attention to the poor logic in the School Committee's rationale (w hich was
not hard to do), and argued that it boiled d o w n to prejudice— or 'colorphobia'.
Pointing to the true m otives behind the com m ittee's rationale sim ply reinforced
w hat the separatists had been saying all along— that because of rampant
prejudice, forcing black pupils into white schools "would interrupt or retard
their elevation."328
There are a few shreds of evidence that hint at the m otives and thinking
of Thomas Paul Sm ith. He was one of a handful w h o supported the form ation
of a black political association in 1847 "for the purpose of acting w ith or against
any of the anti-slavery bodies or societies n o w in existence." Key leaders of the
black integrationists disagreed. A group led b y John T. Hilton, Robert Morris,

328 The Liberator, February 15, 1850.

239

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

E.B. Lawton, Henry W eeden, passed a resolution stating that "it is not necessary
to form an association am ong us, for the purpose of acting politically in regard to
slavery." W eeden and W illiam Wells B row n (who, when presiding over a N e w
England black convention over a decade later, said that he was "unfavorable to
any gathering that shall seem like taking separate action from our w hite fellow dtizens") spoke in support o f this m otion. A m ong the four m en w ho spoke
against it- w h o w anted to form an exclusively black anti-slavery association w ith
political ends- were Smith and Henry Bibb. W ith a clear majority against them,
Bibb offered a com prom ise w ith an am endm ent that stated "the people are under
the highest obligation to rem ove Slavery b y moral and political action." The
next resolution reaffirmed the majority stance against "the formation of any
society... calculated to induce the people to join any existing religious sects or
political parties, w ith the hope or expectation that they will aid the cause o f the
slave's emancipation." H ilton and his supporters saw no need to rock the boat
and were satisfied w ith the current integrated anti-slavery organizations; Smith,
expressing a moderate form o f black nationalism , clearly felt otherwise.329
The severity of the rhetoric integrationists aimed at Smith w as lik ely due
in part to his heritage: he w as the nephew of Thomas Paul, the first pastor of
Boston's first black church. Som e of the black integrationists no doubt
remembered grow ing up under Paul's spiritual tutelage. The scene of m any of
the meetings regarding the school issue and other seminal events in the life of
Boston's black com m unity took place in the very church that Smith's u n cle had
helped found. W hen John T. H ilton and other black integrationists called Smith
a traitor, they m ay have spoken with a sense of personal as well as political

329 The Liberator, January 28, 1848. W illiam W ells Brow n quote taken from Proceedings o f the
Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, Philip S. Foner and George E. Walker, eds.,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980.) 207. The N ew England Colored Citizens'
Convention w as held in Boston in 1859.
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betrayal. It is difficult to know h ow much of the rhetoric w as bom out of
personal hurt, however. Sm ith's stance should not have been a complete
surprise; his uncle had expressed separatist sentiments during the 1820s.
Thomas Paul w as sympathetic to emigration to Haiti, and w hile not an
outspoken supporter of colonization, he was not entirely opposed to it. Smith's
stance in the school issue w as n ot out of the family character.330
D espite som e of the asperions cast upon him, Smith did support black
agitation to secure civil rights. Two weeks prior to the September 17 riot, one of
Smith's compatriots, John H. Roberts, argued that the separatists favored
"removing all legal disabilities from our oppressed people," including forced
segregation. But they did not favor "the abolition of exclusive institutions
among ourselves, literary, religious or scientific, until such times as w e can enjoy
more liberty and equality am ong the whites."331 This reluctant separatism, b om
out of a feeling of the necessity to protect their children from the scorn of white
teachers and students, likely typified the sentiments of m any black parents w ho
wanted the Smith School to rem ain open. Lobbying for a black headmaster and
black teachers a year earlier, three unnamed black citizens argued that "the
colored citizens of Boston, feelin g the greatest anxiety that their children should
be well educated... believe that their instructor should be one w ho is identified
with them selves, w ho is w ell educated, who w ould naturally feel for and
sympathize w ith them...they desire it may be taught by one possessing the
affection of the children, and the confidence of their parents and guardians."
The writers assum ed that a w h ite teacher would not generate the same degree of

330 See Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians, 41.
331 The Liberator, September 7, 1849.
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confidence and affection as a black teacher. Petitions supporting Smith indicate
that this kind of moderate 'nationalism' w as echoed by other black parents.332
These parents wanted to ensure that their voice would continue to
influence decisions affecting their children's education. By dispersing their
children throughout Boston's public schools, integration threatened to scatter
their voices. Ironically, William C. N ell, perhaps the most ardent of the
integrationists, inadvertently confirmed their fears. When the state legislature
eventually intervened in 1855 and m andated integration, he com plim ented the
"mothers w h o accompanied me to the various school houses" to ensure their
children's adm ittance.333 Nell likely did n ot think of the implications of black
children and parents going to "various" schools instead of one.
The separatist parents no doubt also feared the loss of an institution that
served as an arena of common interest. Integrated schools posed the danger of
splintering Boston's black community; in m any w ays the Smith School served as
a focal point for black families. In m any northern cities black students
periodically dem onstrated their musical, mathematical, or other acquired skills.
Black and abolitionist newspapers frequently carried notices of "exercises in
declamation and singing [for] a large audience of family and friends," indicating
the importance of the local black school as a source of pride.334 Black schools, like

332 Contained in the loose papers of the Boston School Committee records, folder #33 o f the box
covering 1847-48, BPL. Other letters and petitions w ith signatures contained in folders #33, 3537. There is som e question regarding the Iegitmacy o f all the signatures; Smith was accused of
forging som e of them. Smith responded in another letter, writing that he signed the nam es of
those who agreed w ith him but could not write their names. There are a few names that
appear to be in Sm ith's handwriting with an 'x' next to the signature. The V was likely m ade
by the individuals w h ose name Smith wrote.
333 "Triumph of Equal School Rights in Boston," December 17,1855. This was a celebration
with speeches by Garrison, Charles Lenox Remond, and other notables. Nell was the primary
honoree.
334 The Liberator, April 19, 1850. This particular exhibition was to raise m oney to "advance
the cause of Equal School Rights."
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black churches, perform ed important functions for black urbanites beyond
educating their children b y providing reasons to m eet, to reaffirm com m on
goals, and as a public display of African Am erican identity to black and w h ite city
dwellers. A n integrated school system m ay h a v e delivered a better education for
black children, as Boston's integrationists believed; but it also meant sacrificing
an institution that helped maintain com m unity, especially for those parents w ho
had little or no in volvem en t in the city's black churches.
The price o f integration was sim ply too great for many black Bostonians.
In their eyes, black teachers being responsible for the education of black students
outw eighed any potential benefits of achieving a dubious victory for 'rights' or
gaining access to the superior facilities of w h ite schools. Reluctance to lo se an
institution that m aintained black identity, the lo ss of control over their
children's education, and the potentially dam aging effects of whites' racism on
their children all ad d ed up to make the uncertain benefits of integration an
untenable goal.
Herein lies on e key difference in the tw o factions. The integrationists,
w hose language depicted the issue in terms o f an eternal battle for truth and
justice w ithin a distinctive American setting, called for sacrifice in order to gain
w hat was rightfully theirs. Citizenship dem and ed the aggressive pursuit of the
equality and opportunity for which their fathers had died. Deprived o f the right
to send their children to public schools attended by w hite children, the oppressed
black American had a duty to "use every effort to obtain an unqualified and an
uncom prom ising possession" of their rights. These m en and w om en v iew ed
free and unrestricted access to the public sch ools— schools supported and open to
every other Am erican— as part of an ongoing effort to make it clear that the
Constitution's "w e the people" included African Americans. Others in Boston's
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black community, identifying themselves no less as Americans, had different
priorities and a different conception of w hat citizenship meant.335
The stance of the separatists defined a space betw een themselves and
w hite society. Being a citizen meant having the right to protect that space and
pursue their ow n interests. W hile they were not inactive or apathetic regarding
their legal, political, and econom ic disadvantages, m eeting the daily dem ands of
life was often taxing enough w ithout the added burdens of waging lofty battles
about 'rights' w ith little prospect of measurable im provem ents in w hite
attitudes. For m any free people of color, working long days and keeping fam ilies
intact was being active in im proving their lot, and life left room for little m ore.
Citizenship sim ply m eant the ability to continue d oin g so without interference
from whites.
These parents recognized that changing the written law might m ean
nothing in day-to-day life. In nearby Salem there w as no law prohibiting black
students from any public school, but there were fe w if any black students. W hen
the Salem Gazette printed an editorial defending the labeling of that tow n's Latin
Grammar School as the first 'free' school, open to any student, black or w hite, the
editor argued that lack o f ability was the only reason there happened to be no
black students. A 'colored citizen' wrote to The Liberator, arguing that w h ile
there was no 'law', public opinion like that voiced by the Gazette's editor w a s in
effect a more potent law . White prejudice kept black students away.336 Separatist
parents m ay have agreed in principle w ith the larger goals of the integrationist

335 The Liberator, A ugust 10, 1849; regarding this perspective am ong nineteenth century African
Americans, see Vincent Gordon Harding, "Wrestling toward the Dawn: The Afro-American
Freedom M ovement and the Changing Constitution," Journal of American History 74
(December, 1987): 718-739.
336 The Liberator, September 23, 1842.
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faction, but in practice the reality of experience w ith w hite society had taught
them that ideals did not change w hite behavior. U nw illing to trade their
children's welfare for w h at seem ed to be intangible and uncertain future benefits
of education in supposedly superior white schools, these parents opted for a safer
immediate course of keeping their children under black supervision.
Attitudes like this explain black leaders' complaints throughout the
antebellum era about the lack of participation and enthusiasm among free blacks
in the abolition m ovem ent; the school struggle generated similar criticisms. One
of the stronger rebukes to the African American com m unity came at the en d of
the fight, when integration had been achieved, and a celebration was held
honoring William C. N ell for his central role. Charles Lenox Remond, one of
several notable speakers, excoriated the defeated opposition, saying that he
"longed to see the day w h en it w ould no longer be possible for any man or
w om an to point to pro-slavery colored churches, and to the spirit of colored
w om en who send their children to pro-slavery schools, as evidences of
inconsistency on their part."337 The 'pro-slavery' churches were African
American congregations not active in the abolition m ovem ent, and the 'pro
slavery school' w as the Sm ith School. In Remond's m ind any church that
directed insufficient energies towards abolition m ight as w ell have been an
apologist for slavery. The church-goers at w hom he hurled this charge m ay or
m ay not have been apathetic, but they probably felt trying to maintain control
over their daily lives consum ed enough strength w ithout shouldering
additional responsibilites that offered questionable returns relative to the energy
expended. Their opposition to closing black schools earned them Rem ond's
wrath. His tactic of increasing pressure on the separatists by connecting the

337

"Triumph of Equal School Rights," December, 1855.
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school debate to the national issue of slavery typified the dispute's sharp
language.
With the lines of dem arcation clearly drawn around the Smith School, the
rhetoric of the integrationists intensified. The separatists, w ho had petitions
representing about 13% of Boston's adult black population, were castigated as
traitors. Thomas Paul Sm ith w as labeled as "a young, am bitious bigot." Two
days before the School Com m ittee's ruling in late August, Smith and John H.
Roberts attended a m eeting that apparently w as open to both factions. Smith and
Roberts acknowledged that they represented a minority in the black community.
Hearing this, "John T. H ilton replied, that [Smith] w as m istaken in representing
him self in the minority, for John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, the American
Colonization Society, and the entire pro-slavery comm unity, were w ith him."
Am ong the resolutions passed at this meeting w as one rem inding the black
minority that "our zeal [shall not] be in any degree abated by the insidious efforts
of those identified w ith us in complexion... who... are reverting, by their anim us,
the hand upon the dial-plate of our liberties." At another m eeting two m onths
later, Henry Bibb compared this internal struggle to other "instances where
colored men have been betrayed in the m ost auspicious m om ent of a freedom
struggle by traitors," likening the separatists to free black m en w ho, for a price,
aided slave catchers in northern cities.338
The integrationists' rhetoric continued to place the school issue w ithin a
larger context. They com pared the leadership group to Christ's apostles, and
called the struggle a "crisis as important... as any this side of eternity, it being
none other than the cause o f truth and right against prejudice and

338 Smith was called a bigot in a letter dated August 6,1848, in the loose papers of the Boston
School Committee records, folder #34 of the box covering 1848 (BPL);77ze Liberator, September 7
and November 9,1849.
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expediency."339 Though lofty language lik e this was not unusual in antebellum
America, its ubiquity does not mitigate th e integrationists' sincerity. Fighting to
secure opportunity for their children to b e educated on the sam e terms as white
children so they w ou ld have a chance to overcom e oppression w a s indeed a
"great and im portant undertaking." Because the future appeared to rest on this
matter, black integrationists related it to other great historic struggles for spiritual
and earthly freedom s, from the Israelites' battles against pagan peoples to the
American R evolution. But this came w ith a price. Pushing the school dispute
into such portentous territory, and cloaking it w ith faith, citizenship, and the
future of free p eop le of color, forced the integrationists to intensify the virulence
of the language aim ed at free people of color opposed to integrated schools.
Doing so led the integrationists to attem pt to establish the boundary of blackness.
For the integrationists, boycotting the Smith School became, at least
briefly, a m eans by w hich blackness could be defined. Arguing to both the white
and black com m unity that there w as no difference other than com plexion posed
an unforeseen problem — what, then, did m ake a man or w om an 'black'? As in
other northern cities, skin color could vary greatly among free p eop le of color in
Boston. W hile m ost black Bostonians w ere not hard to identify as having
African blood in their veins— and thus w ere black as far as w hite society was
concerned— the im plication of the integrationists' argument w as that
com plexion w a s a subjective categorization. Color alone did not provide a
sufficient basis for classifying groups of people. And yet the integrationists
clearly perceived them selves as a distinct group within American society. For a
time, they attem pted to make one's stance on the school issue, w h ich w as tied
into a host of larger issues, a marker identifying w ho belonged.

339 The Liberator, Septem ber 7, 1849.
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The integrationists sought to make the price of opposing integrated
schools high because they recognized the difficulty of achieving integration.
W hen they spoke o f rights and doggedly grounded their claims in the
Constitution, their w h ite opponents did likew ise. Legal historian Hendrick
Hartog has described h o w the efforts of one group to claim rights m eans negating
supposedly constitutionally established rights of other groups. In this case, white
segregationists argued that they possessed the right to keep schools segregated,
and that w hite parents had a right to not have their children go to school with
black children. This ostensibly served the public good by preserving harmony
and providing education aimed at white children's alleged innate talents, and
targeting black children's alleged innate deficiencies. Success by the black
integrationists sp elled the elimination of that interpretation of rights and the
validation of their o w n interpretation of rights.340
Hartog has noted that "when presented as claims to negate rights, rights
readily becom e a focus for group organization and identity." Though Hartog
applied this prim arily to twentieth-century civil rights m ovem ents, m any of the
dynamics are sim ilar.341 Many black Bostonians did indeed focus on their
individual and corporate rights to have access to all public schools. A nd on
som e level, black integrationists m ust have know n that their struggle to open up
Boston's public schools to their children challenged the rights claim s of white
segregationists. A s black integrationists' identity consolidated through focusing
on their ow n rights claims and in response to the difficulty of realizing those
claims, it m ade the lack of support and underm ining actions of the black
separatists all the m ore galling.

340 Hendrick Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That B elong to Us AH'"
Journal of American History, 74 (December, 1987), 1023.
341 Ibid.
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W ithout question, the integrationists recognized that a fractured
comm unity w eakened their fight for expanded civil rights. To some extent, their
language of separation — that any African American w ho did not link arms w ith
them in this battle ough t to be ostracized from the black community —
represented an attempt to make the cost of disagreem ent so high that few, if any,
black m en and w om en w ou ld fail to support the integrationists' position.
Black identity, then, w as not only or even primarily a matter of degree of
complexion, but a combination of physical, cultural, and political variables.
Even culture could vary significantly, as som e black Bostonians were raised in
southern slave societies, som e in northern urban areas w ith a significant black
population, and still others in the rural north. Though m ost shared certain
cultural aspects, differences existed. Making one's political stance a defining
characteristic had the advantage of being inclusive regardless of cultural
background or skin tone. This is w hy a man like Henry Bibb, described as
"almost a clear white," w as identified and accepted as a black man.342 Bibb's past
as a slave and his present activism translated into unquestioned acceptance in
the black community. H ad Bibb chosen to pass as a white man, his acceptance in
the black community lik ely w ould have been challenged.
The integrationists did remonstrate against accepting the separatist blacks
and blamed the separatists for having a part in the failure of integration in 1849.
One w eek after the School Committee rejected the 1849 petition for integrated

342 Regarding how black culture in the North resembled and differed from slave culture, see
William D. Pierson, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in
eighteenth Century New England, (Amherst: University of M assachusetts Press, 1988); and
Shane White, Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810.
On description of Bibb, see correspondence from the Connecticut State Convention of Colored
Men in 1849, reprinted in Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, ed. Philip S.
Foner and George E. Walker (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), vol 2, 25. Bibb
said his father w as a white slaveow ner and described his mother as having "slaveholding
blood flowing in her veins." See Henry Bibb, Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry
Bibb, An American Slave (N ew York, 1850; reprint, M nemosyne Publishing Co., 1969.)
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schools, a m eeting of colored citizens denounced the Com m ittee's decision and
targeted the dissenters in their m idst. Since "Law, justice and God are on our
side," the black integrationists declared that the dissenters' "deeds and their
inevitable results imperatively call for our strongest censure," and cast their
"evil machinations" in biblical term s o f betrayal.343 The integrationists believed
that m uch o f w hite Boston had b eg u n to support opening up the white schools,
and thus the black separatists had throw n their w eight behind the black schools
at the w orst possible moment. T hey w ere, therefore, "false brethren." A ny
"colored persons w h o are not for u s in this trying hour, m ust be counted in the
ranks of those w h o w ould deprive us of our heaven-decreed rights."344 The
knife in the back w as only thrust deeper when Thomas Paul Jr., son of the long
time pastor o f the city's first black church (in which m ost of the meetings
mentioned here w ere held), agreed to become the new headm aster of the Smith
School. Paul, a Dartmouth graduate, raised the stature of the school. His
placement w as a boon for the separatists, since they had requested him as the
school master over a year earlier. Paul no doubt strengthened their position
within the black community.
Part of the separatists' appeal to som e within the black comm unity lay in
their m oderate strains of nationalist sentiment. Thomas Paul Smith had m oved
to establish a black political party early in 1848, but was voted dow n by a cadre of
black m en w h o had a long track record of favoring integrated parties.345 In 1848,
the address at the National C onvention of Colored Freemen in Cleveland

343 The Liberator, September 7, 1849.
344 Ibid., September 21 and October 5,1849.
345 Ibid., January 28,1848. William W ells Brown, one of Smith's opponents on this issue,
would state over a decade later that he w as "unfavorable to any gathering that shall seem
like taking separate action from our w h ite fellow-citizens." Quote taken from Proceedings of
the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, vo l. 2, 207.
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dedared that only ten years previous, "many of us uttered com plaints against the
faithful abolitionists, for the broad assertion of our rights; thought they w ent too
far, and w ere only m aking our condition worse." Though the address insisted
that this thinking had nearly disappeared by 1848, it apparently still characterized
a portion of the black community. The separatists in Boston w ere saying
essentially the sam e thing about the w h ite and black integrationists: because of
pervasive prejudice, the 'broad assertion' o f the rights of free people of color was
not always w elcom e. The speaker at the convention w ent on to encourage
assotiation w ith w hites; some black d tizen s remained less than enthused.
Through their determ ined opposition, the separatists tried to control the extent
of assodation for them selves and their children. Black Bostonians, even in the
d ty wards w ith the heaviest black concentration, lived w ith and am ong white
folks— all the m ore reason w hy som e black urbanites w anted to maintain control
of the few arenas in which they had m inim al assodation w ith w hite
B ostonians.346 The separatists loathed sacrificing the Smith School, a concrete
manifestation o f black identity.
The separatists conceived of black identity broadly by appealing to the
common experience of prejudice. Thom as Paul Smith, responding to the barrage
of rhetoric that challenged the place of the separatists in the black community,

346 Report o f the Proceedings o f the Colored National Convention (Rochester, 1848), 18.
Reprinted in M inutes of the Proceedings of the National Negro Conventions, 1830-1864 , edited
by Howard H olm an Bell (N ew York: A m o Press, 1969). On population distribution for Boston
see Leonard Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1981). Henry Taylor's artide on Cintinnati is instructive on how antebellum black urban
populations, even w hen concentrated in particular sections of a dty, w ere still typically
interspersed am ong white tenants and hom es. See H enry L. Taylor, "On Slavery's Fringe: CityBuilding and Black Com m unity Developm ent in Cindnnati, 1800-1850," in Ohio History 95
(1986), 5-33. Also, Kenneth Kusmer has noted that even by 1910 there were only 5 northern
industrial d ties w ith a high enough index o f dissim ilarity to indicate the beginnings of
distinct 'black belt' of segregation in the North. See Kusmer, "The Black Urban Experience in
American H istory," in The State of Afro-American History: Past, Present, and Future, ed.
Darlene Clark H ine (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 91-122.
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dedared that "we are colored men, exposed alike to oppression and prejudice;
our interests are all identical—we rise or fall together." He w as echoing the call to
common cause and identity expressed at Cleveland's Colored Freeman
convention. The sam e address that called for cooperation w ith w hite
institutions and assodations— which Smith had probably read w h en it w as
published in The Liberator — also rem inded free people of color that "we are one
people—one in general complexion, one in a com m on degradation, one in
popular estimation. A s one rises, all m ust rise, and as one falls all m ust fall."
Smith adopted this language, used it to em phasize a common identity, and
argued for black control of the black future.347
Ultimately, m ost of the separatists w ere motivated less by a nationalist
philosophy than by the exigendes of the m om ent. Intentionally or not, their
separatism held the potential of stim ulating a black nationalism that m ight have
offered a more radical alternative to w hite hegem ony than the integrationists —
if, that is, an antebellum black nationalism had been a viable political entity. The
separatists tried to use a rights discourse to protect a space for them selves, a space
over which they could maintain control. H ad they succeeded, there w ou ld have
likely been a greater potential for fostering a black identity infused w ith a welldefined black nationalism . But success m ay have also meant dim inished
opportunity to engage white Americans on matters of legal prindple. A dassical
black nationalism, which would have been difficult to realize both because of the
threat it w ou ld have posed to white hegem ony and the limited m eans of
ordinary black people, m ay have also pred u d ed maintaining a dialogue about
rights.348

347 The Liberator, February 15, 1850; Report of the Proceedings of the Colored National
Convention , 18.
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The integrationists, through their more active engagm ent w ith w hite legal
institutions, attem pted to exploit the am biguities in white racial thinking while
wielding claims o f constitutional rights. W hen challenging legally defined racial
barriers, the integrationists used twin strategies of employing a rights discourse
laced w ith historical claims of an American identity, and a racial discourse that
questioned ill-defined racial boundaries. The argument for integration, perhaps
not as radical as a black nationalism on the surface, not only represented a
challenge to w hite hegem ony by threatening to reduce legal barriers to education
and opportunity, b u t also attempted to m ake political activism a condition of
African American identity. This held potential to challenge w h ite hegem ony by
ensuring that black protest and activism became an indelible part o f w h at it
meant to free, black, and American.
But the black integrationists' challenge to white hegem ony, contrary to a
classical black nationalism , used the "institutional logic" that Kimberle
Crenshaw describes. Black integrationists called Americans to live up to the
promises of their revolutionary heritage and the principles of the Constitution.
They spoke the lin gu a franca. By focusing on the right to participate in society on
all levels, they legitm ated the principles of a professed egalitarian society. They
also legitimated the legal system by ultim ately succeeding in getting legislation
passed that forced the School Committee to open up the public schools. Success
in turn reaffirmed that fighting for legal rights w as part of w hat it m eant to be
African A m erican.349

348 For a useful definition of classical black nationalism, see W ilson Jeremiah M oses, Classical
Black Nationalism: From the American Revolutioti to Marcus Garvey (N ew York: N e w York
University Press, 1996) 2.
349 Kimberle W illiams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrim ination Law," Havard Lam Review 101 (May, 1988) 1331-1387.
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In the end, it is doubtful that either faction succeeded in defining black
identity solely on its o w n terms.

The tw o groups had much in common: both

groups drew on the sam e repository of American im agery and heritage as a part
of their identity, and both em ployed a discourse of rights. They used their claims
to the rights of citizenship for different ends, but the language stem m ed from a
common ideology sh aped by the Constitution. In addition, black Bostonians
shared a common lifestyle, culture, and m ost w ere in the same econom ic class.
And Smith knew he w a s appealing to the m ost com m on denominator w h en he
spoke to mutual experiences of facing oppression and prejudice. Countering that
appeal, the integrationists used a tactic that African Americans often still em ploy
in publicly defining h o w 'black' one is: supporters of political stances that
seem ed opposed to black America's local and national interests were
characterized as being outside the black community. This tactic w as possible
because these were free p eop le of color w ith a voice through petitions,
newspapers, and pam phlets. Furthermore, in the courts and legislature, and
with suffrage, there w ere institutional channels o f protest available. The same,
however, was open to the separatists, and their response exacerbated tensions
within the black com m unity and within black identity.
Black identity continued to be shaped by a variety of forces. As free people
of color fought on an in d ivid u al and institutional level for equality, ongoin g
m ediation within the black comm unity was central to identity form ation. W hen
the K now-Nothing legislature passed a bill opening the public schools to black
children, and the School Committee closed Sm ith School in the fall of 1855,
these tensions were not necessarily resolved—just submerged, w aiting for the
chance to emerge once again in different forms over different issues.
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C o n clu sio n

In the spring o f 1851, in the w ak e of the Fugitive Slave Law, the Boston
Vigilance C om m ittee nailed up posters around the d ty w arning African
Americans to "Keep a Sharp Look O ut for KIDNAPPERS, and have TOP EYE
open." More om inously, the posters cautioned them to "avoid conversing
with the W atchm en and Police O fficers of Boston," since the m ayor and
alderman had em powered law enforcem ent offidals to detain any black man
or wom an they suspected of being a fugitive slave. N ot only w ere black
Bostonians to m erely avoid talking w ith the police; they w ere instructed to
"Shim them in every possible manner, as so many H OUNDS on the track of
your m ost unfortunate race."350
Over a hundred years earlier, a black man named John W oodby had
been im prisoned by one of the tow n w atchm en and only freed after paying
thirteen shillings. W oodby — w h o w o u ld later himself serve as a temporary
watchman during smallpox outbreaks — w ent to the next m eeting of the
selectmen and lodged a complaint, sayin g he had been held "without legal
process, w hich he humbly A pprehends is against Law and Justice."351
W oodby m u st n ot have been overly concerned with seeing the watchman
punished; he did n ot appear at the n ext selectmen's m eeting w h en they
hauled the w atchm an before them and, since Woodby did n o t appear,
dism issed him "with a Caution to act prudently in all such matters for the
350 A copy of the poster is reprinted in The Black Abolitionist Papers, ed. C. Peter Ripley
(Chapel Hill: U niversity o f North Carolina Press, 1991), vol. 3, 52.
351 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), June 18, 1740.
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future." For Woodby, it apparently was enough to make it d ear he knew the
law and that he w ou ld not stand for unlawful treatment.
African Americans had probably never entrusted the law or legal
authorities w ith total confidence. To varying degrees, they had probably
always kept a "top eye open." But there had been substantial reliance on t^ie
law as a tool to mediate differences w ith other blacks as w ell as w ith whites,
and to provide a foundation for African Americans to define them selves as
dtizens. During the 1850s, how ever, African Americans could no longer go
to the law w ith any assurance. Gone were the days when black Bostonians
could approach the neighborhood constable as they had approached George
Reed in the 1810s. Gone were the days of the police working w ith black men
like Richard Crafus in what w as probably a guarded but m utually beneficial
relationship.
This dissertation has described black engagement w ith the law in
Boston that fostered a legal consciousness over a stretch of two hundred years.
That particular legal consciousness m ay have begun to change toward the end
of the antebellum era. Even then, how ever, the legal arena w as a scene of
victories and defeats. Locally, ordinary African Americans no doubt
continued to use legal beliefs, both inside and outside the formal legal system,
in a variety of ways, w ith varying effectiveness. Nationally, African
Americans experienced setbacks w ith the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in
1850 and the Dred Scott decision in 1857. Black Bostonians experienced the
ability of the law to protect w hen three courts exonerated three leaders of the
black community for assisting in the successful rescue of Shadrach Minkins,
an fugitive slave w h o had been captured for an imminent return to slavery
in 1851. The black leaders, James Scott, Lewis Hayden, and Robert Morris, had
almost surely participated in the rescue, but their defense attorneys managed
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to convince enough m em bers of the white juries to prevent convictions of
Scott and Hayden, and a unanim ous vote for Morris' acquittal. For these
m en, the law worked to overcom e an unjust law. But just a few m onths
later, black Bostonians w o u ld witness the trium ph of injustice w hen Thomas
Sims,0only seventeen years old, was apprehended and all efforts to free him
failed. City policem en had told Sims he w as accused of theft, a charge that
Sims, knowing he w as innocent, had been confident of beating in court. O nly
after he was in custody w as he told that he had been captured as a fugitive
slave. This incident lik ely prom pted the V igilance Committee posters that
appeared a few weeks later. Three years later, black Bostonians w ou ld watch
another fugitive slave, A nthony Bums, m arched through the streets of
Boston by federal troops and returned to slavery. A s African Americans had
always known, the law could be a powerful tool for both freedom and
oppression. On the eve o f the Civil War, the oppressive power of the law
seem ed to be on the verge of becoming overw helm ing.352
It is through the lens of the oppressive pow er of the law that African
Americans' interaction w ith the law is frequently seen. The legal
consciousness of m ost African Americans in the late nineteenth century and
into the twentieth century is probably best typified by a joke that circulated in
the Depression-era South. Two black m en w alking dow n a country road are
hit by a white man sp eedin g along in a big w hite convertible. The first m an is
propelled 150 feet dow n the road. The second is launched straight up in the
air and lands in the convertible. When the police arrive on the scene, the
first black man is charged w ith leaving the scene o f an accident, and the
352 On Shadrach Minkins, see Gary Collison, Shadrach Minkins: From Fugitive Slave to
Citizen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); on Thomas Sims, see James Oliver
H orton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the
Antebellum North (Holmes and Meier, 1979), 105-107.
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second black m an is charged w ith illegal entry.353 Expecting justice in a racist
white w orld w as futile. The legal consciousness of many African Americans,
especially in the south during the m iddle of the twentieth century, reinforced
avoidance o f the law. But it w as not alw ays so. The story in these pages is of
the m ore com plicated story of the relationship betw een African Americans
and the la w in M assachusetts over the tw o hundred years before the Civil
War.
Part of that story is how that relationship shaped black identity. In
contrast to the joke's tw o black victim s, African Americans in colonial
America and during the early republic era w ere not sim ply acted upon by the
law. They responded actively to their changing circumstances by using the
law. H istorians Susan Juster and Lisa MacFarlane note that "our identities
also derive from our active responses to our changing needs and desires,
responses w h ich in turn serve to reconstruct the categories into which w e are
placed."354 W hen A dam Saffin achieved freedom through the courts in 1703,
he m anaged to reconstruct him self as a free man. W hen black integrationists
sought to close the Smith School, they attem pted to define w hat it meant to
be black and American as citizens w ho actively pursued full citizenship
rights. African American identity, never static, w as in m any w ays a contested
identity as black w om en and m en wrestled w ith w hites and one another in
many arenas. The law w as one of few arenas in which African Americans
could hold som e expectation that the playing field m ight be level.

353 Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought
from Slavery to Freedom (N ew York: Oxford U niversity Press, 1977), 318-319.
354 A M ighty Baptism: Race, Gender, and the Creation o f American Protestantism, ed. Susan
Juster and Lisa MacFarlane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 3.
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The real but elusive opportunities for change after the en d o f the Civil
War likely further encouraged the kind o f legal consciousness described here.
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth Am endm ents "were fundam ental
expressions of the black community's struggle, vision, and hope." In the early
years o f Reconstruction, black m en m ade inroads into political institutions,
giving African Americans hope that legal equality might eventually translate
into political and economic equality. Eric Foner describes the developm ent of
a rights consciousness among southern blacks that was connected to the
Declaration of Independence, and African Americans' interpretation of the
postwar amendments as defining a "new national citizenship."355
But for many African Americans hop e waned in the latter years of
Reconstruction before being crushed in the era white restoration.356 Though
there m ay have been a retreat from the la w and the developm ent of a different
kind of legal consciousness among ordinary black folk — one that taught them to
avoid the formal legal system law w hen possible, and to be exceedingly wary
w hen engaged w ith it -- African Americans probably continued to use legal
beliefs privately in a variety of w ays. Black leaders certainly continued to em ploy
legal beliefs about the Constitution and the 'rights that belong to us all.' The
ongoing em ploym ent of legal beliefs w o u ld also continue to generate tensions
w ithin the black community; in the tw entieth century friction at tim es stem m ed

355 Vincent Harding, "Wrestling toward the Dawn: The Afro-American Freedom M ovem ent and
the Changing Constitution/' Journal of American History 74 (December,1987), 724; Eric Foner,
"Rights and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War and Reconstruction," Journal of
American History 74 (December,1987), 880.
356 See Joel W illiam son, A Rage for Order: Black/White Relations in the South Since
Emancipation (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Eric Foner, A Short History of
Reconstruction, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row, 1990); Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of
the New South: Life After Reconstruction (N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1992); C. Vann
W oodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crcrw, 3d rev. ed. (N ew York: Oxford U niversity Press,
1974).
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from the recalcitrance of ordinary black folk, many of them older, to buck an
entrenched system of segregation. Those tensions were nothing new . African
Americans in the twentieth century, as they had in earlier tim es, continued to
work out w hat it meant to black and American.
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